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ABSTRACT 
The present paper analyses the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological 
backgrounds of art reception and art creation in modern visual art and creative 
processes. It critically presents two models of aesthetic experience to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical basis for the discussion. The research purpose is to show 
that with increasing experience and expertise the referential frame of the aesthetic 
judgment is changing and that neural processes involved in object recognition 
provide a starting point for visual aesthetics. Thus, the investigation focuses on 
constructing and testing neuropsychological theories that fall in the domain called 
'neuroaesthetics'.  These theories, in turn, serve as a starting point to formulate 
neural laws of art and aesthetics and aesthetic experience. Some artistic styles, such 
as expressionism, reflect specific neural processes. Various studies indicate 
correlations between hemispheric specialisation and art or creativity and show the 
right hemisphere plays a particular role in it. However, studies exploring the neural 
correlates of aesthetic preference have yielded mixed results. Furthermore, 
neuroimaging studies have proved that different categories of modern artworks are 
processed in different areas of the brain. These diverging results will be discussed in 
a critical assessment of the two models of aesthetic experience.  Besides, the 
question of identifying exclusive neural correlates of aesthetic preference will be 
raised.  
Comparing amateurs and experts has revealed the more reduced the cortical 
activation, the more efficiently it works.  
Biological and neuropsychological factors of creativity point out the meaning of the 
activation level, cognitive inhibition and prefrontal cortex. Divergent thinking differs 
from convergent thinking in terms of the neural level. 
Neurodegenerative processes and brain injuries sometimes influence the artistic 
output surprisingly or even launch it. Lesion studies contributing to understanding art 
experience will be explained. 
Key terms: neuroaesthetics, art perception, aesthetic experience, art expertise, 
visual aesthetics, creativity, neurodegenerative processes, frontotemporal dementia, 
Lewy-body dementia, Alzheimer disease 
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Chapter 1 
 
General Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Neuroaesthetics is a constantly growing branch of research within the field of 
neuroscience. It is still in the process of determining its own subject of research, 
without any consensus on fundamental issues yet emerging (Cinzia & Gallese, 2009; 
Brown & Dissanayak, 2009). For this reason, among others, a broad definition of 
neuroaesthetics is to be preferred, confined not only to the visual processing of 
artworks, and justified by interdisciplinary integration of neuroaesthetics. Nadal and 
Pearce therefore define neuroaesthetics as a discipline of research that examines the 
neural and evolutionary basis for cognitive and affective processes that occur when 
an individual takes an aesthetic or artistic attitude towards art, everyday objects or 
natural phenomena (Nadal & Pearce, 2011). This definition has the advantage of not 
only including studies studies of bottom-up processes in neuroaesthetic research – 
such as for example processes of neural binding that underlie laws of gestalt 
psychology – but also top-down processes of cultural and cognitive style (Cupchik, 
Vartanian, Crawley & Mikulis, 2009). 
 
Regarding the aforementioned problems, only few attempts have been made to 
approach art experience at a neuronal level. A reason for this, relating to 
methodological aspects, may be that the inherent complexity of art experience 
complicates the recording of linear correlations in such a way that intervening 
variables and stimuli themselves can hardly be controlled. The art recipient is not a 
tabula rasa. There are countless aspects, such as personality, momentary mood, 
individual space of experience and memories that influence the relation between 
manipulation of an independent variable and a dependent variable. 
 
In addition, interindividual differences in brain activity can occur; the topographic or 
tomographic activity patterns can vary considerably for the same task. To obtain 
meaningful results yet, a certain number of subjects are essential, for generalization 
from only a few results is impossible. At the same time, the methods used are time-
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consuming and/or expensive. The processes underlying visual preferences can also 
be very subtle. Aversive and positive stimuli or different factors could activate the 
same areas of the brain, or associated changes might be too low to be determined 
with the current methods. Moreover, as already mentioned, the complexity of the 
stimulus material raises further problems. 
 
Therefore statements cannot be made solely on a behavioral level, and the results of 
empirical and experimental observations often differ strongly. This hardly sustainable 
basis makes it complicated to design neuropsychological experiments and interpret 
their results. 
 
Finally a critical analysis of all these jigsaw pieces is needed, like the present models 
concerning aesthetic experience and neuropsychological theoretical approaches, the 
applied research methods like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
electroencephalogram (EEG), positron emission tomography (PET) and so forth, the 
role of emotions and creativity, knowledge from lesion studies about artists with 
neurodegenerative diseases and last but not least the neuropsychological analysis of 
the artist´s work. All that is necessary if we want to understand for example, why 
visual arts provide an extension of the cerebral visual system, a system that has 
been developed millions of years earlier than the language system in the evolution of 
human kind and therefore has a much greater expressiveness (Oeser, 2006).  
 
 
1.2 Main research objective 
 
 
The present theoretical work focuses on neuroanatomical and neuropsychological 
aspects of art reception and art creation, particularly in the field of the visual arts and 
in cognitive neuroscience research on creative processes. The terms 
‘neuroanatomical’ and ‘neuropsychological’ refer to neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging studies that are intended to reveal the widespread network of brain 
areas upon which it relies (Nadal, 2013). Relationships between specific aesthetic 
experience or behaviour connected to these aspects and the underlying biological 
processes will be pointed out, thus providing a theoretical contribution to the research 
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on biological foundations of cognitive processes. In doing so, the focus is intended to 
be on current research about how and with what kind of methods natural science 
attempts to address art and creative processes. For this reason, individual studies 
will be critically described in greater detail in order to evoke a comprehensive idea in 
the reader about the human encountering with art and the resulting neural processes. 
 
1.3 Research approach  
 
The present theoretical dissertation performed a critical review of the research aims 
presented in Section 1.2 and 1.4.  
To meet this requirement, the theoretical dissertation provides a critical and theory-
driven (theoretical-explorative) analysis of the research results generated by research 
methods of electrical recording technique like electroencephalogram (EEG) and 
scanning techniques like positron emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in combination with classical behavioural 
approaches, including systematic variation of style and content and systematic 
limitation of presentation times.  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
As was previously noted, that the focus is intended to be on current research about 
how and with what kind of methods natural science attempts to approach art and 
creative processes. For this reason, individual studies will be critically described in 
greater detail in order to evoke a comprehensive idea in the reader about techniques 
and methodologies that are currently available to explore this research domain. What 
is the contribution of creativity, in particular in the context of neuroanatomical and 
neuropsychological research results, to the understanding of art experience? 
These considerations above lead to the fundamental and the problematic issue 
whether it can be managed within the limits of this dissertation to approach the art 
experience at a neuronal level, using the designated experimental methods in brain 
research in addition to classic behavioral paradigms? 
Furthermore, it shall be attempted to evaluate critically Leder Belke, Oeberst & 
Augustin’s (2004) model of aesthetic experience and Chatterjee´s (2003) model of 
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visual aesthetics in the overall context of art experience, taking into account the 
special role of expertise and visual processing stages. 
Is there research evidence supporting the information-processing model of aesthetic 
experience of Leder et al. (2004) (see Section 2.3) on the one hand and the model of 
visual aesthetics of Chatterjee (2003) (see Section 2.2) on the other hand by studies 
including research methods of electrical recording technique like EEG and scanning 
techniques like PET and fMRI? 
Considering studies in the context of identification of neural areas of aesthetic 
preference, do the results of these studies imply the identification of exclusive neural 
correlates of aesthetic preference?  
Recent reports of changes in art performance among patients and in particular artists 
with some kind of neurodegenerative diseases have provided an unexpected window 
to the neurology of art. That, in turn, implies the question what is the contribution of 
the so-called lesion studies to the understanding of art experience?  
 
1.5 Art and artist within the scientific context 
 
The research objectives of this dissertation deliberately deviates from already 
existing works of the same issue (e.g. Livingstone, 2002; Maffei & Fiorentini, 1995; 
Solso, 1994, 2003; Zeki, 1999), which, among other reasons, remain embodied in the 
area of visual perception probably in order to remain ‘readable’, thus hardly 
describing methods but merely ‘results’.  
Factors, such as emotions, environment or gender differences have been excluded 
or ignored. 
 
Zeki (2002) mentioned, “that all human activity is dictated by the organisation and 
laws of the brain; that, therefore, there can be no real theory of art and aesthetics 
unless neurobiologically based” (p. 54). It is certainly hard not to agree with Zeki’s 
words. Perhaps that is also the reason why the interaction between science and art 
has appeared and still appears to be rather problematic. A possible explanation for 
that can be found in the person of the artist himself, in particular in how he or she is 
influenced by the environment. Kris and Kurz (1934/1979) actually deal with this 
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sociological question of “the environment’s attitude towards the artist”, which is 
placed at the boundary of the psychological question of “where it touches the 
environment’s analysis of the mystery of the artistic personality” (p. 22, author’s 
translation). This mysterious artistic personality would thus be an issue of 
psychology, although in this case psychology and sociology would touch on each 
other in any case of interaction between the artist’s personality and the environment. 
The authors tried hard to point out, “that in every biography there can be found 
certain  basic assumptions of the visual artist’s attitudes, which […] can be traced 
back to the beginnings of historiography" and “which have never quite lost […] their 
meaning up to the recent past “ (p. 23, author’s translation). Still the origins of these 
attitudes would be difficult to grasp rationally. So Kris and Kurz (1934/1979) saw 
parallels in the Hellenistic Age, when the independent artistic biography developed, 
up to the recent past, given that in any stage of historical development new social 
archetypes would add to the older ones. One of these basic notions would be for 
example that an artist’s talent became already manifest during childhood, and that 
fate played a significant role in this. 
The source of historiography would be anecdotal based on which some conclusions 
are drawn about the artist. Stereotypical concepts and ideas concerning the artist, 
which appear to persist until today, could result in a more difficult ‘profane’ analysis of 
the artist’s work and his or her works of art by blending of artist and works of art, and 
transferring the qualities of the one to the other.   
 
1.6 Variable identification 
 
Art production and art reception are based on the relations between three aspects, 
the art object and the artist who created this object and at last the recipient (Schurian, 
1998). These individual aspects and their mutual effects and relations are determined 
by various variables.  
 
One difficulty lies in the exact definition of the independent and dependent variables 
variables according to the research question. A standard methodological requirement 
is to avoid any confusion between the variables, the research question must be 
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clearly defined, the hypotheses must be derived precisely and the methodology must 
be presented and justified.  
 
As described below, the mere quantification of the object that is the work of art’s 
physical qualities constitutes a problem, because it would lead to an immense 
amount of data material. Here scientific considerations can help to clarify the focus. 
In one case the art recipient can be the aim of scientific research, for example 
regarding general functions of perception. In another case the artist can be the focus 
of research, the qualities of his personality and other characteristics. Differences 
between experts and amateurs, psychological oddities among artists or changes in 
their work due to neurodegenerative or other diseases would be considered. In this 
case the work of art itself would come more into focus but only in order to convey 
information about its creator. Here possibly lies one reason for the problematic 
relation between – especially visual – art and empirical science. The art object is 
operationalised as stimulus material and as such ceases to play a significant role 
itself, which is only natural, as the focus is on analysing behaviour, not objects. 
However, many investigations do not put enough care to the choice of their works of 
art and therefore their stimulus material. What is more, the term ‘artist’ is easily 
applied to any person producing visual arts and thus would even apply to patients 
suffering from a frontotemporal dementia. As mentioned below there are some 
indications, that frontotemporal dementia influences artistic production and creativity 
(Miller, Ponton, Benson, Cummings & Mena 1996; Miller & Miller, 2013). 
Furthermore, there are some hints in the context of people suffering from 
frontotemporal dementia, that there is “an improvement of functions within the spared 
regions of brain tissue” (Mendez et al., 1996).  Metaphorically speaking, the 
problematic relation between visual art and empirical science as mentioned above 
culminates in such approaches like the following: The terms ‘artist’ or ‘art’ will be 
used undefined and hasty and sometimes it seems sufficient to become artistically 
active to be called artist, how it can happen with patients suffering from a 
frontotemporal dementia. In several such cases in an early stage of the disease a 
sudden occurrence of artistic skills could be observed. However, such procedures 
may be perceived as trivialising and too simplistic, and this does not just apply to the 
scientific approach to the subject. Accordingly, Schurian (1998) postulates: 
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“In the actual theory of art, art itself, it seems, meanwhile has taken a very special 
place, where it seems to serve firstly as a vibrational surface or a sound box for 
mental, scientific, social, cognitive, political, economical and other ‘relevant’ ideas. 
With all that theory and all that assigning of contingencies the reality of an object, like 
a painting, seems to have 'vanished' from sight. Here, too, reality is governed by 
virtuality, object by reflexion and experience by conception. It seems as if what 
mainly counts are discourses about art, which are treated as scientific and therefore 
are more popular then art itself. Furthermore, it is obvious that new constructions and 
models are created to project and apply each analysis and scientific treatise to the 
objects of art. Not surprisingly, a strong emphasis on theory is now noticeable. For 
centuries practical art teaching had been routine as for example Leonardo da Vinci’s 
and Albrecht Dürer’s painting instructions. Art science had not allowed studying art in 
a distant theoretical way for a long time” (p.5, author’s translation). 
 
Arnheim (1971) formulates this problem as follows: “Art may seem to be in danger of 
being drowned by talk” (p. 5).  At the same time uneasiness seems to spread among 
creators of art. The artist Maria Lassnig (2000) wrote on this in her diaries “Art is 
cornered like an intimidated chicken, while science gives her doctrines like infusions, 
in order to allow her only to express what is ‘objectively’ true” (p. 172, , author’s 
translation). In the musical field cooperation seems less problematic, as is shown in 
several already existing treatises (e.g. Altenmüller, Schürmann, Lim & Parlitz, 2002; 
Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2000; Schmidt & Trainor, 2001). Perhaps here the roles are 
cast more unambiguously. For composing or interpreting a piece of music requires 
certain skills. On the contrary, it is not as difficult for amateurs to create visual arts, 
complicating the question of what it takes to be an artist or what may be called art.  
On April 3rd, 1995 Lassnig made a note in her diary: “What is understood by art is in 
my case mainly concerned by the action, the intention and the necessary failure, 
which combined form something mysterious, not understandable” (2000, p. 173, 
author’s translation). Art in this case is described as something mysterious, not 
understandable, which might imply that it can’t be expected to reveal all the relevant 
information to objective scientific analysis, especially when a seriously pursued 
science is expected to fulfill certain criteria, such as the repeatability of 
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measurements or the claim of objectivity. Zeki understands by art "the translation of 
concepts in the artist’s mind onto canvas or into music or literature" (2002, p. 67). Art 
would then eventually be a mere by-product of the brain’s capacity to abstract 
acquired knowledge and to create concepts, resulting in ideals. An artist can 
epitomize these ideals and present them visually and accessible to others.  
 
The fact most of the test series (presented in Section 3.4) did not employ original 
artworks as stimuli may be of less significance than perhaps widely assumed. The 
first interest is in providing information standardized for all test persons as far as 
possible and presented in an exact space of time. A digitalized presentation answers 
these claims best. Furthermore, studies (Locher & Dolese, 2004; Locher, Smith & 
Smith, 1999; Locher, Smith & Smith, 2001) show that the assessment of art objects 
on different scales (e. g. physical and structural qualities of the composition or 
innovation) presented in different formats (original, postcard size, diapositiv or 
computer screen) did not result in significant differences on most measurement 
scales. So individuals, no matter how experienced in art, seem to be fairly able to 
adjust to the media-based restrictions. Moreover, if the contrary is not the primary 
issue of the experimental design, the mode of presentation (e. g. pictures of art 
objects on screen) is the same for all test persons. What is interesting is a 
comparison of conditions and results, namely the influence of the manipulated 
independent variables on the dependent variable(s), not an absolute aesthetic 
judgement itself.  
 
1.6.1 Stimulus material and variables 
 
However, the precise specification of the applied stimulus material is of essential 
importance, a necessity hardly ever given enough attention. It would be desirable to 
define and quantify the stimuli and their qualities (e. g. their physical and structural 
nature) as exact as possible, so that on the basis of these objectified qualities 
conclusions can be drawn about the connected aesthetic reactions. Obviously this 
claim, especially of quantifiability, is hardly possible to realize when art production is 
concerned. Art, due to for example its complexity and its openness towards new 
influences, presents itself in the most various forms. The resulting variety of 
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differentiated styles and within them different works can cause a broad variety of 
reactions in recipients of art, so that generalizations are hardly possible. It is 
therefore not surprising at all that many studies employed and still employ the most 
simple and controllable stimuli (e. g. Fechner, 1876/1897; Frith & Nias, 1974).  
 
1.6.2 Quality of items 
 
At the same time the results of different studies are problematic to compare if they 
have not used analogous stimulus material, or if the stimulus material was not 
declared unambiguously. A possible answer to this problem could perhaps be a 
standardized pool of items accessible to everyone. An efficient statistical instrument 
would be available with regard to selectivity (e.g. between different categories of art 
styles) by the establishment of a standardized item pool. Thus, a first step towards a 
better comparability of studies would be guaranteed. 
 
Fechner (1876/1897), founder of psychophysics and experimental aesthetics, in his 
aesthetic writings, namely in ‘Vorschule der Ästhetik’1 (1876/ 1897), emphasized the 
dire necessity of such proceedings, to use simple and controllable stimulus material, 
by proclaiming a new methodical approach of the inductive ‘Ästhetik von unten’2. 
Fechner did in fact regret that in this way it was impossible to achieve everything 
expected from an aesthetic theory; but claimed “that many things can be achieved in 
this way, which by an aesthetic theory of a higher style in its contrary direction would 
be left aside“(Fechner, 1897, Part I, p. IV, author’s translation). At the same time 
Fechner kept in mind the problem of generalization:  
 
“The way from below provides or promises at least directly a clear orientation not only 
in the field of concepts, to which submits the field of approval and disapproval, but 
also about individual and interpersonal reasons of approval and disapproval. But it 
hardly ever leads to common aspects and ideas, leaving one easily caught up in 
details, partialities, aspects of subordinate value and of subordinate 
significance“(1897, Part I, p. 3, author’s translation). 
                                                          
1 Meaning ‘Pre-School of Aesthetics’. 
2 Meaning ‘Aesthetics From Below’. 
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In addition to the complexity of artistic stimulus material, the art recipient of course is 
not a tabula rasa but his emotions and reactions are strongly determined by various 
variables of influence, for example socio-cultural background, former experience in 
the field of art and others, and momentary condition. Höge (1984), for example 
showed, that the mood of test persons did have a significant as well as lasting 
influence on aesthetic judgements, that means when associations to a picture vary 
depending on mood in a qualitative sense. In the same way the emotional quality of 
stimulus material exerts influence on judgement. And the range of expertise effects 
cognitive processing and judgement of preference. So amateurs most of the times 
prefer representational works of art (e. g. O’Hare, 1976; Cupchik, Shereck & Spiegel, 
1994). 
 
1.7 Scientific classification and history of aesthetics  
 
The research domains of psychology are human experience and behaviour as well 
as “their inner (located inside the individual) and outer (located in the environment) 
conditions and causes” (Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1999, p. 2, author’s translation). Thus 
aesthetic experience, creativity and art production essentially constitute a research 
domain of psychological analysis, especially based on the original meaning of the 
Greek word ‘aisthesis’, which is commonly understood as sense perception. The 
resulting science of psychological aesthetics had its height at the beginning of the 
last century. It is characterized by an “effort to understand aesthetic phenomena as a 
special form of human acts of perception, and to analyse and explain them from an 
empirical-psychological perspective“(Allesch, 1987b, p. 207, author’s translation). 
Aesthetic phenomena are given an aesthetic meaning clearly distinguished from 
other, for example functional meanings. This however is not supposed to mean 
psychological interpretation of phenomena was an invention of the last century, for its 
origins go back far into the ancient world (see Allesch, 1987a). 
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1.8 Overview of the dissertation 
 
As already mentioned, the present work focuses primarily on research that has been 
conducted to develop an understanding of art experience, art creation and creativity. 
The current prevailing methods will at first be described in a chapter of their own to 
ease the way for addressing the topic. 
 
In further chapters, two models of aesthetic experience will be introduced to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical basis for the study. This will be followed by theories of a 
more distinct neuropsychological orientation. In terms of sensory perception, 
neuropsychological aspects of aesthetic experience will also be introduced. In doing 
so, principles of perception will be explained mainly in terms of their importance for 
art reception and the production of art works. The neural aspects of art reception and 
art production that will be covered in the discussion additionally comprise preference 
judgements associated herewith as well as the difference between experts and 
amateurs. The issue of brain lateralization repeatedly comes to the fore in respect of 
art experience and art creation and also figures in research on creativity. 
Hemispheric studies help us to understand the operation (i.e. the lateralization of 
functions) in the two hemispheres. In this respect, lesion studies play a decisive rule 
(Zaidel, 2005; Zaidel, 2013; Miller & Miller, 2013). 
Neurodegenerative processes and brain injuries partly show surprising impact on the 
artistic output and can also initiate it as such. At the same time, these observations 
provide a scientific opportunity to gain insight into a specific world view that is difficult 
to communicate otherwise. In scientific literature different forms of dementia related 
to that topic are discussed which will be introduced here too. The topic of creativity is 
also supposed to be treated, because art creation is difficult to imagine without 
creativity. Likewise it is conceivable that even the reception of art imposes 
requirements on one's own creative potential. Thus, it is imaginable that a flat 
associative gradient (Eysenck, 1995) associated with creativity will allow more 
diverse interpretations and possibly a wider variety of experience. The emphasis here 
lies also on biological and mainly neuropsychological aspects. 
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In summary it can be stated that this work is aimed at creating a critical analysis and   
assessment of the present state of research in regard to art production, art reception 
or creative processes between the poles of cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology 
and creativity research. 
 
1.9 Methods of experimental neuroscience 
 
The following short description of the most important methods of experimental brain 
research is supposed to support understanding of the presented series’ of 
experiments. Further related literature will be referred to at respective points3.  
 
1.9.1 The Electroencephalogram 
 
An electroencephalogram (EEG) provides an exact time measurement of mental 
processes, that is the temporal resolution is very high in contrary to the imaging 
methods mentioned below, which however are characterized by a good spatial 
resolution. Thus, an EEG can be employed to achieve quantitative as well as 
continuous results on the processing of information. The origin of the cortical 
activation can only be recorded by EEG with relative inexactness (inverse problem), 
and require mathematical and statistical techniques to achieve a more precise 
interpretation of the origins of the cortical activity. An example for such a 
mathematical-statistical analysis would be LORETA (Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi 
& Lehmann, 2002; Pascual-Marqui, Michel & Lehmann, 1994). LORETA (Low 
Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography) shows the current density distribution 
most probable to adjust to a given topography.  The solution space therefore is 
restricted to the grey matter and the hippocampus and refers to 2394 Voxel at a 
spatial resolution of 7mm (see Pascual-Marqui, 1999). The measurements of the 
local current density distribution can thus be employed as a measurement for activity. 
Herrmann and Fallgatter (2004) for example showed that LORETA is capable of 
locating the origin of event-correlated potentials in a replicable and valid way, even if 
those occurred in widespread cortical networks and the results were similar to those 
                                                          
3 For further reading on the principles of neuroscience as well as the neuronal base of cognition and perception see Kandel, 
Schwartz and Jessell (2000). 
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achieved in fMRI experiments. An EEG provides observation of spontaneously 
produced brain-electrical phenomena (spontaneous EEG), but also averaged event 
related potentials (ERP). Event related potentials are changes of current triggered by 
psychic or sensory stimulus or motor activities (see below). Among ERPs there are 
components differing by latence – exogene (early) and endogene (late) potentials – 
and polarity. A positive wave with an average latence of 300 ms is called P300, while 
N100 means its negativation by 100 ms. Potentials in the field of 0-2 Hz of the EEG 
signal are called slow cortical potentials (SPCs). SPCs are shifts of d.c. voltage 
triggered by a stimulus but reacting rather inert to it (Hinterberger, Houtkooper & 
Kotchoubey, 2004).  
In the state of basical activity different rhythms can be detected. Frequencies over 30 
Hz are called gamma-waves. The lower frequency wave spectrum of the EEG (0,5-
30 Hz) is divided into the following areas (Sawyer, 2011):  
 
 Alpha-band (8-13 Hz)  
 
The alpha pattern, most clearly distinct in the occipital brain region, forms the most 
basical pattern of the electroencephalogram, is seen as an indicator of activation and 
symbolizes relaxed awakeness. A change in the alpha rhythm caused by a decrease 
of amplitude and an increase of frequency is called alpha blockade or even 
desynchronisation of the EEG.  
 
 Beta-band (over 13Hz) 
 
These low and irregular waves are an expression of desynchronized, increased 
cortical activity and refer to mental activity, active attention and increased 
concentration but also to a state of stress.  
 
 Theta-band (4 to under 8 Hz) 
 
Slow waves with higher amplitudes which occur connected with emotional stress and 
perhaps are an expression of subcortical influences of excitement. Theta-waves are 
observed in adults during sleep and in states of deep relaxation.  
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 Delta-band (under 4 Hz) 
 
The slowest waves show different, sometimes high amplitudes and occur with 
tiredness and sleep; they are thus an expression of a low level of activation and show 
decreased cortical activity.  
 
The EEG signals registered at the cortex surface always represent the activity 
summarized from various electrical processes, where the thalamic nuclei have a 
synchronizing effect. Frequency and amplitude however can vary in one state of 
consciousness at different points of the cortex (Büchel, Karnath & Thier, 2006). 
Isolated areas of the brain are stimulated (desynchronized) and neighbouring areas 
often inhibited, depending on where the information is processed. By neurometry or 
brain mapping frequencies, phase shifts and amplitudes are analyzed of as many 
areas as possible. During psychological test series, mostly frequency shifts in the 
alpha-, beta- and gamma bands occur, pictured by computer analyses and electronic 
filters. In these cases the analogous signal is dissected into digital points by a certain 
scan rate and further processed by the Fourier analysis as most important method of 
evaluation, which leads to the power4 spectrum of the EEG (Birbaumer & Schmidt, 
1999).  
To extract event related potentials, the EEG signals are averaged. ERPs show much 
smaller amplitude than the spontaneous EEG and are heterodyned by this “noise” 
(Sawyer, 2011). ERPs are related to certain event and thus resemble each other in 
amplitude and form, in contrary to the spontaneous EEG where the distribution is 
coincidentally. By the technical device of averaging ERPs get clearer with increasing 
summarization until the arithmetic average is taken from the summarized graphs 
(Sawyer, 2011). So a sufficient number of test persons and trials are essential to a 
significant series of experiments. To avoid artificial results, meaning potential 
changes caused by extra-cerebral sources, the EEG signal must be free of artefacts. 
Artefacts can be caused by damaged electrodes or deflection cables, by movements 
and potentials of other body parts, by static charge or interference in the equipment.  
 
                                                          
4 Power means the square of the amplitude in the frequency area (µV²Hz). 
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Coherence analyses (Petsche & Etlinger, 1998) highlight changes in coherence. 
Compared with an EEG at rest or a spontaneous EEG, they display an increase of 
coherence because of an increased interregional functional connectivity. That means 
that coherences are calculated from the spontaneous EEG by frequency analysis 
during a cognitive process. Any measurement of coherence correlates to a certain 
frequency. The spectrum of coherence is summarized from all measurements of 
coherence between 0 and 1, 0 meaning no correlation at all among the analyzed 
EEG signals, and 1 meaning that two signals tally completely. Given that correlation 
of cortical electrophysiological processes, namely the synchronisation of different 
regions, is of any functional significance, conclusions can be drawn to the mode of 
information processing. W. Singer (1993, 1999) emphasized that it was highly 
probable for perceptional and motor functions of the cortex to be caused by 
distributed processes which happen simultaneously in different regions and involve a 
great number of neuron populations, who are even spread across huge areas of the 
brain, depending on the complexity of the task.  
 
1.9.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Positron Emission 
Tomography 
 
Positron emission tomography (PET) as well as the functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI or fMRT), also known as Kernspin tomography, unlike EEG and MEG 
(magnetic encephalogram), allow researchers to prove cortical as well as subcortical 
changes in neuronal-metabolic activity (Büchel et al., 2006; Sawyer, 2011).  PET and 
fMRI both measure the regional cerebral blood flow (rcbf). Inside activated areas 
there is an increase of metabolic activity and following from that an increase of blood 
flow and blood volume. An fMRI is characterized by non-invasiveness and thus by 
the opportunity to exert this method several times on the same individual and by a 
very high spatial resolution (1-3mm). A PET is based on the rapid radioactive decay 
of positrons to radioisotopes, thus it is necessary to inject a radioactive substance 
into the blood circulation (Büchel et al., 2006).To avoid damage by these 
radioisotopes they are required to decay quickly and completely, so that 
measurements can hardly be repeated. Depending on the radioisotope employed, 
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specific metabolic and transmitting products can be observed in the particular brain 
area.  
The functional principle of an fMRI is the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast imaging the activated cortical areas5. Concerning an fMRI there are 
different techniques of measurement, each having its advantages and 
disadvantages. The gradient-echo technique FLASH allows a higher spatial definition 
but only provides a relatively low temporal resolution (5-15 s/frame) and a low volume 
covarage. Echo -Planar Imaging (EPI) then provides a high temporal resolution and 
the possibility of multilevel measurements, however the EPI-images due to 
registration problems can only be overlapped with morphological images after 
manual correction (Schad, 2008).  
One possibility to map the interesting brain activities with both methods (fMRI and 
PET) is the technique of subtraction, where during experimental conditions the 
images are subtracted from the images of the control conditions (Goldstein, 2005; 
Schad, 2008). What gets problematic here is the missing possibility to assign 
significance to particular regions. The subtraction does not identify all the regions that 
are involved in a certain behavior, but only those that show a significant difference in 
activation between target and reference tasks. Those regions that are similarly 
involved in the target and reference task do not ‘show up’ in the subtraction. It is 
possible to argue that these regions are not specifically involved in the process of 
interest, but in ancillary processes, which the target task shares with the reference 
task. However, the fact that a brain region is similarly active during two tasks does 
not imply that its effects on other brain regions are the same, and it has the same 
function in the two tasks. Changes in connectivity can be detected by covariance-
based analyses (McIntosh & Gonzalez-Lima, 1994; Friston, Frith, Liddle & 
Frackowiak, 1993), but they have been applied to only a few PET studies so far (e.g. 
McIntosh et al., 1994; Nyberg et al., 1996). 
With a PET the amount of noise interference is so high that the images, as is the 
case with an EEG, have to be averaged. That results in a strong reduction of the 
spatial resolution (4-8 mm), as interindividual differences can be huge. Summaries of 
the images of one test person however get problematic due to the necessarily high 
                                                          
5 The cerebral cortex is structured differently. These structural differences are shown in cytoarchitectonical maps, commonly 
using the map of Brodmann areas. Structure and function however do not always correlate with each other. 
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exposure to radiation. The fMRI also needs a special procedure to measure the 
BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level dependent) effect and at the same time suppress 
the noise interference. According to Schad (2008) “techniques based on the Bold 
contrast are detecting the influence of small susceptibility differences on the MR 
Signal caused by oxygenated and deoxygenated blood” (p.1295). Here analytical 
methods also depend on a statistic average of the coincidental, incoherent noise 
interference in contrast to the continuous coherent signal in the activated regions. 
Nevertheless the employed methods can differ in size and distribution of activity in 
the activated areas.  
Changes of signal under different conditions require a statistical method (student’s-t-
test, z-statistic) to make an assignment of significance to particular regions possible. 
Based on the assumption of normal distribution pixel for pixel is analyzed to search 
for search for a significant divergence from the mean values. At last, to reduce false 
assignments of significance, multiple tests must be conducted since every single 
comparison has a certain likelihood of error. In contrast to the subtraction image in 
these statistic methods the mean differences are weighted with the dispersion of data 
points by the particular mean values, thus making possible a more stable evaluation 
(Schad, 2008). 
 
As in an EEG, where a sufficient number of trials are necessary, the quality of fMRI 
parameter images increases with the amount of recorded data series. The method is 
similarly susceptible to artefacts, which, as in an EEG, can be due to technical 
insufficiencies or physiological reasons. Instability in the fixation of the head is highly 
problematic. To provide an optimal adjustment of the fMRI images, algorithms of 
motion correction are employed (Schad, 2002b). For further reading concerning fMRI 
are suggested Schad (2002a, 2002b) and Di Salle et al. (1999).  
A direct comparison of both methods (fMRI and PET) has been tried in a study of 
Feng et al. (2004). The test persons were given the same visual stimulus under both 
methods. No significant differences concerning either the resulting brain mapping or 
the relative changes in regional cerebral blood flow could be observed. The results of 
fMRI an EEG are also comparable as far as the last is combined with a method to 
locate origins (Herrmann & Fallgatter, 2004). A combination of techniques allows an 
optimal and complete analysis of the central nervous system. The good spatial 
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resolution of the fMRI6 shows where in the brain processes take place, while the 
good temporal resolution of an EEG can answer, when these processes happen, 
both at last complement the information concerning metabolic processes from the 
PET.  
 
1.10 Outline of Dissertation Chapters 
 
The study provided in this document is subdivided into six chapters. Chapter One 
presents a broad overview and general introduction to the research topic. Besides 
the research approach, the methods of cognitive neuroscience and the research aims 
will be introduced. 
 
The aim of the second Chapter is to provide and compare an information-processing 
model of aesthetic experience on the one hand and a model of visual aesthetics on 
the other hand.  
 
Chapter Three tries to clarify the interwoven terms of neuroaesthetics. Several 
studies concerning this matter will be systematically discussed in the context of 
cognitive neuroscience. The terms will be differentiated in their complexity as well. At 
first, neuropsychological theories of aesthetic perception, neuropsychological aspects 
of aesthetic experience and neural aspects of art reception and production will be 
discussed. In addition, the principles of visual perception and meaning for art 
perception and art production will be presented. The hemispheric specialization in 
artistic perception and production will be outlined. Emotional reactions to artworks 
and their neural correlates will be given a special focus amongst the other themes. In 
this respect, the differences between novices and experts concerning emotional 
reactions and aesthetic preferences will be considered. Last but not least the 
complex of neurodegenerative processes and impairments (e.g. different forms of 
Dementia) in the context of artistic perception and production will be discussed 
 
                                                          
6 fMRI techniques of high temporal resolution provide first approaches to the question, when activations actually happen. 
(Schad, 2002b). 
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Within the framework of Chapter Four biological and neuropsychological aspects of 
creative processes will be discussed. The discussion will be focused again on 
hemispheric specialization and as a new aspect on gender differences. The 
meanings of activation patterns associated with different pronounced level of 
creativity and relating to different cognitive strategies will also be attended in this 
chapter.  In addition, creativity and the effects on emotions will be considered. 
 
Chapter Five includes an evaluation, verification and discussion of the two theoretical 
models concerning the results of previous studies.  
 
Chapter Six presents an in-depth discussion and also provides a summary and draws 
some conclusions of the results of the previous chapters with regard to the given 
research questions.  
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Chapter 2  
 
MODELS OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Within the following section, two models of aesthetic experience will be described in 
detail. First, Chatterjee´s (2003) model of visual aesthetics will shed light on the 
neural underpinnings of visual stimuli. Second, Leder et al´s  (2004) information-
processing model will be introduced as an approach to aesthetic experience.  
The presentation and review of the models should be the focus of attention here. A 
further elaboration in the sense of the question regarding a verification attempt of the 
models in the context of fMRI studies will take place in Chapter 3 and 5. 
 
 2.2 A Model of visual aesthetics 
 
Anjan Chatterjee (2003) presents a general model for the processing of aesthetic 
elements in the visual arts and derives this from the framework of the general 
processing of visual stimuli (see Figure 1).  He derives the model from the findings of 
the cognitive neuroscience of vision, in order to have a working model for testing 
neuroaesthetic hypotheses. Particularly visual processes that take place if objects 
are recognized can be used as a framework for visual aesthetics.  
 
 
           
Figure 1: 
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A general framework for the neural underpinnings of visual aesthetics guided by visual neuroscience (Chatterjee, 2003, p.55). 
 
 
2.2.1 Central assumptions and the special role of emotions 
 
Chatterjee´s basic assumptions are reflected in the notion that vision exists of 
different components (i.e. cognitive processes) and that a single answer to a 
component not properly represents aesthetic experience. According to Chatterjee 
(2003) this aesthetic experience is derived from answers to different components. 
Therefore, research should focus on the interaction of the different components. 
 
As a special and central component in the context of aesthetic experience in addition 
to the cognitive aspects of visual aesthetics, he describes an emotional component 
(emotional response). He refers here to neuroscientific research by Breiter, Aharon, 
Kahnemann, Dale and Shizgal, 2001, Delgado, Nystrom, Fissel, Noll & Fiez, 2000; 
Elliot, Friston and Dolan, 2000; O`Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornack & Andrews, 
2001; Schultz, Dayans and Montague, 1997.  These research results suggest, that 
the anterior medial lobe, medial orbitofrontal cortices and subcortical structures are 
responsible for the regulation of emotions in general and reward systems in particular 
(Chatterjee, 2003, p. 56). 
 
Chatterjee (2003) differentiates between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’. He considered ‘liking’ 
within the context of the aesthetic tradition where it  means  ‘liking without wanting’ in 
terms of a pleasure without the corresponding utilitarian consequences that are for 
example the case with desire for sex or food. In this context,  Chaterjee (2003) 
postulates that “the process by which humans react to stimuli and engage neural 
circuits that respond or rewarding stimuli may effect a probe into the neural basis for 
liking without wanting” (p.55). The neural basis of ‘wanting’ according to a desire for 
reward is well known and can be traced back to “dopaminergic circuits including the 
ventral striatum and the nucleus accumbens“ (Chatterjee, 2003, p. 56). In contrast to 
this, the neural basis of an aesthetically determined ‘liking’ has not yet sufficiently 
been worked out.  He noted, however, that “widely distributed circuits, most 
importantly the dorsolateral frontal and medial frontal cortices are probably involved” 
(Chatterjee, 2003, p. 56). 
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2.2.2 The processing levels in general 
 
According to Vartanian and Nadal ( 2007) Chatterjee`s neuroscientific model of 
aesthetic preference is founded on the basic assumption that “aesthetic experiences 
related to visual objects involve three visual processing stages common to the 
perception of any visual stimulus, as well as an emotional response, a decision, and 
the modulating effect of attention” (p. 432). 
 
Based on the research results from van Essen, Feleman, DeYoe, Ollavaria and 
Knierman, 1990; Zeki, 1993 and Farah and Malden, 2000, he concludes that “the 
nervous system processes visual information both hierarchically and in parallel” 
(Chatterjee, 2011). 
 
In this regard Chatterjee (2011) postulates that “any work can be decomposed into its 
early, intermediate and late vision components and individual works of visual art 
(paintings) can be identified that exemplify each of these different componential 
stages” (p.393). Furthermore, he refers to investigations from Russel and George, 
1990 and Woods, 1991 by arguing that “aesthetic writings commonly distinguish 
between form and content” and that “early and intermediate vision process form and 
later vision processes content” (Chatterjee, 2011, p.393). 
 
Schematically described, the levels of visual processing are the following (Chatterjee, 
2003, 2011):  
 
 Simple visual aspects such as color, shape or orientation are extracted in a 
primary, early processing level and analyzed in different brain areas (early 
vision).  
 
 Within an intermediate processing level (intermediate vision), some visual 
aspects are segregated and others are grouped together (grouping). As a 
result of this, coherent regions are formed. Otherwise, a chaotic sensory array 
would overstrain the visual system. 
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 In a late visual processing, a further processing and modelling is performed, 
whereby the visual elements cause attention within the visual field. This leads 
to a further detailed analysis. Information that has been already stored 
(knowledge, emotion) can be connected accordingly with the new visual 
stimuli. In this context of memories, objects can be recognized and meanings 
can be attached.  After object recognition, emotions can be evoked and 
decisions made about the object. 
 
2.2.3 The processing levels within a neuroscientific context 
 
As already mentioned, ideas derived from visual neuroscience stimulate research 
and lead to the formation of research hypotheses within neuroaesthetics. Chatterjee 
(2003) assumes that a large part of the areas involved in the processing of visual 
stimuli play a role in the process of perception and classification of aesthetic 
elements within art as well. 
 
Chatterjee (2003) reflects again on how far this level of visual processing can be 
found in empirical aesthetics. According to findings by Russell and George, 1990 and 
Woods, 1991 he compares the distinction between form and content of a stimulus in 
aesthetics with findings of neurophysiological research. 
Accordingly and already mentioned, form is processed in the early and intermediate 
level of processing while content is in the late level of processing. 
 
Chatterjee (2003, 2011) explains that early attributes of an art work like colour will be 
processed in parts of the occipital cortex, area V4.  The neural context of the 
grouping of these early features to larger visual units proceeds probably in the extra-
striate cortex, whereas this process would be difficult to understand. In this respect, 
the visual attributes of art works will be initially processed like any other visual 
objects. 
  
Chatterjee (2003) states that “the process of grouping gives unity in diversity, a 
fundamental feature of compositional balance, which itself is a central idea about the 
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formal structure of aesthetic objects. If compositional forms are apprehended 
automatically by intermediate vision, then sensitivity to such forms should also be 
automatic “(p. 55). 
 
Furthermore he express that “subjects are sensitive to form ‘at a glance’ with 
exposure as short as 50ms. By contrast, preference for detail (which requires serial 
attentional processing) predominates when images are shown for slightly longer 
times” (Locher & Nagi, as cited in Chatterjee, 2003, p. 55). 
 
Finally and for the positioning of his model within the neuroscientific context, 
Chatterjee (2003) proposes a model of visual processing levels starting with the 
assumption that “visual attributes of an art work initially are processed like any other 
visual object” (p. 55). He stresses in this context, that “various combinations of early 
and intermediate vision” like color, shape and composition are processed within 
fronto-temporal attentional circuits. This is even more the case if “they are balanced” 
(p. 55). With reference to studies from Huphreys, Riddoch & Price, 1997; Motter, 
1993, 1994; Pessoa, Kastner & Ungerleider (2003), Shulman et al., 1997, and 
Watanabe et al., 1998, he emphasizes an ongoing and modulating processing of 
these attentional networks within the ventral stream. In this ongoing modulation he 
presumes the contribution for a more “vivid experience of the stimuli” with regard to 
attributes colors or forms and content like “faces and landscapes” as well (p. 55). 
 
 
 
Vartanian & Nadal ( 2007) postulate that  
 
“in late visual stages, included under the representational domain in this model, 
certain regions of the object are selected for further scrutiny. At this moment, 
memories are activated, and objects are recognized and associated with meanings. 
This visual analysis leads to emotions associated with the aesthetic experience, and 
it grounds decisions about the stimulus. However, this is not a strictly linear model. In 
fact, it posits an important feedback flow of information via attentional processes, 
from higher visual and emotional levels towards early visual processing” (p.432). 
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The question of what kind of everyday visual stimuli processing differentiates from 
the processing of aesthetic experience remains unresolved in Chatterjee (2003, 
2011). 
However, this model helps to justify and eventually explain the different results of the 
studies  (e.g. Vartanian & Goel, 2004; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Cela-Conde et al., 
2004; Jacobsen, Schubotz, Höfel & von Cramon, 2006)  presented in the context of 
aesthetic experience (see Section 5). 
 
2.3 Aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgment as an evaluative output 
 
The model of of aesthetic experience by Leder et al., (2004) includes five levels of 
aesthetic experience: perceptual analysis, implicit memory integration, explicit 
classification, cognitive mastering and evaluation (see Figure 3). The model also 
differentiates between two types of output, the aesthetic emotion and the aesthetic 
judgment. The model of information processing from Leder et al. (2004) presents like 
Chaterjee´s (2004) model of visual aesthetics an instrument for the generation of the 
dependent variables in aesthetic research, namely aesthetic judgement and aesthetic 
emotion (Vartanian & Nadal, 2007). The model could also be considered to be a 
working model for testing neuroaesthetic hypotheses.  Similar to Chatterjee (2003) 
the authors mainly concentrate on visual arts in the sense of painting. Leder et al. 
(2004) emphasize, however, that the model could be applied to other forms of art and 
aesthetic experiences in general. The focus is especially on modern art. 
 
Classification, understanding and cognitive coping with an art work are subsumed 
under aesthetic experience. At the same time, this cognitive process is continuously 
accompanied by affective states, whose evaluations result in aesthetic emotions. 
Aside from, the successful coping with an art work is the source of intrinsic 
motivation, and it could lead to the phenomenon that an individual still devotes 
himself to the exposition of art works in the future. In the long run, this kind of 
motivation results in an increased interest in art again. Leder et al. (2004) considered 
the acquisition of expertise as significant, through which recipients of art could 
heighten their own coping ability with art. In this context, the authors emphasized the 
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style-relevant processing, which, especially in modern art, was seen as an essential 
art-specific challenge. The five levels proposed by Leder et al. (2004) concern 
different cognitive analyses. In this case, serial information flow is not assumed, but 
rather a relative hierarchy of processing levels, whereby a throwback to an earlier 
level is considered possible. The latter levels of information processing will be formed 
to feedback loops in this way.  According to the authors, ambiguity can be herewith 
reduced and both understanding and affective coping can be heightened.  In 
addition, particularly these higher levels are those which would be affected by 
expertise. 
 
               
        
        Figure 2:  
        The model of aesthetic experience by Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin (2004, p.492). 
 
 
Within the model, the input is represented by an art work. The classification of a work 
of art is ensured by a number of context characteristics according to authors. Among 
other things, it is the framework within which an object appears, for example in the 
context of an art exhibition, an art gallery or a museum. The art recipient in turn must 
reside in a particular state to feel aesthetically. According to Leder et al. (2004) the 
problem with respect to the laboratory situation that does not match the natural 
situation of the art reception could be reduced by explicit education/information of the 
test persons that take part in an aesthetics and art reception experiment. A more 
representative form of art reception would be ensured in the context of such a 
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communication. In addition, the emotional situation of the test persons has to be 
taken into account before the experiment has been started. This is important because 
the initial state of emotional experience could have an effect on the artistic 
experience. A negative affective starting situation could prevent a positive 
experience. 
According to the model, (see Figure 2) the artwork will be analyzed on the first level, 
the so-called level of perceptual analysis, with regard to perception. Contrast, 
complexity, symmetry, order and grouping play a role. Visual information processing 
at this level involves mainly occipital regions of the cortex. Previous psychological 
work focused mostly on perception characteristics of art works (e.g. Berlyne, 1974; 
Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Solso, 1994; Zeki, 1999) and thus remains a 
subject of this early level of processing. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), 
Livingstone (2002) and Shimamura (2013) considered the importance of some 
features mentioned above (contrast, symmetry, etc.) that also play a role in terms of 
the aesthetic preference (see Section 3). 
 
Concerning a further level, the level of implicit memory integration, the aesthetic 
processing is based on implicit memory effects, whereby the effects are not required 
as being accessible to consciousness. In this context, familiarity, prototypicality and 
peak shift effects are of importance. In terms of familiarity effects on aesthetic 
judgment, it could be observed through repeated presentation of a stimulus within the 
framework of experiments to the ‘mere-repeated-exposure’ paradigm (e.g. Leder, 
2002; Zajonc, 2001). Regarding to a neuronal level Vandenberghe, Dupont, 
Bormans, Mortelmansand Orban (1995) studied stimulus familiarity. Peak shift effects 
were also taken into account by Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) and are 
described below (see Section 3.2). 
 
Prototypicality stands for the degree in which the object for a class of objects is 
representative. Prototypes partly causing increased judgments. Hekkert and van 
Wieringen (1990) could demonstrate with Cubist paintings depicting human figures 
that prototypicality in the context of images with high categorization can influence to a 
certain extent the judgment of representational art works. Martindale and Moore 
(1988) demonstrate higher judgments for prototypical colours. In regard to art, Leder 
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et al. (2004) indicate that the effect of prototypicality probably most often occurs in 
connection with the prototypicality of an art work for an artist or a specific artistic 
style. In addition, it should be taken into consideration, that expertise affects 
information processing at this level, because experts have acquired knowledge of 
typical artistic styles. It must therefore be assumed that art experts can rapidly 
classify art works with respect to style or an artist, whereas novices cannot perform 
such a classification.  
 
According to Leder et al. (2004) expertise and knowledge of the recipient plays a very 
important rule in the context of the following level of explicit classification. The explicit 
classification no longer happens automatically, but thoughtfully and verbally. Analysis 
at this level relates to content and style. In those cases in which expertise and 
knowledge are restricted, however, the output probably relates to descriptions of 
what is depicted. Therefore, with increasing knowledge the likelihood of other 
solutions arises to the question regarding the content of a work. The authors 
postulated that with increasing expertise, the historical significance of the work or 
specific knowledge about the artist will be taken into account as a part of the content 
of the aesthetic object. An overlap of this level with the previous level is also 
conceivable. The authors emphasized the assumption that in the 20th and 21st 
century, recognition and understanding of individual styles would play an essential 
role in the aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience involves the processing of 
stylistic information accordingly. This, in turn, requires a minimum level of artistic 
knowledge. Abstract images of modern art supply artworks that can be distinguished 
by the style of representation and not by their content. The processing of artistic 
styles in turn leads to their possible generalization (Hartley & Homa, 1981), and as a 
result, new examples of a style can be detected successfully. 
According to the model of Leder et al. (2004), cognitive mastering and evaluation are 
closely linked and are available on the next levels. Art expertise enables the provision 
of information, which in turn supports cognitive processing. A successful classification 
of the style of an artwork will probably be prepared by a self-rewarding cognitive 
experience. According to the model, the results on the level of cognitive mastering 
undergo a constant evaluation in regard to satisfactory understanding in the context 
of an artwork and its level of ambiguity.  
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Therefore, the level of evaluation is linked by performance measurement and 
aesthetic experience. According to the authors, the quality of these feedback loops 
would also reflect in the form of expertise. Art experts would handle artworks based 
on style and visual characteristics of the artwork. Naive recipients, in turn, would 
relate to a greater extent to the content or to external references or they would make 
judgments on the basis of information by self-referential cognitive information through 
association of the content of an art work with one's own situation or own emotional 
states (Forgas, 1995). With increasing expertise, aesthetic experience would always 
become more differentiated and would probably more rewarding, too. Leder et al. 
(2004) point out that with increasing experience and expertise a different basis would 
underlie aesthetic judgment, which further extends the referential framework.  
 
In addition to cognitive processing, further processing is done on the affective or 
emotional level. Within the model of Leder at al. (2004) a continuous change of the 
affective states is assumed. Thereby, it is assumed that the typical affective state that 
can be observed at the beginning of an art-related situation has a positive nature, 
and that the recipient is a continuous access point to the result of the affective 
evaluation.  The continued success of cognitive processing would lead to a positive 
change of the affective state. Furthermore, the authors postulate that the affective 
state would be evaluated by the recipient, and that this information would be used to 
stop processing as soon as a satisfactory status has been reached. In special cases, 
a flow experience can be caused by the aesthetic experience in connection with the 
accompanying emotional state (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). 
 
The model of Leder et al. (2004) considers two relatively independent types of 
output, the aesthetic emotion and the aesthetic judgment. As mentioned above, the 
aesthetic emotion is based on the subjective success of information processing and 
is often described as pleasure or joy. The authors assumed that the interdependence 
of the two outputs for art novices is probably greater than that of art experts. Most 
probably, the art reception of amateurs happens on a rather emotional basis while 
experts would rather see the challenge in a cognitively-based reception. The "affect 
30 
 
infusion model”7 by Forgas (1995) draws attention to the importance of affective 
states in regard to the formation of judgment. The degree of influence concerning 
emotional states varies according to the model along a procedural continuum. 
Judgments that require heuristic or substantial processing are more likely exposed to 
emotional influences than judgments that are based on a direct or motivationally 
justified access. Affective states would be used in the case of heuristic judgments as 
information while in constructive structures of a judgment, affective states would 
serve as priming. It can be assumed that art novices refer to heuristic judgments with 
regard to the assessment of art considering the lack of consistent information and 
that the current emotional situation has a strong impact respectively. Of course, it is 
conceivable that art novices, with the corresponding motivation, choose a 
constructive approach and that they have to deal with the stimulus material seriously. 
It can be assumed that the different stages reflect in the reception of art at the 
neuronal level. The comparison of novices and experts in the field of art is a way to 
approach this method (see Section 3.6). In any case, a model of the aesthetic 
experience requires neuropsychological validation. Neuropsychological theories of 
aesthetic perception will be presented under Section 3.2.1. However, these models 
usually lack the basis of a profound underlying model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The "affect infusion model" by Forgas (1995) identified four different information processing strategies that can underlie a 
judgment. The "direct access strategy" is based on an access of previous, existing crystallised judgments; the "motivated 
accessing strategy" is applied if the formation of a judgment has passed a specific motivation; the “heuristic processing strategy" 
occurs if any attempts are made to make a judgment on the basis of various "short circuits"; the "substantive processing 
strategy" takes place if a selective, constructive processing of related information is necessary, based on a variety of 
association- and memory processes. 
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Chapter 3 
 
NEURAL ASPECTS OF ART RECEPTION AND ART PRODUCTION  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Up to date, very few attempts have been made to approach art experience at a 
neuronal level, which may be partly due to the complexity inherent in art experience. 
It complicates the understanding of linear correlations, since intervening variables 
and the stimuli themselves are difficult to be controlled. The art recipient does not 
represent a tabula rasa. There are countless aspects between the manipulation of 
the independent variable and the result of the dependent variable, such as 
personality, current mood, individual experience space and personal experience 
influence the result. Another aggravating factor is the inter-individual differences in 
brain activity. The topographical or tomographic activity patterns can considerably 
vary at the same task. A certain number of test persons is essential in order to obtain 
significant results, because one cannot generalize from only a few findings. At the 
same time, the applied research methods (see Section 1) are very time-consuming or 
expensive, or both. Furthermore, the processes underlying visual preferential 
judgements can also be very subtle. Aversive and positive stimuli or different factors 
could result in the activation of the same brain areas, or the associated changes 
could be so little that they cannot sufficiently be determined by current methods. In 
addition, as already mentioned, the complexity of the stimulus material raises another 
problem. 
Furthermore, partly for the reasons mentioned above, tangible results cannot always 
be obtained on a mere behavioural basis and results of empirical and experimental 
observations often drift apart. The, therefore, little solid basis complicates the test 
design of neuropsychological experiments and the interpretation of its findings. As 
mentioned previously, Fechner (1876/1897) has already tried to explore the laws of 
pleasure and displeasure by means of experimental procedures. Despite manifold 
test series (e.g. Frith & Nias, 1974; O’Hare, 1976), it has not been possible until 
today to definitely clarify by what aesthetic preference is eventually determined, 
although the effects of preferential judgements have been examined on a neural level 
(see Section 3.4). 
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In the present section, the results of psychological studies will be introduced. In spite 
of all inherent difficulties, they have tried to find a way to bring some light on the 
matter of art reception and art production. However, this is not always done explicitly, 
as for example, in the individual case studies of neurodegenerative diseases (see 
Section 3.7). Brain damages and its resulting specific impairments can change the 
artistic expression in various ways. The kind of changes shed in turn light on the 
degenerative processes and help to increase the understanding thereof. 
Furthermore, issues of the hemisphere specialization for art perception and creation 
(see Section 3.4) will be discussed. It is a subject that continues to prevail within the 
‘scientific landscape’ and will also be reflected in this dissertation, where aspects of 
lateralization will be repeatedly picked up. A further interesting point that will be 
treated, although it has not often been a subject for research, are emotional reactions 
to artworks and their neural correlates (see Section 3.5)  
The models of aesthetic experience, as presented in Chapter 3, postulate a 
differentiated cognitive processing of artworks with the increase of experience or the 
involvement of attention/memory processes. The associated neural differences 
between laymen and experts will be discussed in Section 3.6. 
The central point of discussion will be neuropsychological theories of aesthetic 
perception as well as principles of perception and the resulting consequences for the 
reception and production of artworks.  
 
3.2    Neuropsychological aspects of the aesthetic experience  
 
The concept ‘aesthetic perception’ is used here limited in terms of the reception of 
visual stimuli, which are very likely meant to evoke an aesthetic response. Such an 
example would be an artist who creates a piece of work in order to elicit a particular 
reaction in the art recipient. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) discussed these 
aspects in an essay. Livingstone (2002) and Shimamura (2013) focused on the 
principles of perception and the resulting consequences for the reception and 
production of artworks. Livingstone (2002) paid particular attention to the distinction 
between colour and brightness. Zeki (2002), in turn, placed special emphasis on the 
connection between concept formation and art.  
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3.2.1 Neuropsychological theories of aesthetic perception  
 
One is bound to agree with Zeki (2001; 2002) that art, like all other human activities, 
has a biological basis and is as such subject to the laws of the brain:  
"Art has a biological basis. It is a human activity and, like all human activities, 
including morality, law, and religion, depends upon, and obeys the laws of the brain" 
(Zeki, 2002, p. 53). 
In order to understand the biological basis of art, one has, according to Zeki (2002), 
to investigate the biological origins of knowledge because art constitutes a form of 
knowledge or is knowledge. We might be still far from understanding the neural basis 
of those laws dictating artistic creativity, performance and appreciation. Nonetheless, 
the spectacular progress in the knowledge of the functioning of the visual brain would 
enable first steps towards the formulation of neural laws of art and aesthetics. The 
term associated with it, is called ‘neuroaesthetics’. According to Zeki (2002), an 
important role would be played by a fundamental property of the brain, namely its 
ability of concept formation. At the same time, this ability would be itself a by-product 
of another essential property of the brain, namely its abstraction ability, which, in turn, 
served the primary function of the brain, the acquisition of knowledge.  
 
Zeki (2002) declared the brain's ability of concept formation as the essential basis of 
art. He illustrated this by Dante, Michelangelo, and Richard Wagner. The motivational 
force in art would come "from the creation of ideals and concepts by the brain" (p. 
54). The formation of ideals would be, in turn, a necessary and inevitable by-product 
of an efficient system of knowledge acquisition. Zeki assumed that similar neural 
processes would control all concept formations and that art was a manifestation of 
this neural capacity. However, all brain systems, regardless of their functional task 
would be involved in abstraction and concept formation. That means, each cortical 
region had the capacity for abstraction in its specialized area. The parallel processing 
by specialized areas would of course not exclude the interaction of different parts (the 
resulting problem of ‘bindings’ will be further discussed below). Zeki emphasized the 
unconscious character of these processes and postulated that the capacity for 
abstraction was not acquired by experience, but could be regarded as innate.  
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One of the undisputed primary tasks of the brain is the acquisition of knowledge 
about the essential, permanent and constant properties of objects and situations 
within a permanently changing world. The capacity of abstraction and generalization 
required for this, eventually also bears witness to the limitations of the brain. It is the 
brain's solution to cope with an infinity of details. Thus, the abstraction leads to the 
formation of an idea or a concept, but the actual experience cannot always satisfy the 
superordinate idea:  
 
“Abstraction leads to an idea or concept, but our experience remains that of the 
particular, and the particular that we experience may not always satisfy the idea 
formed in and by our brains. One way of obtaining that satisfaction is to 'download' 
the idea formed in the brain into a piece of artwork” (Zeki, 2002, p. 58).  
 
However, in what form abstraction occurs is only known for more simple constructs. 
Abstraction already occurs at a very early level of visual information processing. For 
example, cells react, in the orientation columns of ocular dominance columns, to the 
particular direction of a contour in the receptive field (see Footnote 13, p. 42).  
 
Furthermore, there are columns of neurons reacting to colours. A cell, for example, 
that is responsive to a vertical line, responds to any type of vertical line, no matter 
whether to any differences in brightness or to an object (e.g. a pencil). The fact that 
the properties of such cells are to great extent genetically determined implies 
according to Zeki (2002) that the process of abstraction as such is innate. Even 
though, when during the so-called sensitive phases the input of visual stimuli is 
necessary to maintain the sensitivity and thereby the abstraction ability of the cell.  
The result of such an abstraction process is, according to the author, the formation of 
an ‘ideal’. In this process, all sensory experiences are synthetically combined to 
generate a construct that may be dependent upon many details, but at the same time 
independent of a given single detail. Hence, it follows "that the ideal formed by a 
brain is dependent upon its neurological machinery (an innate mechanism) as well as 
the experience acquired by the individual" (Zeki, 2002, p. 60). Zeki applies this 
principle of concept formation both to objects, namely to a kind of a formation of 
prototypes, and to complex emotions, such as romantic love.  Zeki went even a step 
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further and postulated: "The only 'ideals' that we have are those constructed by the 
brain" (p. 60).  
As aforementioned, the ideals of the brain could now be recreated in and by the arts. 
The concepts of an artist may however change, both by a further development of his 
creative work and the accompanying learning process. Subsequently, Zeki has also 
found the answer to the question of "what constitutes art", namely "the translation of 
concepts in the artist's mind onto canvas or into music or literature." (p. 67). 
However, the question remains open, what exactly defines an artist. Great art, in turn, 
“is that which corresponds to as many different concepts in as many different brains 
over as long a period of time as possible" (p. 67). Therefore, ambiguity would be a 
characteristic of all great art since it allows for correspondence to many differing 
concepts. An explanation of how the formation of such ideals is precisely taking place 
on a neuronal level, Zeki has yet to give. However, it has recently become apparent 
that considering art as a product of neural functions can be helpful for its 
understanding.  
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) attempted to formulate a theory of the aesthetic 
experience with particular regard to the underpinning neural mechanisms. Claiming 
to determine artistic principles, the authors developed a list of eight laws of aesthetic 
experience. They were meant to contain a set of heuristics, which artists would apply 
consciously or unconsciously to stimulate visual areas of the brain in an optimal way. 
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) introduced the ‘peak shift effect’8 in order to 
explain, among other, the impact of caricatures. They regarded this principle as the 
key to the understanding of some aspects of visual art. According to their theory, 
artists would seek - (though not necessarily consciously) - to extract and even 
intensify the essence of an object in order to achieve a stronger activation of the 
neural mechanisms that occur in the imagination of the original as well. One way to 
accomplish this is by abstraction. Moreover, the authors suggested that perhaps in 
abstract art exaggerated (‘supernormal’) stimuli would be applied in order to activate 
form areas in the brain more intensely than it would be the case with natural stimuli: 
“even abstract art may employ supernormal stimuli to excite form areas in the brain 
more strongly than natural stimuli” (p.15). One can, however, not conclusively 
                                                          
8The ‘peak shift effect’, as a principle from the discrimination learning in animal experiments, may be explained by an example: 
If a rat is rewarded for discriminating a rectangle from a square, it will react even more to a rectangle that is longer and narrower 
than the prototype. 
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ascertain whether the authors speak here of abstract - that is of non-objective art – or 
rather had an abstract figurative art in mind. Considering the fact that the authors 
compared these supernormal stimuli with natural ones, one may, however, conclude 
that they had abstract stimuli in mind.  
 
The object recognition, including properties associated with the object, such as size, 
colour and shape, is a task of the ventral visual path in the temporal lobe (for a 
detailed representation of the physiology, psychology and ecology of visual 
perception (Bruce, Green & Georgeson, 2003; Chatterjee, 2003, 2011). 
Consequently, it would be conceivable that pictures of a different abstraction degree 
of the artwork (from abstracted figurative to figurative) could excite quantitatively 
different activations in the temporal lobe. It would also be possible that this applies to 
works of abstract art and abstract objective works. Vartanian and Goel (2004, see 
Section 3.4) explained that representational works in comparison to abstract works 
caused significantly stronger activations bilaterally in the occipital lobe (BA 18/19), in 
the right temporal lobe (BA 37/39) and in the right parietal lobe (BA 7). However, it is 
important to remember that only different degrees of abstraction have been 
compared here in a general way - which does not entirely correspond to the intention 
of the authors who wanted to have various levels of abstraction to be compared with 
an overemphasized essential form of the same stimulus. It would also be possible to 
compare the effect of photographs and drawings representing the same object, but 
overemphasising prominent features, since both forms of representation (i.e. not the 
comparison of drawing and real object) are at least two-dimensional and could also 
be better standardized. In no way should the importance and effect of abstraction 
and exaggeration in the art be questioned, nor the meaning of abstraction for 
perception. The acquisition of sensory data in the perceptual system takes place as a 
bottom-up processing where the actual physical stimulus properties are converted 
into abstract representations. Separated neuron ensembles respond to particular 
stimulus aspects (orientation, colour, shape, contrast, structure, movement). The 
activity of a neuron ensemble is related to the subjective perception. According to the 
authors, artists can extend the ‘peak shift effect’ to other dimensions, such as colour 
or motion. Furthermore, the authors discussed the effect of key stimuli. These are 
exogenous stimuli that lead to a correlating automatic behavioural response. The 
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behavioural response can be elicited by mocks or natural stimuli. Underlying neural 
processes of stimulus filtering suppress the deviating stimuli. Such key stimuli also 
affect humans, as, for example, the baby schema or the partner determination 
schema. Tinbergen (1951) undertook animal experiments and found out that mocks 
with solely highlighted key stimulus led to even stronger reactions than the natural 
stimulus. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) interpreted this as a generation of a 
super-stimulus or a cartoon. The authors concluded it might also be that some art 
movements, such as Cubism, would activate processing mechanisms in the brain in 
the same way as exaggerated, congenital ‘form primitives’, even though these have 
not yet been fully understood as such. According to the authors, it may also be 
conceivable that, for example, the Sunflowers by Van Gogh or the Water Lilies by 
Monet activated those neurons representing memories of the colours of those 
flowers, more than they would be activated by a natural sunflower or lily. However, 
key stimuli are biologically relevant stimuli that are quite often depicted in the art, 
such as sexual contents, social relationships, aggressions and fighting as well as 
food. However, the stimuli in turn hardly elicit the instinctive behaviours, at least not 
during their presentation, which is already due to the cultural environment. Attention 
and mood are influenced, whereas the key stimuli have a far more immediate and 
intense effect if rationality is excluded. It is, therefore, hardly surprising if such 
mechanisms are often used by artists and that is also used in advertising. In addition, 
contemporary artists have the possibility to apply these techniques consciously, on 
the basis of insights gained from such results (Schuster, 1992).  
  
‘Perceptual grouping’ was mentioned as another important principle. One of the 
primary functions of visual areas consists of the figure-ground mechanism. The 
tendency to perceive objects on a background is so strong that figures are 
recognized even where they do not exist. The objects in the visual field are 
differentiated from the ground by detecting correlations between stimuli, for example 
by means of groupings or other gestalt laws9. Furthermore, Ramachandran and 
Hirstein (1999) assumed that the associated process would be reinforcing for the 
organism. Consequently, areas in the limbic system would be already involved in this 
                                                          
9 The laws of visual perception formulated by the Gestalt psychology are based on the principle “The whole is more than the 
sum of its parts”. Thereby, one tries to find out the laws and principles, which may explain the organization of parts into a whole. 
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process and not only after completely recognizing an object. The reinforcement of the 
process, in turn, would serve as an incentive for detecting correlations and 
associations of stimuli. As an example, the authors mentioned the aesthetic pleasure, 
likely to occur when discovering colour correlations; for instance, if someone 
harmonizes the colours of his clothes and carries a blue cloth with red flowers on a 
red T-shirt. Figure 3 demonstrates another example: Recognizing the Dalmatian 
before the mottled background leads to an ‘aha experience’, "a pleasing effect, 
caused perhaps by activation of the limbic system by temporal lobe cortex" 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999, p. 21). 
                                        
Figure 3: An example of the figure-ground separation. The recognition of the Dalmatian leads to an ‘aha experience’ (R.C. 
James, from: Marr, 1982, p. 101). 
 
The neural aspects underpinning the grouping shall be explained here in a brief and 
simplified way. The primary visual cortex (VI or BA 17) is organized retinotopically: 
spatial stimuli patterns of the retina are reflected in the spatial stimuli patterns of 
neurons in the visual cortex. Characteristics that are proximately situated in the 
perceivable space are, so to say, also proximately located in the cortex. The 
secondary extra striate visual cortex areas V2, V3, V3A and V410 in the occipital lobe 
are also organized retinotopically. The neurons of area V4 are mainly colour 
specifically organized so that the object recognition takes place based on 
characteristic surface colours and colour contrasts. Grouping would happen, in this 
                                                          
10 According to Zeki's "functional specialization theory", different cortical areas are specialized with respect to different visual 
functions. The main functions of the respective areas are the following: V1 and V2 contain different cell groups that respond to 
colour and shape; cells in V3 and V3A react to shapes (especially to the shape of moving objects), but not to colour. Cells in V4 
respond primarily to colour, but many also to the orientation of lines. Cells in V5 respond to movement, but not to colour. 
39 
 
case, on behalf of the conformity of wavelengths, without requiring a physical 
proximity (Bariow, 1986). Therefore, points with similar wavelengths in the retinal 
image would induce proximate activations in the colour specific area. In this case, 
proximity would be defined within a particular characteristic dimension. With regard to 
the example above, this would mean that the fictional wearer of a blue cloth with red 
flowers on a red shirt may additionally choose matching shoes in the same shade of 
blue, and would be happy to have succeeded in creating an elegant combination. 
Sensory, cognitive and motoric processes are the result of parallel interactions 
between large neuron populations of multiple cortical and sub-cortical structures. The 
process responsible for the functional relations of this distributed activity is called 
‘binding’ (Engel, Roelfsema, Fries, Brecht & Singer, 1997; Seth, McKinstry, Edelman 
& Krichmar, 2004). 
 
In the visual system, this process corresponds to identifying relationships between 
different features within an image in order to recognize objects. It means the different 
information about colour, shape, and movement of an object has to be integrated. 
Evidence suggests that the grouping of features evokes on a neuronal level the 
synchronization of the action potentials of neurons that extract such features. 
Accordingly, those neurons are synchronously active that are responsive to the same 
object. For reviews on the Temporal Correlation Hypothesis of Visual Feature 
Integration, refer to Singer (1993, 1999) and Gray (1999).  
 
One possible interpretation, according to Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), could 
be that these synchronizations direct a corresponding signal to the limbic system, 
thus enhancing the binding process by a feedback process. The authors draw the 
conclusion that artists would therefore try to stimulate the system with the aid of as 
many cues of potential objects as possible. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999, p.23) 
commented that this might help to clarify why grouping and ‘perceptual problem-
solving’ would be used both by artists and fashion designers. On the other hand, 
visitors beholding abstract art at an art exhibition do not only strive to recognize its 
(supposed) content, but find this process in itself to be quite rewarding. Many a 
reader might have already experienced this. Furthermore, examining artworks on 
compositional aspects seems to enjoy great popularity. The authors thus postulated 
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that the reinforcement of the binding process is a source of aesthetic experience, 
which, in turn, influences the effect of compositions and groupings within artworks. 
 
In order to validate this hypothesis, the authors proposed to test patients suffering 
from the Kluever-Bucy syndrome caused by a bilateral destruction of the amygdala.  
These patients would not only suffer from visual agnosia11, but would also have 
difficulties to segment objects from noisy backgrounds. The amygdala represents an 
important part of the limbic system; by a bilateral lesion, the reinforcement of the 
binding process and thereby of the object recognition would be impaired 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999, p.24). However, the Kluever-Bucy syndrome is a 
rarely occurring disease and usually described as a result of bi-temporal lesion.  
 
Another principle dealt with the isolation and enhancement of the visual modality and 
the associated focusing of attention ("Isolating a single module and allocating 
attention"). Therefore, according to Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), a drawing or 
sketch would be more efficient as ‘art’ than a colour photograph. The distribution of 
attention is subject to limitations; that means one cannot simultaneously focus on 
several components to the same extent. The authors concluded that art appeared to 
be particularly appealing if it led to an increased activation of a particular dimension 
(e.g. by means of the ‘peak shift effect’ or grouping). Such would be the case with 
redundant activation of multiple modalities. By isolating a singular modality (e.g. 
shape), the recipient would be able to focus his attention more efficiently on that 
particular source of information, so that the emphasis effected by the artist would 
become apparent. Thereby in turn an increased activation of the limbic system would 
be evoked. Consequently, "less is more" would also apply to the art.  The effect of 
outlines, sufficient to recognize objects, might be based on the fact that the cells in 
the visual pathways would be stimulated adequately by edges and were indifferent to 
homogeneous areas (Hubel & Wiesel, 1979). Hereby it would be explained, 
according to the authors, why outlines were sufficient for object recognition, but not 
why they were more effective than a colour photograph that provides additional 
information. In order to validate the authors' hypothesis that outlines are more 
efficient (see Figure 4), a portrait consisting of outlines would have to cause a 
                                                          
11 A visual agnosia refers to the inability to name objects by visual identification. 
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stronger activation in the brain areas relevant to face recognition (Haxby, Hoffman & 
Gobbini., 2000; Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997) than a photograph.  
   
Figure 4: Example of the effect of different representations of a portrait in a colour photograph, a drawing and a contrast 
reinforcement. 
 
 If, for example, skin colour and skin texture were not decisive for identity recognition, 
this additional redundant information could deduct the limited attentional resources 
from the attributes relevant to object recognition. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) 
considered this principle of isolation moreover as a possible explanation for the 
sudden occurrence of artistic activities in patients with frontotemporal dementia (see 
Section 3.7.2.4) or in autistic persons. 
 
Another law was related to the extraction of contrasts ("Contrast extraction is 
reinforcing"). Here, it was also assumed that the process as such has an enhancing 
effect. Marr (1982)12 proceeded in an influential algorithmic approach from the 
assumption that the analysis of the retinal image according to differences in the 
intensity or brightness, and subsequently, the extraction of edges, contours and 
surfaces represented an early stage in object recognition. Ramachandran and 
Hirstein (1999) described the extraction of contrasts as possibly "intrinsically pleasing 
to the eye" (p. 25), thereby explaining the efficiency of outline drawings. The reason 
                                                          
12 Marr is considered as a pioneer of algorithmic approach to object recognition. He explains the process of perception as a 
process, taking place in steps. It eventually leads - within three segments - to more and more detailed information regarding the 
visual environment and, finally, from the two-dimensional image to the three-dimensional representation. 
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this process of edge detection13, initiated by cells autonomously and at a very early 
stage, should have a rewarding effect, the authors explained again with the 
distribution of attention. Information is found primarily in regions of change, such as in 
edges (due to differences in the intensity or brightness distribution). Therefore, it 
would be useful if these areas attracted more attention to themselves, thus becoming 
more ‘interesting’   than homogeneous surfaces. The authors concluded, what would 
be ‘interesting’ for a cell could also be considered as ‘interesting’ for the whole 
organism – and - that ‘interesting’ in certain circumstances - would stand for 
‘pleasing’. Artist would apply the contrast effect - like other stimulus properties (e.g. 
colour, texture) - in order to achieve attention. The aforementioned contrast effect 
would also be noticeable in other dimensions. For example, a female nude with 
jewelry would be aesthetically more pleasing than total nudity or than a combination 
of clothing and jewelry. Caravaggio (1573-1610) should be mentioned as a further 
example. His images gain significantly in intensity from the contrast effect of light and 
dark (see Figure 5). 
                                
Figure 5: Caravaggio, ‘The Holy Catherine of Alexandria’, 1597. Madrid, Fundación Coleción Thyssen-Bornemisza. 
                                                          
13 The retinal ganglion cells whose axons form the optic nerve, have concentrically organized receptive fields. If a light stimulus 
falls on the receptive field center, the discharge frequency of the cell is increased, in contrast, the discharge frequency is 
reduced when a light stimulus falls on the surrounding periphery (this applies to on-center neurons and vice versa to off-center 
neurons). In this way, the cells respond better to abrupt discontinuities of the light pattern penetrating the retina than to gradual 
changes in light and to the absolute light level, whereas the latter usually have lower biological significance. These concentric 
organization and antagonistic nature of the processing can be also applied to coloured light stimuli. This organization of the cells 
can moreover be found in the thalamus, in the lateral geniculate body. 
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Thus, the impact of outlines and drawings may be explained by the selective 
sensitivity of retinal ganglion cells to discontinuities (see Footnote 13, p. 42). Cells 
are stronger responsive to abrupt changes and weaker to constant stimulation. This 
phenomenon plus the fact that each part of the visual scene is analysed separately 
by the system can be exploited by changing the perceived brightness of the 
foreground of an image by gradually altering the brightness of the background 
(Livingstone, 2002). If the background becomes darker, it seems that the front 
becomes brighter in relation hereto. 
 
Symmetry was described as another aesthetic pleasure-inducing factor. Most 
biologically relevant objects are symmetrical (e.g. hunter, prey, potential partners). 
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) concluded that this property might serve as early 
warning system to achieve attention and to facilitate further processing steps until the 
object would be recognized as a whole. Evolutionary psychological theories postulate 
that the judgement regarding attractiveness of faces would reflect information 
concerning the health status of an individual (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999).  
 
In addition, the authors introduced the ‘generic viewpoint’ principle ("The Generic 
Viewpoint and the Bayesian Logic of Perception"). Object recognition presents itself 
as a complex task if the given stimulus configurations are ambiguous, for example if 
they are partly covered. So-called puzzling pictures or dual-aspect pictures also 
represent ambiguous stimulus patterns where the same stimulus pattern evokes two 
different perceptions, not usually occurring at the same time. The two-dimensional 
image on the retina allows for multiple interpretations whereas the most likely one will 
be preferred. Interpretations arising from projections of very distinct perspectives that 
occur with lower probability are rejected (see Figure 6). Improbable coincidences are 
somewhat suspect. The authors then postulated that just the opposite might be the 
case in art and that the violation of this principle would rather cause more pleasure 
than complying therewith.  
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Figure 6: Representation of the "generic viewpoint". A seems to represent two overlapping squares different to B, shown from a 
particular point of view. The flat hexagon in D could correspond to the cube C from a special point of view but will not be 
interpreted as a cube as in E. 
 
 
In the following principle, Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) investigated the 
question, why ‘art as metaphor’ appears aesthetically pleasing and why capturing 
artistically designed analogies is perceived as rewarding. According to the authors, it 
may be the use of a simple, specific, or simply to be visualized example, which 
makes it possible to ignore irrelevant, potentially distracting aspects of an idea or a 
concept and allows us to highlight the most essential aspects. 
Whether this phenomenon is a means of effective communication or "a basic 
cognitive mechanism for encoding the world more economically" (p 31), remains to 
be clarified. According to their theory, there would be many paintings, which directly 
evoked an emotional response, long before the metaphor had become explicit.  The 
authors concluded that "this suggests that the metaphor is effective even before one 
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is conscious of it, implying it might also be a basic principle of achieving economy of 
coding rather than a rhetorical device" (p. 31). 
The underlying principle would be the ability, necessary for survival, to classify 
objects into categories. Whereby consequently, the discovering of similarities and the 
detection of connections between superficially regarded dissimilar events would lead 
to the activation of the limbic system, to ensure again that the process is rewarding. 
 
Again, the ‘eight laws of artistic experience’ postulated by the authors are 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Peak shift effect and filtering out of the essence  
2.  Isolation of a single (visual) dimension or feature and focus of attention  
3. Perceptual grouping and binding lead to direct enhancement. 
4. Extraction of contrasts has a rewarding effect  
5. Perceptual problem-solving and recognizing implicit meaning  
6. Generic viewpoint or the probability of a specific perception  
7. Art as a metaphor  
8. Aesthetic preference for symmetry 
 
Thus, the authors primarily described visual perceptual phenomena and processing 
mechanisms related to the reception and production of visual arts. They referred to a 
possible involvement of the limbic system during these processes, which would have 
a reinforcing and rewarding effect. In order to validate these assumptions, 
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) proposed to capture the degree of the limbic 
activation or rather the emotional reaction to the reception of images by means of 
measuring the psycho-galvanic reflex. 
 
Astounding and at the same time symptomatic of the difficulties of understanding that 
apparently exist  between art and science, were the partly angry responses to the 
(1999) essay written by Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999). 
 
Gombrich (2000) criticized, for example, that the authors had too much not taken into 
account of what is found today as art in museums. Ramachandran replied that 
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Gombrich had not given sufficient attention to certain aspects of artworks found in 
museums. lone (2000), an artist herself, criticized that artists, who were, in some 
sense, the experts in the field of art, had been excluded from the discussion. 
Wheelwell (2000), in turn, spoke out vehemently against a reductionist approach to 
art, which she saw realized here by a confusion of activation and beauty. Although 
the authors claimed that a large part of what is called art, was actually based on 
these eight principles, they were nevertheless aware "that much of art is 
idiosyncratic, ineffable and defies analysis but [we] would argue did whatever 
component of art is lawful - however small - emerges either from exploiting these 
principles or from a playful and deliberate violation of them " (p. 50). 
 
3.2.2 Principles of visual perception and their meaning for art perception and 
art creation 
 
Livingstone (2002) emphasized the difference between colour and luminance or 
brightness14. The first one may probably serve as a carrier of emotion and 
symbolism, the latter, on the other hand, only defines shape, texture and line. 
As stated above, Marr (1982) postulated the extraction of edges using brightness 
differences in an early stage of object recognition (see also Footnote 13, p. 56). 
Brightness differences between two gray levels can be readily perceived, though the 
same distinction between two proximate colour values may often be difficult. 
Accordingly, artist would have to deal with different brightness levels, regardless of 
the colour, because colour and brightness are carriers of differing visual information15 
and are processed by various structures of the brain (neural brightness system and 
neural colour system). Thus, they can play different roles in the arts. The author 
analysed ways in which various artworks reflect different characteristics of our visual 
system. She was referring preferably to exhibits of impressionist painters, particularly 
because these artists had developed some techniques, whose effects could be found 
in the parallel structure of our visual system. Unrealistic brightness levels can, in turn, 
                                                          
14 Brightness is the subjective description of the luminance; the brightness measured physically, whereby there is no simple 
linear relationship between the two. Luminance is the amount of visible light that leaves a point on a surface in a given direction. 
Thus, brightness is the amount and colour of the perceived frequency of visible light.  Colours described under the same 
conditions are described in the dimensions of brightness, shade and saturation. 
15 The sense of sight is divided in the qualities of brightness (or gray level) and the colours red, green and blue, divided 
according to the spectral sensitivities of the photoreceptors. With respect to pigments, red, yellow and blue are referred by 
convention as primary colours; with respect to light, the primary colours are red, green and blue, in printing and photography 
cyan, magenta and yellow, the "negative" of the optical primary colours. 
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lead to an illusory experience of luminosity, depth, and movement. As an example, 
Livingstone (2002) refers to Monet's impression at sunrise (‘Impression, Soleil 
Levant’, 1872, see Figure 7), from whose title the corresponding art direction 
Impressionism derived its name. This example may demonstrate how difficult it can 
be to assess different brightness values. The sun in the original picture (A) appears 
to the recipient as bright, vibrant, intense and alive. The corresponding black-and-
white reproduction (B), however, reveals that the sun and the surrounding cloud layer 
exhibit nearly the same brightness value. In the manipulated version of the picture 
(C), the sun receives a higher brightness value - (as it can also be seen in the black-
and-white reproduction (D) and would correspond to natural circumstances) - but 
does, however, no longer have the same effect and looks rather dull and pale. 
 
Figure 7: Claude Monet, ‘Impression, Soleil Levant’, 1872, Paris, Musée Marmottan. A represents the original version, B shows 
the corresponding black and white reproduction; the sun has nearly the same brightness as the clouds in the background. C 
shows the altered version with the sun brightened. D shows the corresponding black-and-white reproduction with brightened sun 
(based on Livingstone, 2002, p 38). 
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The sun of the painting has different effects on different parts of the visual system. 
While the sun seems almost invisible for the system, which, among other things, is 
responsible for movement, depth perception (three-dimensional), figure-ground 
structure and position in space (dorsal path), it seems clearly visible for the primate-
specific colour sensitive part, later developed in evolution, which is responsible for 
object and face recognition (ventral path)16. From this discrepancy possibly arises the  
vibrating, pulsating effect. The importance of the surrounding light conditions for the 
perception of colour and brightness, and therefore for the perception of artworks, 
depends on the different sensitivity of the retinal photoreceptors to certain 
wavelengths (spectral sensitivity to light). With increasing light intensity, the response 
of the photoreceptors increases, they react by a change in the membrane potential 
and the optical pigment contained in different sensors decomposes. The 
photoreceptors are, in the whole, most sensitive to light in the green / yellow range of 
the spectrum (e.g. Livingstone, 2002; Shimamura, 2013). In contrast, there are more 
photons required in the red / blue regions of the spectrum in order to sense an 
equivalent brightness.  
 
During the colour perception at light (photo topic vision), the rods are active, for the 
black and white vision at dusk (scotopic vision) the cones, which contain more 
photosensitive pigment and can already react to a single photon. Since there are only 
cones at the point of the sharpest vision, the so-called fovea centralis, the visual 
acuity decreases with decreasing brightness as well. The two types of photoreceptors 
have a different sensitivity with respect to the frequency of light. In comparison to 
cones, rods react more sensitive to short - wave light (blue/green), with a maximum 
sensitivity at 505 nm. The maximum sensitivity of the cones is at 555 nm. With 
increasing twilight, the eye adapts to darkness. Thus, the rods are increasingly 
involved in the process. The result is a shift of the perceived brightness of the 
colours: at the same luminance, red is perceived as more dark and blue as relatively 
                                                          
16 The last section of the visual pathway, the optic radiation, ends in the retinotopically organized primary visual cortex (area VI 
or Brodmann area [BA] 17) in the occipital lobe. The signals from these regions are transmitted to the visual association and 
integration areas. From Area VI leave at least two largely independent extra striate visual pathways that act in parallel. A dorsal 
path of VI goes towards the parietal visual regions and mainly serves the object localization, but also the visual control of 
movement. It is colourblind. The object recognition, including all properties associated with the object, such as size, colour and 
shape, is a function of the ventral visual path in the temporal lobe and responds to colours, but with a lower resolution than to 
shapes. This is consistent with the larger receptive fields of colour-specific ganglion cells that react antagonistically to the 
complementary colours red-green and yellow-blue. 
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brighter (‘Purkinje shift’; see Anstis, 2002). There are about twice as much red as 
green cones, and only about 1% of cones are blue; thus, the combined response of 
the cones is relatively insensitive to the blue range of the spectrum17. Rods, on the 
other hand, are, as mentioned beforehand, more sensitive to the corresponding blue 
light wavelength and less susceptible to longer wavelength (red) light. Therefore, in 
dim light, the same quantity of shorter wavelength (blue) light appears 100 times 
brighter than the same amount of longer wavelength (red) light (Livingstone, 2002). 
 
 An object can only appear in colours or mixtures of colours, which are also included 
in the light source. White yellow sodium lamps, which may occasionally be found 
along roads, may be mentioned as an example: They radiate very little green and red 
light. As a result, some objects appear colourless. Reflectance and context of the 
object are also significant, because the colour surroundings of an object influence its 
perceived colour (Livingstone, 2002). 
 
Thus, the perception of brightness and colour value depends, among other things, on 
the lighting conditions18, the reflectance of the surface, from the context, the 
frequency of the reflected light (obtained by multiplying the reflectance with the 
lighting spectrum) and the degree of adaptation of the eye. Accordingly, the design of 
a painting could be adapted to the conditions of later exposure, provided that the 
spectrum of the later illumination is known. About self-tests, it should be remembered 
that the eye requires a particular time for adaptation to the dark. The greatest 
sensitivity of the eye, and thus of the rods, begins only after remaining at least for 30 
minutes in the dark (Livingstone, 2002).  
 
Thus, colours show a different variability in brightness, which, in turn, affects the 
perceived three-dimensionality of various parts of the painting. Shading results from 
variations in the light level without changes in saturation. For example, shading and 
the resulting contrast effects within a garment painted in dark colour are limited, 
                                                          
17 There are three types of cones (L M and S), which have different spectral sensitivities due to their different colour pigments. 
Within the L-system (long-wavelength sensitivity cones), the maximum sensitivity is at 590 nm, thus in the red zone, at the M-
system (middle-wavelength sensitivity cones) at about 540 nm (green) and for the S-system (short-wavelength sensitivity cones) 
at about 440 nm (blue).   All three systems are always activated, although to a different extent. The ratio of the number of the 
respective types of receptors is 40: 20: 1 for L: M: S. 
18 An increase of the luminance of a stimulus also leads to an increase of the colourfulness, thus lighter coloured stimuli appear 
more colourful (Hunt effect).  
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which leads to a reduction of the perceived three-dimensionality. Perceived depth 
through shading is a function of the dorsal ‘colour-blind’ path (see Footnote 16. p.49), 
that responds only to contrasts within the brightness dimension. The varying extent to 
which shading effects the depth of different colours could undoubtedly evoke, 
however, interesting effects within a painting.  
 
Pictures applying the same colour brightness value, therefore, stimulate only the 
ventral path of the visual system and lose some depth. Very small contrasts in 
brightness with very little or no colour contrast stimulate, in turn, only the dorsal path 
of the visual system, which is far more sensitive to contrasts than the ventral path. In 
this case, there would be a sensation of space and a perception of the form, yet, at 
the same time, increasing difficulty to recognize contents. Three-dimensional 
sensations are therefore also achieved by applying completely unrealistic colours, as 
long as the brightness contrasts are right. Livingstone (2002) takes the style of 
Fauvism (e.g. Matisse) as an example. On the basis of differing properties of the two 
visual pathways, Livingstone (2002) also explained the illusory perception of 
movement that appears to come from some paintings, exemplifying the art of the 
Impressionists again. According to her, some colour compositions of these artists 
showed such a small brightness contrast, that it would result in this illusory motion 
perception. The reason for this would be the same as why one would also perceive 
little or no depth in such images. The dorsal path, which plays a role in the perception 
of depth, position, and movement is as already mentioned, highly sensitive in terms 
of brightness differences, but insensitive to colour (Livingstone, 2002; Shimamura, 
2013). However, the ventral path is quite capable of recognizing objects painted with 
the same brightness values, but different colours, whereas their position and stability 
would remain poorly defined through the dorsal path. Subsequently, an oscillating 
impression could thus be created (see Figure 7). The dorsal path is also responsible 
for constancy in perception, in terms of the stability of the perceived visual scene 
despite eye movements. A lack of brightness contrasts impaired this function; this 
would lead in turn to an illusory sensation of movement. In that sense, it would be 
enough to let the eyes wander over a pattern of spots and dots with the same 
brightness values in order to cause such a sensation, that is, independent of the 
perception of objects (Livingstone, 2002). As already mentioned, the ventral path of 
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the visual system is sensitive to both colour and shape and serves the object 
recognition (see Footnote 16, p. 49). Here, the colour system operates at a relatively 
small resolution: the cells have larger receptive fields within the colour system. 
Livingstone (2002) postulated, if a strong contrasting line was added to colours with a 
low brightness contrast in relation to the background (e. g, watercolour or pastel 
colours), the effect would be that the coloured area seemed to conform to the outline, 
even if this was not the case in reality. This effect would be correlated, in turn, with a 
higher sensitivity to contrasts of the colour sensitive ganglion cells, which are less 
responsive to homogeneous surfaces. Accordingly, the colour would be perceived as 
being "filled into" the contrasting edges. Therefore, if one drew an object, and 
coloured its borders and made the colour fade towards the centre, one still produced 
a relatively homogeneous colour impression. Therefore, it is assumed that a high-
resolution form system defines an object, whereas a colour system, working with 
lower resolution, ‘fills’ the colour ‘in’. If dots or patches of colours with similar 
brightness values are painted next to each other (as e.g. in the Neo-Impressionism 
and Pointillism), it produces an effect of a colour mixture and thereby of a relatively 
homogenous surface defined by illusory edges. The similar brightness values within a 
region lead to the illusory perception of the border to an area defined by different 
brightness values, which is not the case, if the colours showed large differences in 
brightness (Livingstone, 2002; Shimamura, 2013).  
As already explained above, the visual processing runs parallel as different qualities 
of vision are processed in parallel (see Footnote 16, p. 49) and sequentially. The 
visual system consists of separate subsystems, independent from each other, which 
analyse different characteristics of the retinal image (contrast, shape, colour, 
movement, structure). At each stage of the visual process, the neurons become more 
sensitive to specific features; this is the case over growing regions of the visual field. 
Thus, cells in the retina and the thalamus react selectively to discontinuities (see 
Footnote 13, p. 42). Cells in the primary visual cortex (VI) react, among other, to the 
direction of the contour (orientation columns). Further processing steps take place in 
the visual association and integration regions. Higher visual areas may then be 
sensitive to faces (fusiform gyrus) or other complex features (Livingstone, 2002).  
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The perception of our environment is based on the cellular activity of all these stages. 
Thereby, we can become simultaneously aware of local and global visual information. 
If global and local information are consistent, there is no conflict between the 
information on the individual stages of visual processing. If this is not the case, there 
may be an interference with information of the different phases. An example to be 
mentioned are photo mosaics (as known from posters) representing objects 
consisting of individual photographs. In this case, global and local information is 
inconsistent. Usually, there is a dynamic interaction, at one time amplifying the global 
information (the entire object is detected), then again, the local information becomes 
prominent (and the individual photographs are better perceived). Images usually 
have in common that they are designed on a flat surface, the image carrier; hence, 
they are two-dimensional, as the retinal image is also. However, from the retinal 
images, especially of both eyes, visual information can be extracted, which paintings 
do not deliver. J. J Gibson (1979/1982) understood by visual information the one 
"which can be extracted from an in-flow optical arrangement" (1982, p 67). The 
characteristic of this kind of information is, according to him, that it will not be 
transferred, does not consist of signals and does not require neither a transmitter nor 
receiver. By ‘array’, everything is understood which is "distributed in any way, 
structured or arranged" (p. 69). It cannot be assumed though, that paintings met 
these requirements since they represented “an image on a flat surface” (p. 69). The 
optical arrangement of still images is fixed, that means is not in a state of flux. 
Nevertheless, also still images would be characterized by invariants providing the  
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information, but not shapes and colours19. J. J. Gibson, therefore, formulated the 
concept of information particular to perception, differentiating it from a concept of 
information based on the theory of communication:  
"We cannot explain perception by concepts of communication; it is rather the other 
way around. We cannot share any information about the world with others if we have 
not previously perceived the world. And the information that we have at our disposal 
for our perception radically differs from the information that we share." (1982, p.67)  
 
The formation of shades, interposition or occlusion, the size-distance relation and the 
associated linear perspective and distribution of the surface structure (texture 
gradient) and the more pronounced blue colouring and blurring of further distant 
objects are available for developing depth in paintings. These factors are called 
mapping factors and can be perceived with only one eye and motionless head. In the 
real world, however, there are more factors available for depth perception, such as 
the motion parallax and two binocular sources, the lateral disparity and convergence.  
                                                          
19 Perceiving the environment means, according to J. J. Gibson (1979/1982) "to extract information from the surrounding light 
assembly" (1982, p. 287), whereas the information contained in the ambient light does not consist of shapes and colours but of 
invariants. An image was "an arrangement of permanent structure invariants that are without form and name" (1982, p. 291). It 
is supposed that "some invariants of an optical arrangement can be separated from their perspective structure, not only with 
changing perspective as in everyday life, but also when the perspective is held, as indicated in a still image (p. 291). A picture 
without motion showed no transformation, hence no invariants could be found under transformation, but still would this image 
show invariants, albeit weaker than in a moving image. J. J. Gibson developed a nativist approach to perception by focusing 
primarily on the analysis of the ecological context. His theory of ‘ecological optics’ dealt rather with the stimuli than with the 
mechanisms of perception as such. The active exploring of the environment through movement would be essential in this 
process. It was assumed that information regarding the invariant or stable characteristics of the environment was directly 
accessible.  
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The lateral disparity originates from the fact that the pupils of the two eyes have a 
distance of about 6 cm (2.3 inches), thereby shifting the horizontal positions of the 
corresponding retinal images. The eyes will therefore receive slightly different images 
since they perceive the subject from a slightly different perspective20. The amount of 
lateral disparity depends on the relative distance of the objects from the beholder. 
However, lateral disparity appears as depth information only up to a distance of 6 
meters (Shimamura, 2013).  
Depending on the distance of the objects to the beholder, the axes of both eyes 
converge and meet at the fixation point. This binocular depth information is called 
convergence. The angle of convergence is evaluated as a measure of the distance of 
the fixation point. However, the information obtained therefrom is only useful up to a 
distance of 3 meters; beyond that, the differences are too small.  
 
The motion parallax21 conveys depth relevant information: During motion, even small 
movements of the head or eyes are sufficient for the retinal images in the two eyes to 
determine the relative distances of objects in the real world and the amount and 
direction of their relative motion. As we move, nearby objects are moving faster over 
our visual field than objects farther away.  
 
Within paintings, there is now no relative movement between the objects, and the two 
retinal images are also similar (absence of binocular disparity); thus, an image 
appears flat in any case, regardless of the applied mapping factors for depth 
perception. If one closes an eye, however, and maintains a greater distance to a 
painting, the depth perception increases. The reason is that, in this case, the 
binocular depth cues are suppressed and the monocular, the mapping factors, 
                                                          
20  In order to visualize the effect of lateral disparity, the following self-test is described: with left eye closed both index fingers 
are held in front of the right eye. One is held at arm's length, the other about an inch from the face away. Both are one on the 
line of some object. Keeping this position and fixing on the distant object, now the right eye is closed and the left open. With the 
left eye you can see the fingers, due to the somewhat different perspective, clearly shifted laterally (Zimbardo, 1996; 
Shimamura, 2013). This simple experiment demonstrates once again the calculating power our brain during visual perception, 
by combining the two different retinal images into a unified perception and interpretation of the horizontal displacement as 
depth. 
21 To illustrate the phenomenon of motion parallax, take the same position as described in the self-test for lateral disparity (see 
Footnote 20, p.54). Subsequently, upon further fixation of the object, the head has to be inclined to the side. Now you see both 
fingers moving, the nearer one faster than the more distant, while the fixed object remains quiet (Zimbardo, 1996; Shimamura, 
2013).  
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become more apparent - provided the corresponding mapping factors have been 
applied to the painting.  
 
As during binocular vision the differences between the two retinal images are only 
subtle, enough details have to be recognized in order to be able to discriminate them 
at all. If there is a deprivation of binocular depth cues, the mapping factors will gain 
new relevance - (if monocular and binocular depth cues convey contradictory results, 
the latter are of greater importance) - and convey an illusory sense of three-
dimensionality. Livingstone (2002) postulated that paintings without any exact details, 
which seem to be blurred in some way, do not represent an effective stimulus for 
binocular depth perception and thereby evoke a greater depth effect.  
Here, the author referred once again to the art of the Impressionists, whose mostly 
airy, light and colourful brushwork would favor such effects.  
 
As an explanation, Livingstone (2002) refers to the particular organization of 
individual ganglion cells at an early stage of the processing in the visual system. As 
already stated (see Footnote 13, p. 42), there exist cells in the visual system with 
concentrically organized receptive fields. They work antagonistically and are more 
responsive to abrupt differences in brightness and wavelength than to gradual 
changes. Cells organized in this way respond to differences in depth in the same 
way. Consequently, the visual system responds to abrupt changes in depth stronger 
than to gradual ones, and this applies largely to local rather than to global depth 
variations. Livingstone (2002) then assumed that the effect of bas-reliefs was 
attributable to the fact that they appeared three-dimensional, more than they actually 
were, since local depth information would be more prevalent here. Furthermore, a 
paste application of colours would favor an illusory sensation of depth, just as the 
binocular depth cues react more sensitive to abrupt than to gradual discontinuities.  
Images showing horizontally repeated patterns can likewise evoke false depth 
impressions as the brain produces wrong connections between various points within 
the two retinal images. The elements of these 3-D-images are arranged minimally 
different within each vertical row. If the axes of the two eyes now cross in front of or 
behind the picture (that is, look through the picture), they are not directed to the same 
element, which leads to a systematic disparity and a sense of three-dimensionality.  
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A further possibility of how semi-regular patterns can cause an illusion of depth is that 
the visual system establishes a connection between non-corresponding elements 
within the pattern. The illusion occurs even with a correct fixation point of both eyes 
on one level of the image. The retinal images of the two eyes are identical if we look 
at a plane surface, that is, each element of the surface projects an image on 
corresponding points of the two retinas. In a three-dimensional scene, objects, which 
are in front of or behind the fixation line, project images on non-corresponding points 
of the two retinas. Repeated patterns can now lead to a faulty connection of the 
different retinal images, as there are in this case more identical valid ways of 
connecting, which, in turn, can cause the effect of the illusion of depth.  
 
Livingstone (2002) referred to paintings of Impressionism and Neo-Impressionism, 
which can trigger an atmospheric sensation. She indicated to the possible reason for 
an illusory depth impression: semi-regular patterns (leaves, flowers) or a coarse, 
rough duct may evoke this effect. 
 
3.3 Hemisphere specialization in artistic perception and creation 
 
In former and present times, art and creativity have been discussed in the context of 
hemisphere specialization (see Section 3.6 and 4.5.2). Manifold investigations 
support the assumption that the right hemisphere plays a predominant role in artistic 
abilities. In simplified terms, the picture processing is predominantly attributed to the 
right and language processing to the left hemisphere. However, studies indicate that 
both regions are involved in linguistic and spatial cognition (Ng et al., 2000), though 
in a different way and manner. In the majority of right-handed people, the planum 
temporale, a part of the temporal lobe of the left hemisphere, is stronger and more 
pronounced than in the right hemisphere22.   On one hand, this is connected with the 
localization of language processing in the left hemisphere, on the other hand with the 
identification of a ‘dominant’ hemisphere.  However, it cannot be spoken here of a 
hemisphere dominance in the absolute sense; each hemisphere is specialized in 
different functions and therefore dominant in terms of these particular functions. The 
                                                          
22 Morphological left-right asymmetries seem to be rather an exception than the rule in biological systems (see Good et al., 
2001). 
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right hemisphere shows a greater involvement in visual-spatial tasks, geometric 
patterns, mental rotations and imagination, as well as in face processing. Zaidel 
(2013) notes that: 
"The right hemisphere is now widely regarded as specializing in spatial perception, in 
topographical layouts of personal and extrapersonal space, mental visualization of 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional figures, mental rotation of visual 
representations, and in facial processing for recognition and identification. The strong 
specialization in the right hemisphere for faces is supported by neuroimaging fMRI 
studies, from cases of prosopagnosia (the loss of the ability to recognize people by 
their faces alone), and from poor performance by right anterior temporal lobectomy 
patients on facial memory tests (Damasio, Damasio, Van Hoesen, 1982; Kanwisher, 
2010)” (p. 8). 
The left hemisphere, in turn, is the language and analytically oriented and allocates 
meaning to visual scenes that are not clearly defined, as, for example, in surrealistic 
art. 
Concerning characteristic thinking and cognitive computational styles that distinguish 
the cerebral hemispheres, Zaidel (2013) postulates:  
"the left hemisphere applies detailed sustained attention piece meal, analytic, and 
logical computational approaches, whereas cognitive computations in the right 
hemisphere are based on global, holistic, or gestalt principles. However, it is highly 
likely that many normal human perceptions and expressions are modulated 
bihemispherically, either jointly or through complementarity, when some cognitive 
subcomponents are controlled by one hemisphere and other subcomponents are 
controlled by the other hemisphere” (p. 9). 
Zaidel (2013) bases his hypothesis of the left hemispheric involvement at the 
perception of surrealistic art on a study by Zaidel and Kasher (1989). In their 
hemifield study, they investigated the question of right or left hemispheric 
involvement, examining healthy subjects in terms of remembering a series of 
paintings. The stimuli consisted of two types of paintings, surrealistic (by Magritte, 
Dali, and so on) and realistic (typical representations of reality). The authors 
revealed, 
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"that surrealistic paintings were remembered better by the left hemisphere than by 
the right hemisphere while no significant hemispheric differences emerged with the 
realistic paintings. These results show that the fine art is not a unitary entity, at least 
not from the viewer's point of view. Conceptual features applied by artists distinguish 
the format of the works; visual art is multifaceted and highly diverse, thus requiring a 
range of cognitive processing on the part of the viewer. To wit, there are numerous 
schools of art, impressionism, expressionism, surrealism, realism, symbolism, and so 
on and so forth. All of this has sadly been overlooked in exploring the neural 
underpinning of art (Zaidel et al., 1989) "(Zaidel, 2013, p. 11). 
At tasks related to steered attention, it could be observed that by global attention, 
that means attention oriented on the picture as a whole, the right gyrus lingual nerve 
was activated. Conversely, in focal, detail-oriented attention an activation of the left 
inferior occipital lobe (Fink et al., 1996) appeared. The right parietal lobe processes 
probably global features of complex stimulus arrangements, as well as the 
corresponding spatial relations, whereas the left parietal lobe is involved in a detailed 
visual analysis (Ng et al., 2000). In this respect, both hemispheres are involved in the 
visual-spatial information processing. However, the right parietal lobe seems to play a 
more dominant role as consistent earlier and greater frequency changes can be 
observed there, and brain lesions have a stronger effect. 
Studies describing artistically creative individuals with neurodegenerative processes 
and other brain lesions (see Section 3.7), support the assumption that visual art 
mainly evokes the involvement of the right hemisphere. The left parietal lobe creates 
the visual-spatial preconditions for art, while the right temporal lobe integrates and 
interprets these percepts. The right temporal lobe appears also to play a role in terms 
of the extraction and highlighting of essential features of artistic compositions. In 
contrast, it seems that the left parietal and temporal lobes exercise inhibitory effects 
on artistic expression by drawing the attention to visual-spatial details and a semantic 
labelling. Frontal executive functions are in terms of artistic creation probably also of 
importance, in particular with regard to a behaviour referred to as ‘novelty – seeking’ 
(Méndez, 2004). 
Besides, the two cerebral hemispheres appear to play different roles in relation to 
emotions, with the right hemisphere apparently being more involved in negative 
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emotions and the left in inhibiting such negative emotions (Altenmüller et al., 2002; 
Schmidt & Trainor, 2001).  
When considering a face with asymmetries in the expression (see Figure 8), it 
depends on the left half of the face, consequently on the one corresponding to the 
right hemisphere, which impression one gains. From such observations one can infer 
that the right hemisphere is superior to the left with regard to emotional reactions. 
 
              
Figure 8: Faces with asymmetries in the expression. If you look in the middle of the one or the other image, one senses a 
different facial expression respectively, laughing or sad (from Maffel Florentini. 1995, p. 169). 
 
In viewing and processing an image, the possible conversion of content into terms, 
that means the verbalization, is undoubtedly of importance. Related herewith is 
probably the greater challenge of abstract art to the untrained viewer. In this context, 
Linke (2001) pointed to ‘Melencholia I’, (1514), a work of Albrecht Dürer, in which he 
discovered evidence of the hemispherical division of the brain functions (see Figure 
9). According to this theory, the verbalization of the polyhedron in the left half of the 
picture of the emblematic work would cause difficulties. The placement of the visual-
spatial analysis task in the left visual field, which is associated with the right 
hemisphere, would be thus in optimum correspondence. Furthermore, a far stronger 
depth effect is realized in the left half of the picture than in the right half 
(corresponding to the left hemisphere), which seems to correspond more to a 
narrative character, as for example by the writing Putto. Spatial thinking is as 
aforementioned, allocated to the right hemisphere and located mainly in the parietal 
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lobe. If we assume that consciously or unconsciously artists seek to arrange their 
artworks in such a way that visual areas of the brain are optimally stimulated 
(Ramachandran &; Hirstein, 1999; Zeki, 1994), one may suspect that the artist in the 
presented work has been successful. In Figure 9, an illustration of Dürer’s 
melancholy is shown both according to the original and in a mirrored-reverted 
perspective. The viewers of the picture may now cover one-half of the image and 
decide for themselves which of the two representations are more pleasing to them. 
The fixation of the viewing direction should be in the middle since the information 
should be presented separately to the hemispheres, which is however difficult due to 
the small size of the pictures. 
Dürer’s engraving ‘Melencholia I’ is also symbolic because the many tools, the 
polyhedron, and the globe refer to artistic activity, representing at the same time a 
relationship with geometry as the basis for all arts. In addition, the melancholy comes 
into play, which has been related to talent and creativity since antiquity. The number 
‘I’ is to be understood as a reference to the expression of the slightest form of 
melancholy, supposed to be essentially in art (Anzelewsky, 1988). Indeed, a more 
severe depressive episode would be hardly conducive for artistic or any other 
activities. Depressive patients are at least at the beginning of treatment, hardly to be 
motivated to draw (Kraft, 1986). The interaction of art and psychopathology will be 
briefly addressed later on.  
A reduced inhibition of the right hemisphere by the left hemisphere may result in an 
increased artistic output as observations of patients with frontotemporal dementia 
have demonstrated (Miller, Boone, Cummings, Read & Mishkin, 2000; Miller, 
Cummings et al., 1998; Miller et al., 1996; see Section 3.7.2.4). At the same time, the 
temporary inhibition of the left hemisphere leads to increased negative feelings. 
Affective disorders have more frequently been observed in artists (Post, 1994). A 
disinhibition of the right hemisphere appears to be one hand related to creative skills, 
but possibly also promotes the occurrence of negative feelings and affective 
disorders. 
An important role with regard to the dynamics of neuropsychological processes in the 
picture analysis is also allocated to the frontal lobe. To the forebrain, memory 
functions (e.g. Ranganath, Johnson, & D'Esposito, 2003) and higher cognitive 
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functions such as attention, expectations, and motivational functions are attributed. 
The right frontal lobe is also involved in "novelty seeking and divergent non-verbal 
tasks, in the sense of a creative use of objects” (Carlsson, Wendt & Risberg, 2000; 
see Section 4.5.3).  
                  
Figure 9: Albrecht Dürer, ‘Melencolia I’, 1514, Berlin, museum of prints and drawings SMPK. The left side shows a picture of the 
original, while on the right side, there is a reflection of the same. 
 
 
3.4 Art preference and neural mechanisms  
In this research paper, three important milestones with regard to neuroimaging 
studies will be presented. They are supposed to create a first provisional framework 
with regard to neural correlates of aesthetic appreciation and aim at representing 
brain activity associated with judgments in terms of the beauty of visual stimuli (Cela-
Conde et al., 2004; Kawabati & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004). In addition, 
where it seems appropriate, studies supporting or expanding the results of the three 
core studies will be presented. Regarding the studies of Cela-Conde et al. (2004), 
Kawabati and Zeki (2004) and Vartanian and Goel (2004), Nadal, Munar, Capó, 
Rosselló and Cela-Conde (2007) have proposed the thesis that these were different 
from previous neuropsychological results of research and moreover, that there would 
be no concordance of their results. However, the authors point out that the three 
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aforementioned studies are indeed displayed in Chatterjee's (2003) model of visual 
aesthetics. In this respect, a detailed analyse in the context of the question whether 
the model can be verified by studies including research methods of electrical 
recording technique will be presented in Chapter 5.  One can illustrate, according to 
the authors that the neuroimaging results of research are not contradictory in nature, 
but complement each other and are to be determined as a thematic enrichment 
(Nadal et al. 2007).  
The study by Cela-Conde et al. (2004) to be presented here, was based on the core 
statements made by Bartels and Zeki (1998), namely that the artist is able to make 
intuitively use of this processing/perceptual system in order to stimulate aesthetic 
perception.  
Cela-Conde et al. (2004) concede to Bartels and Zeki (1998) the identification of 
some "laws" of aesthetic experience, but they also stress the important role of an 
aesthetic variable in the context of identification of such brain areas that are involved 
in visual perception. The lack of such an involvement of an aesthetic variable should 
be critically scrutinized.  This has been the reason for a more specified study on the 
involvement of the prefrontal cortex in aesthetic perception.  
Considering the previous point, Cela-Conde et al. (2004) have asked whether the 
prefrontal cortex is eventually selectively activated and furthermore whether this 
activation can be observed by means of the neuro imagination technique of magneto 
encephalography (MEG).   
Concerning the use of neuroimaging methods (MEG) by Cela-Conde et al. (2004) it 
should be prefaced that this is the most obvious distinguishing feature in comparison 
to the other studies, all of which were carried out by means of event-related fMRI.  
Cela-Conde et al. (2004) tested eight women, inexperienced in the art, at an average 
age of 30 years, using MEG. The stimulus material consisted of 320 "artistic and 
natural colored pictures" (Cela-Conde et al., p.6321). In order to achieve the highest 
possible standardization, the authors have homogenized the stimuli with regard to 
"pictorial complexity, color spectrum, luminosity and light reflection" (Cela-Conde et 
al., p.6321). 
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Every stimulus was also set to 150 pixels per inch and a dimension of 12 x 9 cm. 
Photographs containing close views of people were discarded (Cela-Conde et al., 
2004) to avoid neural face recognition effects. In comparison to the other studies 
presented, Cela-Conde et al. (2004) were, moreover, the only ones who used non-
artistic stimuli besides artistic stimuli. 
 The results showed a statistically significant activation of the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex of the participants while viewing beautiful stimuli (p <0.01). This 
activation was observed both with natural and artistic stimuli. The said activation was 
recorded with a latency of 400-100ms; the other related latency of the visual cortex 
was carried out after 130ms. 
Bartels and Zeki (1999, as cited in Cela-Conde et al., 2004) remarked on this that, 
"time is crucial because it shows that in a multistage process attributes perceived at 
different times are processed at different sites" (p.6323). 
A series of variance analyses (two-way hemisphere x aesthetic / non-aesthetic 
condition) also led to the conclusion for late latencies (400-900ms) that aesthetic 
stimuli resulted in comparison to non-aesthetic stimuli into a significantly higher 
number of activation sources in the left prefrontal dorsolateral cortex  (Cela-Conde et 
al., 2004). In the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, this distinction was not to be 
observed (see Figure 10). Similarly, clear differences in the left hemisphere with 
regard to dipole activation were observed in each test person. 
 
             
Figure 10: Activation of the PDC under stimuli qualified as beautiful by participant (left) and under stimuli qualified as not 
beautiful (right) (Cela-Conde et al., 2004, 6323). 
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According to the above-mentioned “multistage process of perceiving attributes”, Cela-
Conde et al. (2004) see parallels to the “theory of multistage integration (TMI)” in the 
visual system (Bartels & Zeki, 1998, Zeki & Bartels, 1999; Zeki, 1999).  Zeki and 
Bartels (1999) postulate that "The visual brain consists of several parallel, 
functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) 
which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously 
presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node 
and at different times if processed by different nodes" (p.225). 
The authors consider the concept of TMI as sustained in several aspects by their 
experimental results. 
Firstly, the research results have confirmed that the visual perception could be 
regarded as a system built up of different stages (Cela-Conde, 2004). As far as 
Bartels and Zeki´s multistage system is concerned, further considerations will be 
made in Chapter 5.  As mentioned above, these distinct stages of processing occur in 
different temporal epochs. Secondly, Cela-Conde et al. (2004) take into consideration 
special brain areas underneath the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the context of 
aesthetic experience. Referring to this consideration, the authors assume the 
existence of a perception area for aesthetics. According to the authors, this area has 
an additional function to areas involved in a perception of forms and colors that is 
more fundamental. Cela-Conde et al. (2004) refer in this connection to the 
experiments of Zeki and Martini (1998), who describe this area in the context of 
subjects perceiving abnormally colored objects. Zeki and Martini (1998, as cited in 
Cela-Conde et al. 2004, p.6324), were inspired in their study by the "liberation of 
colors", as in fauvist art, thus heightening its emotional and expressive power. By 
their experimental results, Cela-Conde et al. (2004) consider the results of Zeki and 
Martini (1998) confirmed with regard to the perception of aesthetic attributes induced 
by this "liberation of color“. Furthermore, the authors describe the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex as a cortex area of "perception-action interface in multiple brain 
functions" (Cela-Conde et al., 2004, p. 6324). 
Cela-Conde et al. (2004, p.6324) also note that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
involved in a complex proceeding processing of the "information from posterior 
parietal and occipital areas", even more than is required for the creation of a 
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correlated action. The authors conclude that this would lead to a special series of 
actions aroused by a series of visual stimuli.  According to several studies, the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays an important role "for the monitoring of multiple 
events in working memory" (Petrides, 2000, as cited in Cela-Conde et al., 2004, 
p.6324) and "plays a key role in making decisions that call for the consideration of 
multiple sources of information" Krawczyk, 2002, as cited in Cela-Conde et al., 2004, 
p.6324). Consequently, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is a dominant part in terms 
of “evaluative judgment” (Cupchik et al., 2009) and “visuospatial working memory” 
(Glahn, et al., 2002, as cited in Cela-Conde et al., 2004, p.6324) .  
The aforementioned Cela-Conde et al. (2004) conclude that an activation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the cingulate cortex can be noted during judgment 
tasks. 
While an activation of the cingulate cortex can be observed both by ‘beautiful’ and 
‘not beautiful’ stimuli, which may be a result of the judgment decision, a "selective 
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex" can only be observed by stimuli 
considered as ‘beautiful’ (Cela-Conde et al., 2004, p.6324). However, this selection in 
favor of the positive stimuli, the authors do not ascribe to a behavioral response, that 
means raising the finger as a sign for a stimulus considered as ‘beautiful’, because 
exactly this condition had been counterbalanced before.  
Also Cupchik et al. (2009) have emphasized the special role of the prefrontal cortex 
in connection with the aesthetic experience. Their results also showed a greater 
activity in the left lateral prefrontal cortex.  
Cupchik et al. (2009) advised the participants of the study "to approach the stimuli 
with an engaged aesthetic attitude" when they were required to take an objective and 
detached approach. Nadal et al. (2013, p. 141) herein have seen the reflection of the 
"top-down control of perception".  
Vartanian and Goel (2004) examined the neuroanatomical correlates of aesthetic 
preference for artworks using fMRI. 20 pictures (from the archives of 
http://www.artcyclopedia.com) of abstract and figurative paintings were graphically 
manipulated resulting into three different conditions per image. Images were referred 
to as ‘original’, whose size was adapted in such a way that they fit into a framework 
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of 500 x 500 pixels. Pictures were called ‘altered’, where a section of the image had 
been placed to a different location. Images were dubbed as ‘filtered’ which were 
manipulated by the use of a filter, so that the colours within a radius of 16 pixels were 
randomly distributed. These filtered images served as a control condition, as by the 
pixel shift the basic stimulus properties, such as colour and brightness, remained, but 
no detailed content of the image was recognized. Through the manipulation of 
figures, was then investigated whether compositional changes had an effect on 
judgments of preferences. Twelve right-handed subjects (of which two were male) 
were presented the resulting 120 pictures in a direct sequence of 6 sec. each, each 
three corresponding images in randomized sequence. The subjects were asked to 
specify their preference judgments per image on a five-point scale, with 0 = very low 
preference and 4 = very high preference. 
 
The average rate of preference within the ‘original’ format for the representational 
works amounted to 2.32 ± 1.19 and to 1.36 ± 1.23 for the abstract works. Figurative 
works thus received a higher score on an average. The statistical test by means of 
analysis of variance with repeated measurements showed that the figurative works 
were preferred to the abstract works (p <.05). The ‘original’ and altered works 
received better judgments in relation to the filtered works (p< .001). Eventually, a 
significant interaction between type (abstract or representational) and format 
(original, altered, filtered) was found (p < .001). The decline in the preference rate 
between ‘original’ and altered works in relation to the filtered works within the group 
of representational works was more pronounced than it was the case in the group of 
abstract pictures. In addition, the response latencies were raised, amounting to ms 
2351.4 ± 1033.4. A significantly positive, however low correlation (r = 0.16, p <. 05) 
could be observed between the rate of preference and response latency. As the 
preference rate increased, so did the latency of responses.  The implication is that 
the more the participants 'liked' a picture, the longer they contemplated it before 
delivering a judgment of preference. The activations corresponding with the 
preference judgments were collected by fMRI, irrespective of the response latency. 
The results showed that the activation in the right nucleus caudate, with expansion 
up to the putamen, declined in relation to the preference rate. 
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The less 'favour' an image evoked, the less activation there was in this brain 
structure.  If images received a very low score, only a minimal activation could be 
observed. Conversely, the following structures were stronger activated, the higher the 
preference judgment: left sulcus cinguli (BA 32/10), bilateral gyrus occipitalis, 
including bilaterally the gyrus fusiformis (BA 18), right gyrus fusiformis (BA 37/39) as 
well as bilaterally the cerebellum (Vartanian & Goel, 2004, p. 895). 
 
Representational works (see Table 1), which were preferred according to behaviour 
data, evoked, in comparison to the abstract works, significantly stronger activations 
bilaterally in the ventral occipital poles (BA 18/19), in the right posterior gyrus 
temporalis medius (BA 37/39) as well as in the right precuneus (BA 7). At a 
comparison of ‘original’ and altered works, the former evoked a significantly higher 
activation in the right gyrus lingualis (BA 18) as well as in the right cerebellum. The 
comparison of ‘original’ versus filtered works showed significant differences in the 
right gyrus fusiformis (BA 18/19). With regard to the interaction analysis (type x 
format), significant activations could be observed bilaterally in the gyrus lingualis (BA 
19), in the left sulcus parietalis superior (BA 5/7), and medial occipitotemporalis in the 
right gyrus (BA 19).   
 
Table 1: Comparison of the activation types (representational, abstract) and 
format (original, altered, filtered). 
comparison Area of activation BA Laterality 
 representational - abstract Ventral polus occipitalis 18/19 L 
  18/19 R 
 Gyrus temporalis medius 37/39 R 
 Praecuneus 7 R 
      original - altered Gyrus lingualis 18 R 
 Cerebellum  R 
     original - filtered Gvrus fusiformis 18/19 R 
(representational original - Gyrus lingualis 19 L 
representational filtered) -  19 R 
  (abstract original - abstract Sulcus parietalis superior 5/7 L 
      filtered)   Gyrus occipitotemporalis medialis 19 R 
BA stands for the Broadman area to which the activation is allocated; R stands for the right, L for the left hemisphere. 
 
Vartanian and Goel (2004) concluded from the results that activations in the right 
nucleus caudatus, bilaterally in the occipital areas, in the left sulcus cinguli, bilaterally 
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in the gyrus fusiformis, and in the cerebellum are in different ways connected with 
preference judgments. The decrease of activation in the nucleus caudate in the 
presence of a decreasing preference judgment is compared with other studies, in 
which, in the case of patients with depressive disorders compared to the non-
depressed control group also a reduced activation of the mentioned structure can be 
found. The role of the striatum (of which the nucleus caudatus is an essential front 
part) with respect to emotional and reward-related stimuli is empirically well proved 
(e.g. by Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott, Newman, Longe & Deakin, 2003). 
Consequently, the observed activation in the nucleus caudate may be interpreted in 
this context as specific activation patterns in terms of less rewarding stimuli. The 
increase in activation in the two occipital poles, and bilaterally in the gyrus fusiformis 
in relation to the increase of favour judgment is consistent with other studies 
observing the role of the primary and secondary visual cortex when processing 
images of faces of different emotional valence (e.g. Geday, Gjedde, Boldsen &amp; 
Kupers, 2003; Taylor, Phan, Decker & Liberzon, 2003). It became also apparent in 
the above presented test series by Hansen et al. (2000), that the activations in 
relation to the primary and associative visual cortex correlated quantitatively with the 
favourable judgements. However, Vartanian and Goel (2004) pointed out that the 
increased activation in these areas could also be attributed to an increased visual 
attention, triggered by the higher rates of preference. Thus, also increased positive 
favour judgments appeared, which could be brought in that sense in connection with 
increased visual attention. Likewise, confirmations regarding the increase in 
activation in the left sulcus cinguli in relation to emotionally significant content appear 
in the literature as well (Taylor et al., 2003). 
 
The behavioural data showed that figurative works produced more positive 
favourable judgments than was the case in abstract works. The comparison of 
figurative and abstract works revealed in the former case increased activations in the 
two occipital poles, in the posterior gyrus temporalis medius, as well as in the 
praecuneus. The simultaneously found increased activation in the presence of an 
increasing favour rate in both occipital poles and bilaterally in the gyrus fusiformis 
might have partly determined the above result, since figurative works found more 
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favour. The calculations regarding the neural correlates of preference judgments 
were not separately conducted for the two styles. 
 
The comparison ‘original’ works versus modified compositional ones showed a 
significantly higher activation in the right gyrus lingualis. The authors concluded that 
probably an element of the compositional structure of ‘original’ works (e.g. perceived 
harmony of arrangement) was connected therewith. When the "original" works were 
compared with the filtered works, a higher activation was shown for the ‘original’ 
works in the right gyrus fusiformis (BA 18/19). The authors brought this process into 
connection with the probably more emotional or rewarding properties of the ‘original’ 
works. The comparison with the filtered works was in the case of figurative images in 
relation to the abstract ones more pronounced. Vartanian and Goel (2004) consider 
the relevant activations to be in connection with a stronger distinction with regard to 
relevant preferential activation in the visual cortex. The comparison of altered versus 
filtered works resulted in no significant difference in the activation. As a possible 
explanation, the authors suggested, that the compositional reorganization may have 
adversely affected the relevant quality of images (Locher, 2003). If the structural 
composition was now connected with aesthetic preference, the reduced 
compositional quality of altered pictures may have reduced the probability to 
determine differences on a neuro-anatomical level. 
 
Kawabata and Zeki (2004) focused their research on the neural correlates of the 
sense of beauty in relation to artworks. The authors investigated the question 
whether there were brain areas, which exhibit a consistent activation between the 
subjects, if these judge the paintings as beautiful or as ugly. In a preliminary testing, 
300 illustrations of paintings per different categories (abstract art, still lifes, landscape 
painting and portrait painting) were given to the subjects (N=100, half females) via 
monitor.  
 
Each representation of a painting was assessed by the test subjects on a ten-point 
scale. Values 1-4 were classified as ‘ugly’, values of 5-6 as neutral, values of 7-10 as 
‘beautiful’. 16 stimuli, for each of the three types of taste, from each category were 
extracted from this pool. In total, each test person during the scanning operation 
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using fMRI 192 were offered paintings in randomized order twice. Only such 
paintings categorized as ‘beautiful’ at a value of 9-10 or, respectively, in the category 
of ‘ugly’, valued 1-2, with 5-6 remaining unchanged were used. The subjects were 
presented 12 blocks in random order, whereby each block corresponded to a 
category of images (e.g., landscape painting or portrait painting). Each image was 
presented for 2 seconds and shown a total of two times resulting in a total of 384 
presentations. The subjects had to submit their judgments (beautiful, ugly, neutral) 
with button press. 
 
The results showed no significant differences in the response times with regard to the 
different assessments. This is in contrast to the study by Vartanian and Goel (2004), 
which observed a response latency in positive assessed images. However, as a 
reflection of the functional specialization of the visual cortexes, activations were 
observed in different regions of the brain for the various categories of images (see 
Figure 11). This was especially true for portrait images and landscape pictures, 
regardless of the respective assessment. The contrast portrait versus non-portrait 
evoked activations in the right middle gyrus fusiformis and bilaterally in the amygdala. 
The gyrus fusiformis (fusiform face area) has been associated in multiple studies with 
facial recognition (e.g. Haxby et al., 2000; Kanwisher et al., 1997). The contrast 
landscapes versus non - landscape images in turn showed activations in the anterior 
part of the right gyrus lingualis and in the ‘parahippocampal place area’   up to the 
anterior gyrus hippocampalis ranging into BA7 of the right parietal lobe. As 
repeatedly evidenced, the parietal lobe is, among other things, in connection with 
object localization and spatial aspects of visual stimuli, but also with aspects of 
attention (Behrmann, Geng & Shomstein, 2004; Culham &amp; Kanwisher, 2001). 
The contrast still lifes versus not still lifes showed activations within the occipital gyri, 
especially in the left area V3, also areas of areas V1 and V2 of additional extensions 
up to the posterior gyrus lingualis were included (see Footnote 10, p. 39). The 
contrast of abstract works versus non-abstract works resulted in no significant 
differences (i.e. different patterns of activations were found with abstract than with 
figurative works). 
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Figure 11: The category-specific activations within the comparisons portrait vs. non-portrait (A); landscape vs. non-landscape 
(B); still life vs. non-still life (C) and abstract vs. non-abstract (D) (from: Kawabata & Zeki, 2004, p. 1701). 
 
 
In addition, the activations produced by the assessments regardless of the category 
of images were computed (see Figure 12). The contrast ‘beautiful’ versus ‘ugly’ 
corresponded to activations only in the middle orbitofrontal cortex. The contrast 
‘beautiful’ versus ‘neutral’ showed activations in the frontal lobes (BA 11), in the 
anterior gyrus cinguli (BA 32) as well as in the left parietal lobe (BA 39) on. In the 
study by Vartanian and Goel (2004) also increased activations at positive favour 
judgments were recorded in the BA 32, in the left sulcus cinguli. The contrast ‘ugly’ 
versus ‘beautiful’ showed bilateral activations in the motor cortex, of far higher degree 
in the left hemisphere. The contrast ‘ugly’ versus ‘neutral’ in turn displayed 
surprisingly no significant differences. The areas of the brain involved in the 
described comparisons, were therefore limited to the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior 
part of the gyrus cinguli, the parietal-and the motor cortex. 
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Figure 12: The specific judgment activations within the comparisons beautiful vs. ugly (A); beautiful vs. neutral (B); ugly vs. 
pretty (C) and ugly vs. neutral (D) (corrected, p >05). A: activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, B: activations within the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior gyrus cinguli, and the left parietal cortex. C: activations within the bilateral somatomotor 
cortex. D: at given significance level no activation (from: Kawabata & Zeki, 2004, p. 1701). 
 
 
The quantitative characteristics of the activations within these regions were collected 
with the neutral stimuli as a baseline, in function of the corresponding response 
category of the stimulus. Parameter estimates showed a linear function of the activity 
in the orbitofrontal and motor cortex, where stimuli classified as ‘beautiful’ displayed 
the highest activations in the former one and stimuli classified as ‘ugly’ showed the 
highest activations in the latter. Such a function could not be observed within the 
gyrus cinguli and the parietal cortex. Vartanian and Goel (2004) could, however, 
observe that the higher the favour judgment, the more did the activation in the left 
sulcus cinguli (BA 32/10) increase. Therefore, the same brain areas are involved, 
according to Kawabata and Zeki (2004), when ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ classified stimuli 
were observed, whereat the extent of activation reflects the response category in the 
appropriate area. It has to be noted that in the study by Vartanian and Goel (2004) at 
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least the quantitative characteristics of activations correlated with the quantitative 
characteristics within the response categories (see Table 2). 
 
Since the image categories, such as portrait, still life and landscape, resulted in 
different activation patterns, the authors Kawabata and Zeki (2004) investigated the 
question, whether there were any additional activations within the specific areas of 
the brain, which resulted in judging the images as beautiful or ugly. An analysis of the 
interaction took place between the typical activations triggered by portraits and 
landscapes (respectively the most activated voxels, on the one hand in the gyrus 
fusiformis and on the other hand, in the parietal lobe) and the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (stimuli classified as beautiful showed the highest activations in the 
orbitofrontal cortex). The results showed no consistent connection between produced 
activity in the two areas (gyrus fusiformis and parietal lobe) and judgment (‘beautiful’, 
‘ugly’ or ‘neutral’). Consequently, it is not additional activity within a specific stimulus 
centre that causes this stimulus to be perceived as ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ in the present 
case. 
 
In summary, the study by Kawabata and Zeki (2004) showed that a functional neuro-
anatomical base underlies aesthetic judgments, in the sense that pictures of a 
specific category lead to increased activation in specific brain areas. This does not 
mean however to assume that specific brain areas become active independent of 
others. It is rather considered probable, that there are networks in specfic areas 
which produce higher activations and reciprocal influences. In addition, the study 
indicated that special aesthetic judgments (‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’) correlate with activations 
in specific regions of the brain, especially in the orbitofrontal cortex and probably also 
in the motor cortex. A specific area reacting to stimuli perceived as ‘ugly’, was not 
observed in this study (comparison ‘ugly’ versus ‘neutral’). Parameter estimates 
indicated that it is mainly a question of relative activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, 
whether a stimulus was perceived as ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’. The same was evident 
because of the activations in the motor cortex, where stimuli both classified as ‘ugly’ 
and as ‘beautiful’ showed activations comparable to the baseline changes, with the 
former provoking the strongest and the latter the least activity. If you see beauty and 
ugliness or like and dislike as extreme poles of a continuum, it may not be surprising 
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to find quantitative changes, which may explain the characteristics on this continuum. 
As the authors themselves pointed out, this raises the question what precisely 
causes the increase in activity. 
 
Table 2: Studies on the activations at preference judgments in comparison. 
Study Stimuli Judgement 
Area and direction of 
the activation 
BA Lat 
Cela-Conde et 
al.(2004)  
MEG 
40 × (abstract art, classic, 
impressionist, postimpressionist) +160 
photos (=320) 
 
Beautiful dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex ↑ 
8/9 L 
beautiful 
 
anterior cingulated 
cortex↑ 
25 L/R 
not beautiful 
 
   
Vartanian and 
Goel (2004)  
fMRI 
(20 x (representational, abstract)) x 
(original, filtered, altered) (=120) 
Positive sulcus cinguli ↑ 32/10 L 
gyrus occipitalis ↑  L 
R 
gyrus fusiformis ↑ 18 L 
R 
gyrus fusiformis ↑ 37/39 R 
cerebellum ↑  L 
R 
Negative nucleus caudatus ↓  R 
Neutral not calculated   
Kawabata and 
Zeki (2004)  
fMRI 
16 x (abstract, still life, landscapes, 
portraits) x (beautiful, neutral, ugly) 
(=192) 
beautiful vs. 
neutral 
orbitfrontal cortex 11 R/L 
anterior gyrus 
cinguli 
32 R/L 
parietal cortex 39 L 
ugly vs. 
neutral 
No significant 
activation 
  
beautiful vs. 
ugly 
medialer 
orbitofrontal cortex 
  
ugly vs. 
beautiful 
motor cortex 
(increased left) 
 L/R 
 
BA designates the Brodman area to which the activation is allocated; Lat stands for laterality, R for the right, L for the left 
hemisphere. The direction arrows stand for a quantitative increase or decrease of the activations.   
 
 
3.5 Emotional Reactions to Artworks and Their Neural Correlates  
 
Although the authors of the following study had apparently did not primarily intend to 
explore art experience as such, they nevertheless used artwork paintings as stimulus 
material. Carretie, Iglesias and Garcia (1997) examined the effect of complex 
emotion-laden visual stimuli on the cerebral activity by means of event-related 
75 
 
potentials ERPs (see Section 1.9.1). The emotional factor scores were determined 
by two dimensions, on one hand by the arousal (relaxing-activating), on the other by 
the emotional valence (attractive-repulsive). The stimulus material consisted of 12 
paintings, which, by means of pre-testing, were assigned to the characteristics of 
these two dimensions: 
■ Three activating attractive paintings (A+ group): 
Titian (1490-1576): "The Bacchanal" 
Pierre (1713-1789): "Jupiter and Antiope" 
Rubens (1577-1640): "The Fortune" 
■ Three activating-repulsive paintings (Group A): 
Goya (1746-1828): "Las Parcas" and "La Romería de San Isidro and "Aquelarre" 
■ Three relaxing paintings (R): 
Poussin (1594-1665): "Landscape with buildings" 
Lorraine (1600-1682): "Landscape with Moses saved from the Nile."  
Dughet (1613-1675): "Landscape" 
■ Three neutral paintings (N): 
Meléndez (1716-1780): "Bodegón: Servicio de chocolate" and 
"Bodegón: Rodajas de salmón, limón y recipientes" 
Sánchez-Cotán (1560-1627): "Bodegón" 
All three paintings are still lifes.  
(= „bodegón") 
The ERPs were recorded in 31 subjects (students, five of which were male) at nine 
electrode positions (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz and P424).  
                                                          
 
24 see Figure 13 with regard to the electrode positions.  
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The investigation focused on the evoked slow potentials in relation to visual, 
emotional stimuli and on their sensitivity to the two affective dimensions, arousal and 
valence. Johnston, Miller, and Burleson (1986) found that emotionally positive and 
negative stimuli evoked larger P300 amplitudes than neutral visual stimuli. Other 
investigations showed, however, that an increase in amplitude of the P300m, a 
positive wave with an average latency of 300ms, was even possible when the 
subjects considered a stimulus as relevant for testing, regardless of its emotional 
charge  (e. g. Bashore & van der Molen, 1991). For this reason, Carretie et al. (1997) 
used non-explicit stimulus material, not distinguishable for the subjects with regard to 
its relevance level. In order to increase the number of passages, each stimulus 
showed up nine times on the screen. 
 
 
 
                                                                                      
                                  Figure 13: The 10/20 electrode placement system by Jasper (1958). 
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Two negative components could be clearly distinguished after evaluating the results, 
namely an N200 and an N300.  
The P300 also occurred in parietal and right hemispheric regions.  
The N200 appeared with a latency between 150 and 250ms; the N300 occurred 
within an interval of 275 and 324ms, the P300 again occurred between 350 and 
450ms. The average amplitude values were calculated from these three intervals and 
subjected to an analysis of variance (with the factors stimulus (A+, A-, R and N) and 
electrode position) and to a post hoc procedure.  
Significant differences manifested themselves only in the negative component N300, 
namely with regard to the factor electrode position and the interaction stimulus x 
electrode position.  
The amplitude values at positions F3, Fz, C3, Cz, and Pz differed in their response to 
activating-repulsive pictures (stimulus group A) significantly from their response to 
neutral pictures (N). Furthermore, the electrode positions Cz and C4 showed different 
amplitude values to the activating-repulsive paintings (A-) in comparison to the 
relaxing landscape pictures (R). However, in the case of the parietal regions (P3 and 
PA), it were the activating-attractive paintings (A+) which resulted, in contrast to the 
other stimulus groups (A-, R, N), to increased reactions.  The amplitudes of the 
stimulus group A+ differed at the Pz electrode position from the groups R and N, but 
not from A-. Differences with respect to the hemispheres were only significant in 
response to the activating-repulsive painting (A-J, namely only between positions F3 
and F4) and with respect to the neutral painting (N) between the positions C3 and 
C4.  
The amplitude values of the electrode positions of the centreline were significantly 
higher than those in the lateral positions (with the only exception of Fz-F3 in respect 
to all four stimulus groups). Fz-F4 and Cz-C4 were higher regarding the neutral and 
Pz-P3  the activating-attractive paintings.   
According to Carretie et al. (1997), this would be because the underlying activity was 
localized mainly subcortically, most likely within limbic structures.  
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According to the results of the study of Carretie et al. (1997), the components N200 
and P 300 show little sensitivity to emotional stimuli. The authors suggest that P300 
responds only to intense emotionally laden stimuli.  
In a previous study, the authors (Carretie & Iglesias, 1995) were able to show that 
N300 could respond to affective characteristics of visual stimuli, namely with the 
highest amplitudes to activating visual stimuli. In the study just discussed, the 
amplitudes of N300 demonstrated in general (with the exception of the electrode 
position F4) the highest values in response to the activating-attractive or activating-
repulsive or both paintings. 
The authors concluded, “[…] that N300 reflects mainly neural reactions associated 
with arousal charge of visual stimuli” (p.213).  
In view of the emotional valence, the results showed that the activating-repulsive 
paintings (A-) evoked the highest N300 amplitudes, namely within the frontal position 
(F3, Fz, C. and C4J), thereby significantly differing from the relaxing (R) or neutral (N) 
paintings.   
The activating-attractive paintings (A+), in turn, demonstrated, as already described, 
the highest amplitudes of the N300 components in parietal regions (P3, Pz and P4). 
Therefore, Carretie et al. concluded that the effect of the emotional valence of visual 
stimuli expresses itself in the component N300 within spatial relations.  
In summary, the study of Carretie et al. (1997) leads to the observation that in the 
absence of significant differences in the P300, the component N300 showed the 
highest amplitudes in response to activating stimuli. Namely, within frontal regions 
during the presentation of negative or repulsive stimuli, and within parietal regions 
during the presentation of positive or attractive stimuli.  
Inter-hemispheric differences were at the same time only very slight. One of the 
differences, however, manifested itself in the reaction to negative stimuli, which 
turned out stronger left frontal than right frontal. The result, in turn, stands in contrast 
to other studies that postulate a more pronounced right hemisphere activation at 
negative stimuli.  
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Carretie et al. (1997) as Kawabata and Zeki (2004, see Section 3.4) were able to 
observe that different image categories, such as nudity, portrait, still life and 
landscape, led to differentiated activation patterns. Carretie et al. let 40 paintings of 
classical figurative style, all exposed in the Museo del Prado in Madrid, be 
categorized by 174 persons by means of a five-level scale with the opposite poles of 
the above mentioned dimensions arousal (activating-relaxing) and emotional value 
(attractive-repulsive).  
The combination of extreme forms of the two dimensions eventually led to the 
selection of 12 paintings with the corresponding highest values, subsequently used 
as stimulus material.  
The procedure resulted in the interesting effect that the stimuli within a group were 
each associated with a common theme. Stimuli of group A+ were nudes, those of 
group A all came from Goya’s ‘Pinturas Negras’ (Black Pictures), the pictures of the 
R group were landscapes, those of group N were still lifes.  
As already mentioned at the outset, the authors did not primarily target at 
investigating the neuronal correlates of differing art styles. Still, it turned out that 
these do not only exhibit different emotional qualities in different dimensions, but are 
also reflected in the activation. In this respect, it is important to consider these 
aspects in the choice of stimulus material, not least in order to minimize interfering 
influences.  
 
3.6 Experts and amateurs – Differences on the neuronal Level  
 
In some studies, artists were contrasted with non-artists. Kaplan (1998) focused her 
investigation on neurophysiological correlates of artistic talent. Among other, she 
collected differences in the cortical activation of female artists and non-artists on the 
level of perception, imagination and imaginative execution with respect to the EEG-
parameters amplitude and coherence. These were determined by means of spectral 
analysis and additionally correlated with behavioural data.  
The sample consisted of 38 right-handed female subjects. The experimental group 
consisted of 19 female painters with appropriate training at the art academy, who 
made their living from artistic activity. The control group consisted of 19 art-interested 
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non-professionals. The stimulus material consisted of four paintings presented via 
slide projector25.The individual paintings were presented for two minutes each to both 
the experimental and the control group. Between the presentations of the individual 
paintings, the subjects had to read a text for 1 minute as an interference task. 
Subsequently, they had to remember the painting just shown to them (for another 2 
minutes). In the ensuing narrative phase, the subjects were supposed to describe 
their imagination of the painting, which was then evaluated by content. For this a 
category and assignation system was used that led to the identification of scores with 
respect to memory and imagination.  
Consequently, the subjects were instructed to ‘create’ a mental picture of their own 
and put it then on paper. A recording of an EEG in rest took place at the beginning 
and the end of the experiment. EEG-measurements were based on 19 scalp 
electrodes placed according to the 10-20-system of Jasper (1958). Amplitude and 
coherence were analysed for six frequency bands from 1.5-31.5 Hz.  
These calculations were carried out for each of the groups as a whole and both 
groups (female painters and control group) separately while they were contemplating 
paintings and memorizing them. The procedure was repeated each time both for all 
paintings and each individual painting separately, as well as for the mental creation 
of a picture of their own in relation to the EEG in rest.  
The spontaneous EEGs in rest of the two groups were compared as well. The EEG 
data were correlated with the scores on memory and imagination. The most 
important findings from the resulting complex data set will be described in the 
following section. Significant differences were obvious in the visual cognitive 
processing of the female painters and the control group. At the same time, one has to 
point out that, in case of these calculations, no localization of the original activity had 
been made before. Therefore, the observed activation below an electrode position 
does not necessarily indicate that the source of activation is also located at that 
place.  
                                                          
25 Jordaens:  “the festival of the king of beans”- a moving grouping; Rembrandt: “the windmill”- a drawn landscape; Kandinsky: 
“Aquarelle et Encre Rouge” – an abstract coloured picture; Holbein: “Jane Seymour” – a portrait. 
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It is assumed that there exists “a connection between the degree of coherence and 
strength of the fibre connections on the one hand, and the difficulty of a task on the 
other” (Kaplan, 1998, p.343). Hence, if a task is perceived as easier, coherence 
decreases. When comparing the two groups, this training effect became evident. 
Both when they created a picture of their own and when the spontaneous EEG was 
recorded, the female artists showed a lower coherence in the left hemisphere and in 
the inter-hemisphere. 
 
 
Figure 14: Significant differences in inter-hemispheric coherence for all frequency bands. Group compared (painters vs. control 
group) while contemplating a painting, memorising a painting and creating a painting of their own. Each time, both the right and 
the left hemisphere are visible. The solid lines indicate higher coherences in the group of female painters; the dashed lines 
indicate higher coherences in the control group (according to Kaplan, 1998, p. 336). 
 
This observation was interpreted as a lower exchange between the hemispheres, 
that means that they work more autonomously, and as a reflection of a localized 
operation26.  With regard to the inter-hemispheric coherence across all frequency 
bands, a consistent increased cooperation between the parietal areas could be 
observed in the female painters. The same applied to all three conditions 
(contemplating paintings, memorizing paintings, creating their mental pictures). In 
                                                          
26 It should be mentioned again that increases in coherence are understood as an increasing functional cooperation between 
brain regions within a certain frequency range. In connection to this, decreasing coherence is interpreted as a decrease of 
coupling and therefore as an increase of functional independence of the affected brain regions. Consequently, a decrease of 
coherence is not to be equaled to a decreasing neuronal activity. Other studies not based on coherence analyses were able to 
show that training or expertise results in a lower activation of the same brain areas than in untrained persons (e.g. Solso, 2000; 
see further below). Expertise, training and skills result, in this case, to a lower activation in the cortex.  
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turn, the same could be observed in the control group with regard to frontopolar 
cooperation (see Figure 14). These group-specific inter-hemispheric relationships 
were interpreted as correlates of cognitive load and may, according to Kaplan, be 
related to attentional processes.  
Regarding the activation patterns within the hemispheres across all frequency bands, 
differences between the painters and the control group (see Figure 15) became 
manifest. The differences were particularly distinctive for the left hemisphere, while 
the extent of activation in the right hemisphere was similar despite involvement of 
different areas in both groups (see Figure 15). 
The female artists showed higher right centro-parietal coherences (electrodes 
position C4-P4) while they were memorizing a picture and mentally creating one. 
Increased coherence values were also perceived between parietal and frontal (Pz-
Fz). 
According to these findings, in the group of female painters more interactions are 
taking place in the right hemisphere than the left one. Kaplan considered this result 
as an evidence suggesting “that visual perception and visual imaging, as two aspects 
of artistic talent, are reflected in higher Centro parietal coherences, whereas the right 
hemisphere can be considered as decisive for the global form processing” (1998, 
p.344).  
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Figure 15: Significant differences of the intra-hemispheric coherence for all frequency bands in a group comparison (female 
painters vs. control group) while contemplating a painting, memorising a painting and creating a painting of their own). Each 
time both the right and the left hemisphere are visible. The solid lines indicate higher coherences in the group of female 
painters; dashed lines represent higher coherences in the control group (according to Kaplan, 1998, p. 335).  
 
The control group showed a much greater extent of activation in the left hemisphere. 
The result may be due to the more efficient neuronal processing within the group of 
female painters. Evidence that expertise results in a facilitated neuronal processing 
within the corresponding domain can also be found in the studies mentioned further 
below (e.g. Solso, 2000, 2001). 
In the control group in all three conditions, left temporal connection between P3-T5 
could be recorded. According to the author, it is located in the area involved while 
reading, namely the area of the gyrus angular, as well as an intense involvement of 
the frontal cortex.  
He suggested that the reason was an increased use of semantic processing in 
addition to visual processing, which would prove “clearly the increased verbal 
processing of visual cognitive activity” (p.346). However, once again it has to be 
84 
 
pointed to the above-mentioned objection of a missing localization of the original 
activity. Therefore, one can by no means claim that the activation clearly falls into the 
area of the angular gyrus. In no way should the significance of neuronal networks 
and parallel processing be questioned, it is only questionable whether the method 
chosen here is purposeful to uncover such networks.  
Bhattacharya and Petsche (2002) took a similar approach and compared functional 
and topographical differences between female artists and non-artists by means of 
EEG phase synchronization analysis during the visual perception and imagination of 
four art works of different styles and epochs. 
Their experiment was based on the assumption that different frequency bands reflect 
functionally different components of information processing from sensory perception 
to encoding (Klimesch, 1999). The experimental design corresponded in part to the 
study by Kaplan (1998). Even the stimulus material was the same (see Footnote 25, 
p. 80). The sample consisted of ten female artists having completed their training at 
the art academy and ten female non-artists.   
The subjects were presented with a picture for 2 minutes by slide projection, followed 
by a rest period of 1 min. After a distraction task of 2 minutes, a rest period of 1 
minute and an imaginative task followed, in that the picture shown before should be 
visualized. After another rest period of 1 minute, another painting was shown. In the 
group of female artists, a significantly higher synchronization in the highly frequent 
beta- and gamma bands was observed during the perception of the artworks.  
At the same time, a high involvement of the right temporal electrodes (T4, T6) 
became evident, as well as an amplification of the inter- and intra-hemispheric 
connections of temporo-parietal areas. Within the group of non-artists, especially the 
alpha-band showed an enhanced extent of synchronization, bilaterally within the 
frontal cortex, both between the frontal (Fp1, Fp2, F7) and the right temporal occipital 
cortex (T6, 02). 
Within each group, the topographies of the imagination task exhibited, apart from the 
delta band, a comparatively high degree of similarity. The observation is consistent 
with the assumption that brain regions, active during sensory-induced perception, are 
reactivated when remembering, that means while imagining such information. In the 
85 
 
low-frequency bands (especially delta) synchronization was significantly increased 
only in the group of artists and particularly high for the imaginative task, with 
particular involvement of the posterior regions, both intra- and inter-hemispheric. 
During the perceptual task, the increased synchronization was mainly perceived in 
central and parietal areas. A definite coherence decrease within the alpha band was 
found predominantly in the female artists during both tasks.  
Furthermore, the right hemisphere showed a higher synchronization in the female 
artists than the left one. A hemisphere asymmetry was less significant in the group of 
non-artists than in the artists. The authors conclude from the results that within the 
panel of artists, the increased synchronization of the high-frequency bands was 
probably due to a stronger integration of multiple visual features. Thus, they would be 
able to integrate even minor details of elaborate works of art to generate an internal 
representation of the artworks. At the same time, the increased synchronization of 
low-frequency bands is presumably due to the larger involvement of the long-term 
memory, especially during the imaginative task. 
Consequently, the artists would be characterized by a greater ability to integrate 
visual patterns from long-term memory. Artistic training would, therefore, have an 
impact on the dynamic cooperation between distant cortical areas during visual-
related cognitions. Accordingly, these artistic skills would be reflected in the 
synchronizations within differing frequency bands and their correlations with specific 
cognitive functions. 
Both the study by Kaplan (1998) and the one by Bhattacharya and Petsche (2002) 
emphasize a more pronounced visual memory in artists, as compared with a group of 
non-artists. It consists of the “easier perception, processing, recognition and retrieval 
of visual information from associative networks and ensembles” (Kaplan, 1998, 
p.361) while generating pictures. The visual encoding starts in the artists already at 
the perception level and therefore would favour a long-term storage.  
Furthermore, within both studies, the female artists display a higher synchronization 
of the right hemisphere, and both studies emphasize the activations of parietal 
regions. Consequently, a greater role for visual artistic talent should be assigned to 
the right hemisphere. In the same way, both studies within both groups demonstrate 
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a similar neuronal activation with regard to perception and imagination, that means 
regarding bottom-up and top-down processes. As already mentioned, the method of 
coherence analysis used by the authors, however, is, controversial and only seldom 
applied. 
Solso (2000, 2001) presented an fMRI study in which a famous British portraitist 
(Humphrey Ocean) and a control person, inexperienced in the art, were drawing 
portraits and geometric figures during the scanning procedure27.  A notepad was 
fixed above their face; arm and elbow of the subjects were supported. Six faces and 
six complex geometric shapes were alternately presented on a page of the notepad. 
30 seconds per drawing were available. Surprisingly, the subjects reported that both 
their drawings as well as their thoughts regarding the drawings were similar to those 
under normal conditions.  
The activations, while drawing geometric figures, were subtracted from the 
activations during portrait drawing in order to control interference factors, such as 
motoric activities and individual visual operations (e.g. activities in the primary visual 
cortex). The author observed in both subjects an increased activity in the right 
posterior parietal lobe and associated this with processes related to face recognition. 
However, in the comparison, it appeared that the activation in the mentioned area 
was comparatively stronger in the control person.  
According to the author, the lower activation in the portraitists justifies the conclusion 
that the artist is more efficient in face processing than a non-artist. Moreover, the 
artist demonstrates a stronger activation in the right middle frontal lobe, which was 
associated with a more complex association and manipulation process of visual 
forms and the planning of motoric activities of the right hand. The author postulated 
that the portraitist, who sees and draws faces more often, spends comparatively little 
energy for the basal face processing, but more for the processing of these features 
as regards the associated correlations. The interpretation of these features therefore 
takes place at a higher level, based on an abstract representation of the face. 
Conversely, the control person without such relevant experience would process faces 
                                                          
27 Innerhalb eines Ganzkörper-MRI-Scanners ist die Bewegung massiv eingeschränkt, der Kopf ist immoblisiert. 
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at a lower level, which would be more involved with features than with the 
interpretation of faces. 
Solso (2000, 2001) himself emphasized that these results were based on the 
comparison of only two individuals, that means further studies would be needed to 
make more definitive statements. However, it has to be considered that drawing will 
be far harder for the non-artist control person than for the experienced artist.  During 
the process of drawing, there are also activations in the parietal lobe to be observed 
(Makuuchi, Kaminaga & Sugishita, 2003), to which the results may partly be due to.  
Moreover, face processing seems to be predominantly a function of occipital 
temporal areas (see review of Haxby et al., 2000).  
The findings of the studies on the comparison of experts and non-experts show that 
art expertise and artistic talent in painting may lead to an altered approach on the 
level of perception, imagination and performance and, in turn, the efficient use of 
stimulus material to a reduced activation of a certain brain area.  
The presented studies on neuronal aspects of art reception and art production 
indicate that to date there does hardly yet exist any clear idea of how to approach the 
complex field of art experience on a ‘neuronal’ level. Experts and non-experts have 
been compared (Battacharya & Petsche, 2002; Kaplan, 1998; Solso, 2000), 
correlates of preference judgments identified (Cela-Conde et al., 2004; Kawabata & 
Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004) and a variety of theoretical thoughts been 
provided (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Zeki, 2002).  
Mostly in the course of these studies, one did not follow a superordinate theoretical 
model, but rather investigated isolated aspects of art experience. Researches of a 
not neurophysiological nature have rarely been considered (the same applies vice 
versa). Equally problematic appears the choice of stimulus material to which 
apparently not enough attention had been paid. Consequently, it has partly not been 
possible to make a statement regarding even a selected area of the spectrum of art, 
or just only regarding a too specific area. These circumstances, regardless of the 
complexity of the material, make it impossible to formulate laws of a general nature. 
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3.7 Neurodegenerative processes, brain damage and artistic creation  
 
Art is an expression of neuronal functions as well as an expression of the 
organization and interpretation of perception. Brain injuries, as some studies have 
proven, change artistic expression. By evaluating the effects of brain injuries on the 
perception and expression of art, insight into the changes of neuronal universal 
principles of perception and cognitive organization can be gained (Mendez, 2004). 
Furthermore, awareness shall be raised to the fact to what extent human beings, with 
all their (artistic) thinking and acting and their (artistic) personality, are subject to 
neuropsychological processes and laws. Descriptive individual case studies are 
naturally prevalent here, which do not correspond to the intended focus of the 
present study, namely, reporting on studies based on experiment. However, by no 
means shall the fate of several individual artists be explored here, nor their medical 
history or changes in their artwork and personality associated therewith are worked 
up meticulously. For this aspect, one can refer, among others, to Bankl (2005), who 
described the cause of death of some famous artists, scientists and politicians, which 
brought him broad public success. Bankl reported on educating artists (e.g. Manet, 
Makart, and Gauguin) who died from syphilis. Syphilis or ‘lues’ is a chronical 
infectious disease, which may cause changes in the central nervous system 
(progressive paralysis). Bankl quoted for example Makart and added: 
 “In his death year, he painted a large number of flower parts, hardly to be 
differentiated from one another, a mental stereotype characteristically for his syphilitic 
brain disease” (2005, p. 223).  
Due to his life story, Van Gough became the object of many analyses and 
retrospective diagnoses (e.g. Morrant, 1993). Likewise, the present study will not 
dwell on changes in the perception and artistic creation caused by substance abuse 
or exposure to other toxins, although some artwork may have been created under 
such influences.   Nor are psychiatric disorders and their potential impact on artistic 
creation its subject. To this end, there exists, however, at least since Prinzhorn 
(1922/1994), a variety of literature, which in this context often alleges diseases from 
the spectrum of schizophrenic disorders. An early study of this subject comes from 
Reja (1907/1997). Besides, refer, for example, to Bader and Navratil (1976), to 
Navratil (1983) and to Kraft (1986), who presents various individual case studies. 
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However, neurodegenerative processes and brain lesions mostly allow valid 
conclusions about the function of the brain; consequently, they can thus provide 
more insight into the creation of art and creativity. Simultaneously, works of art, as a 
very specific expression of human existence, and changes in their style caused by 
degenerative processes, may facilitate conclusions about the neuronal correlates of 
artistic activity.  
“Acts of creation such as paintings capture our imagination, not just, because we can 
explore their nature, but also because they reflect the nature of their creator. It is this 
relation that makes the examination of artistic and creative talent in the context of 
illness so revealing” (Crutch, Isaacs & Rossor, 2001, p.2129). 
Works of often, but not exclusively of well-known artists were examined under the 
aspect of traces of neurological and psychological disorders by comparing them with 
their premorbid creative ability. However, considerable differences in artistic talent 
and style in their premorbid work make that approach more difficult so that the 
question arises whether this allows for the formulation of general principles. The 
same is true for style and content. Different artistic traditions might underlie different 
cognitive behaviour.  
In the context of artistic production and neuropsychological deficits, Chatterjee (2004) 
emphasized the difference between ‘description’ and ‘expression’. According to him, 
a general understanding of the difference was, “descriptions emphasize 
representations of the world and expressions emphasize representations of an 
artist’s internal state” (p.1568). Brain lesions may affect the descriptive and the 
expressive manner of artistic production differentially. For example, the loss of the 
ability to apply line and form descriptively may lead to a broader expressive style. 
Consequently, one may conclude that the neuronal basis of visual descriptions and 
visual expressions had to be different.  
As it will become evident in the discussions below, neurophysiological deficits do not 
necessarily lead to an artistic output of lower quality. Style or content may change 
and indeed gain a higher expressive force or rather, result in greater aesthetic 
experience. A manifestation of the opposite case could according to Chatterjee 
(2004) possibly be observed in artists affected by frontal-temporal dementia. In them, 
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a more naturalistic and detailed kind of art comes to the fore, lacking abstraction and 
symbolism.   
Neuropsychological syndromes may be associated, in addition to deficits, with 
positive phenomena. Such phenomena, e.g. caused by epilepsy or migraine, can 
mutate into a source of artistic inspiration (Chatterjee, 2004).  
 
3.7.1 Neuropsychological deficits, perception, and artistic output  
 
Specific neuropsychological deficits change artistic creation in most cases. However, 
such artworks, created under certain impairments, give an eloquent information about 
the underlying deficits. Smith, Mindelzun and Miller (200) for example described the 
occurrence of a simultanagnosia28 in the course of a stroke in an artistically active 
female patient. While it may be difficult to imagine the effects of deficits in the visual 
perception, artistic works may enhance the understanding thereof.  
The patient presented by Smith et al. (2003) painted objects and scenes from 
memory. Her works before and two years after a stroke showed usual ability to centre 
objects and present them as a whole. The works created during her recovery 
however revealed a sort of selective attention towards a part of the object, “as if she 
could not simultaneously create the image in her mind’s eye” (p. 1832). Until her 
recovery, the works displayed a progressive change. Agnosia seemed to distort the 
inner representation of the whole; probably, the authors concluded, on the level of 
the associative visual cortex. Thus, the hypothesis would be supported that the 
associative visual cortex is not only involved in the abstraction of visual inputs, but 
also in the formation and interpretation of visual memories. Therefore, artistic works 
can increase the understanding of experiences otherwise difficult to communicate 
since the patients merely described their perception as ‘not right’. 
Cantallago and Della Sala (1998) described the case of the famous producer 
Federico Fellini who, in addition to his talent to produce movies, had distinct graphic 
skills. Fellini suffered a stroke in the right parietal lobe resulting in a left-sided 
visuomotor neglect29.  It was unusual that the artist showed a high degree of 
                                                          
28 A simultanagnosia describes the inability to perceive a visual scene or a group of objects as a whole. 
29 Due to lesions, mostly in the parietal cortex, complex disorders in the visual-spatial attention may occur. A hemi-neglect 
arises mainly at right hemisphere lesions, whereby the response to stimuli contralateral to the lesion is non-existent or 
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awareness of his attentional and motoric deficits. In the course of two months, Fellini 
was exposed to intensive observation and a number of physical examinations.  
The motoric symptoms improved over the two-month-period only slowly, sensory 
deficits, mainly restricted to the lower left quadrant of the visual field, remained 
unchanged. The artist showed no deficits in intelligence, language, simple perception 
and verbal memory. In part, Fellini, showed evidence of an implicit processing of 
neglected parts of the visual stimuli, partly reflected by the tendency to personalize 
the drawings (e.g. in a line dividing task; see Figure 16).   
  
 
   
 
Figure 16: Examples taken from line-dividing tasks, performed by Federico Fellini, with a tendency to personalize these (A-C). 
They partly revealed an implicit awareness regarding the left-sided final point of the line, in spite of a shift of the centre to the 
right (“Vai a metà” – Go into the center) (from: Cantagallo & Deila Sala, 1998, p. 168-169). 
 
Fellini’s drawings from memory provided, in turn, no direct evidence of the existence 
of a representational neglect, in spite of the fact that he omitted several times details 
on the left side and a tendency to draw on the right side of the page. Spontaneous 
drawings displayed only mild evidence of a unilateral neglect. However, Fellini 
expressed his frustration with his visual deficits and his partly inadequate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
insufficient. The neglect therefore affects mostly the left side of one’s own body and of the space. Segment division tests show 
that the sense for the center of the room has shifted to the right. If items have to be copied, only or mainly the right side of the 
template is copied.  
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performance of the defined task in his drawings (see Figure 17). Sixty days after the 
brain infarction, his drawing abilities were completely restored. However, the artist 
died soon after that as the result of a second massive brain stroke.   
                                      
 
Figure 17: Two of Fellinis’ spontaneous drawings reflecting his feelings regarding his visual deficits (“cosa vede qui?“ – What do 
you see here?). (From: Cantagallo & Deila Sala, 1998, p. 176). 
Another artist many times described who suffered from a neglect is Anton Raeder 
Scheidt (Wurtz, Goldberg & Robinson, 1982). His self-portraits are known and 
displayed changes in concordance with his symptoms. Other artists are Lovis Corinth 
and Otto Dix. These artists, however, were apparently not aware of their deficits; or 
rather, their awareness level grew in parallel to the improvement of the visual-spatial 
functions. Therefore, Fellini is in this respect an exception. Artists with neglect and no 
awareness of it do not complete their artworks, regardless considerable effort 
(Marshall & Halligan, 1993). Despite Fellini’s awareness level of his deficits, it did not 
help him to overcome them.   
Furthermore, evidence of implicit processing of neglected parts of stimuli was 
observed (Marshall & Halligan, 1988). Cantagallo and Della Sala (1998) postulated 
that a deficit of the visual-spatial working memory of the visual field, contralateral to 
the lesion, might be responsible for this phenomenon (Ellis, Delia Sala & Logie, 1996) 
which, in turn, based on the assumption that the implicit processing takes place by 
accessing knowledge stored in long-term memory. As a direct consequence, patients 
suffering from neglect should only be able to process meaningful precepts in the 
neglected field implicitly, since meaningless contents can probably not be activated 
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by traces in the long-term memory. Ellis et al. (1996) provided experimental support 
for this hypothesis. The authors eventually drew the following conclusion:  
“It might be postulated that the dissociation between impaired spatial performance 
coupled with awareness of such deficit shown by FF [Federico Fellini], might be 
mapped onto the relative impairment of visuo-spatial working memory functions 
(responsible of the impairments in visuo-spatial tasks) and the intact conceptual 
awareness, which capitalizes on the good long-term memory functioning” (Cantagallo 
& Della Sala, 1998, S. 182).  
Moreover, Fellini showed a neglect of the left lower quadrant of the visual field at the 
presentation of a visual stimulus, displayed however no neglect in connection with 
imaginative tasks. This specific pattern would be indicative of a double dissociation 
between representation and perception in neglect, which in turn undermines the 
hypothesis of a common underlying mechanism.  
Blanke, Ortigue and Landis (2003) reported on the occurrence of a mainly colour 
related neglect in a 71-year-old professional educational female artist. A 
haemorrhage in the right posterior parietal lobe led to an anopsy of the left lower 
quadrant of the visual field.  
Drawings completed during the period of her impairment revealed a mild left-sided 
graphic neglect, with a particular emphasis on colours. The coloration of the drawings 
focused on the right side of the picture (the left side projects in the right hemisphere 
where the lesion was localized).  
A similar procedure could not be found in her premorbid works and disappeared six 
weeks after her brain injury. The observations indicated that parietal damages may 
not only affect spatial relations but also, in a dominant manner, visual stimulus 
attributes, such as for example colour.  
A neglect may also affect sculptural abilities, as Halligan and Marshall (1997) 
reported in their case study of a 75-year-old well-known British painter and 
sculptor.After a brain stroke, the artist displayed a mild left-sided sensory-motoric 
deficiency, an anopsy of the left lower quadrant and a left-sided visual neglect. Eight 
years before the brain stroke, the artist lost in an accident the functional ability of his 
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right dominant hand; however, he succeeded in transferring his artistic abilities to his 
left hand. Six months after his stroke, the artist was discontent with his sculptural and 
painting performances, in spite of regaining the capabilities of his left hand. The 
drawings seemed to be less organized and elaborated than they used to be while the 
artist was concentrated mainly on his right side. In addition to the left-sided hemi-
neglect, some sculptures and drawings demonstrated distorted, exaggerated or 
deformed figures. Despite the completeness of head and eye movements, the artist 
was not able for example to complete the left side of a clay face even approximately 
as well as its right one.He was no longer able to integrate diverse perspectives into a 
coherent three-dimensional whole. Although the apparent impairments improved 
within a year, traces of neglect were identifiable in many subsequent drawings and 
paintings until his death. The artists could however never regain his former 
smoothness in his sculptural performance.  
Finally, the presented case studies demonstrated that even a life-long dedication to 
artistic creation offers no or only little protection against a sudden decrease in the 
ability to pay attention to objects in the left visual field.  
3.7.2 Different forms of Dementia  
Below, various forms of dementia and its impact on artistic and creative work will be 
discussed. In this context, mainly Alzheimer’s disease and the frontal-temporal 
dementia have been dealt with in the literature. According to Miller and Miller (2011): 
“Alzheimer disease and frontal-temporal dementia provide contrasting examples 
through which focal brain injuries influences artistic production and creativity. 
Typically, visuo-constructive abilities are lost in early stages of Alzheimer disease, 
and over time, there is a diminution of color and style. One assumes that prominent 
and early parietal involvement in Alzheimer disease results in the loss of artistic 
ability” (p.103).  
 
3.7.2.1 Alzheimer disease and artistic creation 
  
Alzheimer disease is a degenerative dysfunction of the brain, characterized by 
cognitive and functional deficits and changes in affect and behavior. Patients 
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suffering from Alzheimer disease become more passive and show only little 
inclination to begin and complete projects.  
 
As a result, little-experienced artists rather seem to cease to work creatively 
(Chatterjee, 2004). Artists who continue to be active, in turn, display a tendency to 
simplification. Crutch et al. (2001) investigated the correlation between changes in 
the artistic expression of a professional painter (William Utermohlen) with the stages 
of his Alzheimer disease.  
Neuropsychological studies over several years evidenced a continuous general 
deterioration of cognitive functions. Mainly affected was his verbal memory, visual-
perceptual, visual-spatial and executive abilities. An MRI revealed a generalized 
bilateral cerebral atrophy.  
In the period after the diagnosis at 61 years, the artist's work focused on self-portraits 
of which some are presented in Figure 18 representing the changes in style and the 
deterioration of the cognitive status, mainly in terms of visual-perceptual and visual-
spatial abilities. While painting A is still a typical image of his premorbid creative 
work, the later works show that the brushwork became coarser, and the surfaces 
rougher.  
A sense of proportion, perspective and depth and the structural capabilities gradually 
deteriorated, an abstract background has no longer been implemented. The realistic 
implementation of the earlier works could no longer be realized by the artist. The self-
portraits can also be seen as an expression of the inner status; issues such as 
anxiety and depression are distinct. 
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Figure 18: A series of self-portraits by the painter William reflecting the progression of his Alzheimer disease. Painting A was 
created at the age of 60 years, still unaffected by the illness. Painting B was completed at 62, painting C at 63, painting D at  64, 
painting E at 66 and painting F at 65 years of age (from: Crutch et al., 2001, p.2131). 
 
An impairment of the ability to process perceptual and spatial information seems to 
be of particular importance for the artistic changes observed. The investigations 
carried out have shown, however that the visual memory was not affected, which 
might have been one of the reasons why the artist was able to continue painting. 
Motivation, creativity, and artistic, creative urge seem to be unequally affected by 
neurological insults. Abstraction appears to be another possibility to give expression 
to artistic intention despite various impairments.  
Cummings and Zarit (1987) had already made similar observations in a semi-
professionally-working artist. Over a period of two years, they systematically 
performed behavioral and neuropsychological tests. In correlation to the deterioration 
of neuropsychological abilities, changes occurred in his artistic output. In the 
presence of intellectual impairment and a gradual decline in most neuropsychological 
functions, visual-motoric and constructive abilities were the least affected and 
demonstrated a marked decline only towards the end of the observation period. A 
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painting completed at the age of 67 years, when the first symptoms were already 
manifested, displayed considerable skills in presentation, shading, color, perspective, 
proportion and balance in the image construction. At the age of 70 years, when 
Alzheimer disease was diagnosed, the deterioration of artistic skills was manifest. 
Seven years after onset of the symptoms, a loss of detail, a lack of perspective and a 
simplification of the color choice were recognizable. A year later, at the age of 75, the 
artist produced only stereotypical reproductions of earlier paintings in which errors in 
perspective and proportion became evident. At the age of 76, his paintings 
demonstrated a complete dissolution of the image construction with a total loss of 
perspective, intrusion of irrelevant details and a striking perseveration.   
The described case study (Cummings & Zarit, 1987) confirms the general tendency 
to simplification in the artistic creation in the course of Alzheimer disease.  
The subjects became simpler, whereas specific contents were detained and earlier 
works drawn on. A decrease in the richness of details and a minimized coloration, as 
well as the loss of perspective representation, manifested themselves. Similarly, a 
decline in motivation became evident. 
In the earlier stages of the disease, the authors observed an affection of artistic skills 
mainly on a motivational, organizational and executive level; later on, however, also 
the visuomotor skills were affected. 
The authors suggested that the visuomotor skills, an important element in artistic 
expression, were probably genetically and/or by training higher developed and 
therefore less affected: “Their relative preservation suggests that the intrinsic 
neurophysiologic organization of this component of his talent may have rendered it 
less vulnerable to impairment” (p. 2733). Consequently, the correlation between 
neuropsychological deficits to changes in their artistic production allows insights into 
the structural functional organization of the brain of a talented individual.  
The readiness of the artist William Untermohlen and others to participate in the 
presented study of Crutch et al. (2001), thus providing the possibility to carry out 
neuropsychological investigations over a longer period and the use of imaging 
procedures offer an optimal opportunity to investigate changes in artistic style caused 
by Alzheimer.  
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This is however not the case with the well-known representative of abstract 
expressionism, Willem de Kooning, who also arouse the interest of scientists. 
However, the assessment of his work is far more problematic on behalf of diagnostic 
uncertainty.  
Kontos (2003) analysed among other the late paintings of the artist de Kooning under 
the aspect of a progression of his probable Alzheimer disease. Here again, it became 
evident that the art in particular, as a distinct human experience and expression, may 
be useful for scientific discourse. The paintings of de Kooning from the 80ths of the 
last century displayed a decisive change in style. At this time, he experimented with 
simple paintings, mostly held in red, white, yellow and blue. By means of a projector, 
he transferred his smaller earlier works on a big canvas and subsequently 
represented the object in a clear cut and reduced line (Espinel, 1996; Reif, 2001). 
However, what seemed to astonish the world of art and the world of science likewise 
was that de Kooning, because of his advanced dementia (presumably of multiple 
etiologies), should not have been able to do so (Kontos, 2003). Kontos proceeded on 
the assumption that the resistance to accepting that de Kooning, despite his 
dementia, had been artistically creative would be based on the biomedical 
commitment to inextricably link intention and mental capacities.  
Kontos claimed "that the body can be a source of inventiveness and creativity, 
inviting us to understand the body as active, that is, imbued with life force that has its 
own intentionality” (2003, p. 166). Accordingly, the continuous performance of artistic 
intention of de Kooning would testify of “the body’s potentiality for innovation and 
creative action” in spite of neural affection (p.167). In any case, the creative work of 
de Kooning in spite of his progressive disease raises some questions, which may 
contribute, among other, to broadening the scientific view about a particular illness. 
Thus, Kontos wrote, „Individuals with this illness must be seen as retaining a sense of 
self with the persistence of agency despite cognitive impairment“(p. 168). In addition, 
Espinel (1996) dedicated himself to the work of de Kooning and again, raised the 
issue as to the healing power of art and to the particular role of art, especially in its 
abstract form, for the convalescence of de Kooning. Espinel spoke of convalescence, 
but based his assumption only on the fact that de Kooning had continued to paint.  
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The case study of the artist Untermohlen (Crutch et al., 2001), as well as the case 
studies by Cummings and Zarit (1987), investigated artists suffering from dementia. 
These studies proved a marked deterioration and impairment of their artistic activity. 
Considering this fact, one may assume that the changes in the style of de Kooning 
might not have been the expression of artistic intention, but rather of impaired ability. 
Is it then still possible to speak of art? Does the intention of an artist to create suffice 
or can you still explicitly speak of intention? Meulenberg (1996) hypothesized that the 
ability to remember an artistic idea or concept could be so severely disturbed that the 
artist may no longer be able to compare his idea with the result of his ongoing work 
on the canvas. At that moment, when an artist can no longer convey a subordinate 
intellectual content, one may speak at best of “decorative results”, as Gibson did 
concluding 
“[…] that this tragic dementia is such that he [de Konings] is beyond saying anything 
significant and this appears to be born out by his paintings. They have become 
decorative, and their interest lies in the legacy of a successful and original painter" (p. 
1838).  
De Kooning’s separate living wife Elaine and her brother supported him actively, 
motivating and encouraging him to paint. Without such support and guidance, his 
works would hardly have come into existence (Stewart, 2002). 
The act of painting might have been of therapeutic value for de Kooning or not. The 
question would be rather whether a creative act, if consciously or not, has a greater 
therapeutic value than some other ergo-therapeutic work (e.g. basket weaving). Art 
therapy seems to have at least a positive impact in the case of dementia (Stewart, 
2002). In any case, cognitive impairments do not necessarily result in a decline of 
artistic style. The works can indeed gain expressional force and eventually appear to 
be far more interesting than those from premorbid creational periods do.   
It is certainly necessary to deepen the understanding of de Koonings later works by 
an understanding of his disease. De Kooning showed clear parallels in his later work 
to the described changes in the work of other artists with similar symptoms 
(Cummings & Zarit, 1987; Crutch et al., 2001). Characteristic features of the above-
mentioned case studies were a general simplification of artistic work, the reduction, 
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and perseveration to subjects, the resorting to earlier works, a loss of richness in 
detail, a limited choice of colors and a decline in motivation.   
As Stewart (2002) wrote:  
“When a skill is lost, the whole being must readjust itself. It is the way that a patient 
readjusts himself to the loss that is fascinating and unpredictable. Do we then view a 
person by what the disease has robbed them or by what they have preserved and 
how they have managed to adapt it?” (p. 316).  
 
3.7.2.2 Lewy- Body Dementia 
Sahlas (2003) retrospectively described the changes of the British artist and writer 
Mervyn Peake (1911-1968) in the light of current scientific knowledge. The 
neurodegenerative disease of the artist had been temporarily described as Alzheimer 
disease, Parkinson disease or post-encephalitic Parkinsonism. Symptoms and 
behavioral changes could not be clearly classified in those days. Due to biographical 
notes, Sahlas assumed that Peake had suffered most likely from Lewy Body 
Dementia. In his fifth decade of life, the artist showed signs of Parkinsonism and 
cognitive decline. Visual hallucinations were reflected in his drawings (see Figure 19) 
and, in addition to paranoid delusions, in his poems. As the deterioration increased, 
short episodes of pertained insight manifested themselves into drawings of figures 
with pointy hats and often a worried, anxious expression (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Drawings of the artist Mervyn Peake, completed at a progressive stage of his disease. A shows a motive repeatedly 
used by the artist; B was drawn when the artists suffered from visual hallucinations (from: Sahlas, 2003, p. 891). 
 
The progressive dementia with Parkinsonism, visual hallucinations and severe 
cognitive fluctuations suggest a dementia of Levy type. The progressive cognitive 
decline was noticeable in the late works of the artist. His pronounced difficulties in 
attention and visual-spatial perception are part of the phenomenon Lewy Body 
Dementia, whereas memory decay is prevalent in Alzheimer disease.  An increasing 
abstraction up to the point of cartoon-like structures took place in his graphic 
expression. Similar features were perceivable in the artists Willem de Kooning and 
William Untermohlen (see Section 3.7.2.1), who could both, in the course of dementia 
of the Alzheimer type, only produce distinctly abstract works. According to Sahlas 
(2003), this is a result of deterioration of visual-spatial functions, and probably based 
on the involvement of posterior isocortical association areas. Peake differed from 
artists who probably suffered from Alzheimer disease by the recurrence of bright 
moments, still preserved for a long time, in which he completed drawings. 
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3.7.2.3 Vascular Dementia and artistic expression  
 
Annoni, Devuyst, Carota, Bruggimann and Bogousslavsky (2005) reported on two 
case studies. They described significant changes in the artistic style of two artists, 
mainly as consequences of an ischemic infarct (stroke caused by vascular occlusion) 
of small extent in the left occipital lobe or the thalamus. The specific influence of focal 
and limited brain lesions due to executive and affective changes in the artistic style 
have rarely been studied yet. The induced artistic changes were analysed based on 
extensive neurological, neuropsychological and psychiatric evaluations. The change 
in their artistic expression remained initially unnoticed for both patients. They showed 
mild forms of executive dysfunction, but no general cognitive decline.  
Patient I displayed minor visual perceptual difficulties (dyschromatopsia and scotoma 
in the right upper visual field) due to a suffered infarction in the occipital areas 
corresponding to the areas VI and V2. In addition, the patient showed increased 
anxiety and difficulties in emotional control. His artistic style changed towards a more 
stylized and more symbolic art. In contrast to previous works, a general simplification 
of forms, a monochromatic choice of color and the use of a background independent 
from the foreground. Moreover, he incorporated lighting effects in his works triggered 
by the scotoma. 
According to Annoni et al. (2005), the works of the second patient were referred to as 
‘figurative-impressionistic’ before his stroke. After a small left lateral damage in the 
thalamus, this patient also displayed a slight reduction of emotional control and a 
change in artistic expression. Patient II, ambidextrous, painted shortly after a stroke 
with the left hand and subsequently alternately with both hands, a method that he 
had never previously applied. From his impressionistic mode of painting his style 
changed to a more realistic form of representation, faithful to detail, the intensity of 
the colors increased and the organization of the image construction became more 
structured and geometric. According to the authors, the artist associated his change 
of style with the use of the left hand. According to the artist, objects completed with 
the left hand demonstrated a stronger emotional expressiveness and a stronger 
coloring. Conversely, paintings completed with the right hand would have clearer 
lines, sharper contours and a clearer perspective. The artist noticed an increased 
creativity by using his left hand.  
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The observations by Annoni et al. (2005) are also interesting regarding questions on 
the hemispheric specialization, a subject further discussed below in connection with 
creativity (see Section 4.5.2). The use of the left hand probably evokes a stronger 
connection to the right hemisphere, which in turn is associated with the processing of 
non-verbal, spatial content and greater involvement in terms of emotional perception. 
Moreover, increased creativity is associated with a stronger involvement of the right 
hemisphere. 
Annoni et al. (2005) concluded from the results that minor cognitive and affective 
changes caused by focal posterior brain injury might have a significant impact on the 
artistic expressiveness. Since both patients did not perceive in themselves any 
changes at the beginning, it had to be assumed that these changes did not occur 
because of a personal decision, but were of a neuronal nature. Moreover, in both 
painters only a change in terms of their creative work was noted and had affected 
neither other activities nor habits. 
Since posterior regions apparently play a particular role in creative thinking (Mölle et 
al., 1996), it was, to the mind of the authors, not surprising that a minor brain damage 
in these regions would change artistically creative thoughts and thereby artistic style. 
The authors concluded that the minor executive dysfunctions, as well as the mild 
emotional loss of control of both painters, might be at least partly responsible for of 
the changes in style. 
3.7.2.4 Frontotemporal Dementia and artistic creation  
According to Miller and Miller (2013) “frontotemporal dementia30 is a collection of 
heterogeneous conditions that have focal onset of disease predominantly in the 
frontal and temporal lobe, hence the name” (p.100). 
                                                          
30 Frontotemporal dementia was described by Arnold Pick around 1900 and therefore also called Pick disease. The disease is 
characterized by a locally accentuated atrophy of the frontal or temporal lobe which are, among others, a cause for the dementia. They 
may also result in changes of personality and disturbances of social relations. There is a loss of the ability to work professionally. 
Norms are no longer respected which may lead to difficulties in the social realm and to criminal actions. A heightened sexual drive and 
inhibition can also be observed. Patients are not able to acknowledge their disease. The onset of the disease is usually between the 
50th and 60th life decade. The onset of the symptoms and the progress of the disease are slow. Sensual functions, memory and 
special-constructive abilities are hardly affected. Among others, the following three groups of disease are allocated to the pick-complex 
(approximately 20% of all dementia): the frontotemporal dementia, the primarily progressive aphasia and the semantic dementia. In 
frontotemporal dementia, the atrophy is predominantly pronounced in the medial, dorsolateral, and orbital frontal lobe. In the primary 
progredient aphasia, an asymmetric, left frontolateral lobe atrophy is present and the semantic dementia is caused by a left temporal 
lobe atrophy (see Brun et al., 1994; Navy et al., 1998).   
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Viskontas and Miller, 2007, as cited in Miller & Miller, 2013) postulate,  
“Commensurate with the focal pattern of anatomical disease, patients with 
frontotemporal dementia develop focal cognitive and behavioral deficits, with sparing 
of functions in unaffected brain regions” (p.100).  
As mentioned before, a neurological change does not necessarily result in a 
deterioration of artistic expression. Miller et al. (1998) described the clinical, 
neuropsychological and sculptural characteristics of five patients with frontotemporal 
dementia who developed artistic abilities in the course of this illness. In 
frontotemporal dementia, an atrophy of the dorsolateral and orbital frontal lobe is 
prevalent. Four of these patients displayed the variant of frontotemporal dementia 
with the anterior temporal lobes involved and the dorsolateral frontal cortex 
unaffected.  
Visual abilities were preserved, whereas lingual and social abilities were severely 
impaired. The loss of the function of the anterior frontal temporal lobe apparently 
resulted in an increase of artistic abilities. 
After years of intensive creative activity, some of the patients gave painting up again; 
however, this was not surprising in the face of the progressive process of the 
disease. The creativity of the patients demonstrated visual but never verbal forms. 
The paintings, photographs, and sculptures were realistic representations, partly 
painted out of memory with abstract and symbolic components missing yet. In spite 
of progressive cognitive and social impairments, the patients showed an increased 
interest in tiny details of faces, objects, forms and shades of colors. All patients 
dedicated themselves to their creative work with enormous intensity. Planning, 
organization, and motivation are influenced by the dorsolateral and medial part of the 
frontal lobe – areas, which remain unaffected in the temporal variant of 
frontotemporal dementia. Moreover, most of the patients mainly displayed a 
dysfunction of the dominant hemisphere. Dysfunctions of the dominant hemisphere 
may leave drawing skills comparatively unaffected (Kaczmarek, 1991), whereas 
dysfunctions of the non-dominant hemisphere may also destroy artistic abilities in 
formerly talented artists (Alajouanine, 1948).  
105 
 
Kapur (1996) coined the term “paradoxical functional facilitation” for the phenomenon 
of unexpected improvements in the behavior after brain injury, thereby highlighting 
the two major neural mechanisms, inhibition and compensatory plasticity. Talent, on 
the one hand, as in art, may be accompanied by dysfunctions in other areas, such as 
social skills. Miller et al. (1998) concluded that the loss of social skills and inhibitions 
might have facilitated the artistic output of the patients. The authors postulated that 
the selective degeneration of the anterior temporal and orbital frontal cortex might 
have evoked a reduced inhibition of visual systems located further behind and, as a 
result, an increased artistic ability and interest. The breaking of social conventions, 
which occurs to a major extent in artists (and by reduced inhibition in the patients), 
may lead to a more inhibited, creative output.  
Similar observations were made previously by Miller et al. (1996) based on three 
patients who became recognized painters after the onset of frontotemporal dementia. 
All three patients with the temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia showed artistic 
improvement during the early and middle stages of the disorder. One of the three 
patients, who had been a successful businessperson before, was part of the study 
described above (Miller et al., 1998). At the age of 68, he had been ill for a period of 
12 years.  
At the age of 56, he began to describe, ‘open’ and ‘closed’ periods of time. In the 
‘closed’ state, he appeared agitated and dysphoric; lights and sounds were perceived 
as extremely intense and painful. In the ‘open’ state, lights and sounds resulted in 
euphoria, and subsequently to increased creativity. In the following decade, he 
painted visualized images of the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ states. At 58, he became 
verbally repetitive, anomic and uninhibited. He changed his clothes in public places 
and insulted strangers. His increased sensitivity to light remained; moreover, he 
displayed an increased visual awareness of his environment. 
Without any prior interest in art, he began to paint at the age of 56, over time with 
increased precision and observation of detail. Between 63 and 66, he succeeded in 
winning some art awards of local art exhibitions. While his creative activity 
continuously developed in the beginning, a deterioration became manifest at the age 
of 67. At 68, he drew bizarre puppet-like figures. At this point of time, he was absent 
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and irritable, but displayed only small facial emotion. His interest in his surroundings 
increased and he extensively commented on colors and shades. 
The mini-mental-state Test31 resulted in a value of 15 out of 30. A magnetic 
resonance tomography revealed a bitemporal atrophy. The PET to measure regional 
blood flow showed a bilateral hypoperfusion, right worse than left, while the frontal 
perfusion was normal. The highest perfusion was manifested in the right posterior 
parietal and occipital cortex. Miller et al. (1996) concluded from the results that brain 
lesions limited to the anterior temporal lobe could be associated with increased 
artistic output. Therefore, the loss of the functions of the anterior temporal lobes, 
which are associated with the inhibition of the posterior visual cortex, could have 
resulted in intense, unfiltered visual experience, including visual memories. 
The increased visual experience might have served, in turn, as a motivation for 
painting. The unimpaired functions of the frontal and parietal lobe, however, may 
have enabled the planning and performance of the works.  
In an extended recent study by Miller et al. (2000), data from multiple investigations 
of 69 patients diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia were included. Twelve of 
these patients displayed new or preserved musical and visual skills.  
Despite diverse forms of talents, the patients had several features in common. The 
manifested talents were of musical or visual, but never of a verbal nature. Symbolic 
and abstract components were missing. The painters of the test group copied or 
remembered realistic landscapes, animals and persons or perfected visual design.   
The processes indicated a retrieval of previously learned information or images. As a 
result, this information was manipulated because the mediation of language was 
missing. The patients pursuit their work with sometimes considerable obsession and 
frequent replication, which, in turn, became an important factor in developing the 
quality of their products. 
                                                          
31 The mini- mental-state-test according to Folstein serves as an orienting psychometric test method for diagnostic verification and 
clarification of psychic performance disturbances and subsequently, for the observation of their course. This test is often applied for a 
first determination of possible dementia in a person.   
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While in the case of frontotemporal dementia anterior frontal and temporal 
degenerations or both occur selectively, in the early stages of Alzheimer disease, 
entorhinal and posterior parietal and temporal areas are affected. 
Because of the reduced function of posterior parietal and temporal regions, areas 
contributing to visual constructive, linguistic and musical skills, artistic and musical 
abilities rapidly disappear in patients with Alzheimer.  
Patients with frontotemporal dementia preserve, however, visual-constructive 
abilities, since posterior parietal regions have remained unaffected. However, even in 
the case of frontotemporal dementia, reduced creativity occurs. The authors 
concluded that individuals who developed new creative skills or retained former ones 
displayed a specific form of this disorder.  
However, it remains unclear to what extent one can speak of creativity considering 
the fact that the manipulation of the content appears limited. In most cases, one 
speaks of copying or painting from memory in the absence of abstraction and 
symbolism. Also striking is the obsession with which each of a specific activity was 
pursued.  In general, these patients frequently demonstrated compulsive behavior, to 
which a part of their performances could be traced back. 
In the retrospective study (Miller et al., 2000), eight of the patients with musical or 
visual abilities exhibited the temporal variant of dementia, another three a 
predominant temporal involvement, though including an affection of the frontal lobe.  
In patients without such specific skills or in those no longer practicing their skills, a 
vast frontal and temporal hypoperfusion was observed. Thus, in contrast to the rest of 
the patients with a diagnosed frontotemporal dementia, the unifying feature of 
patients with newly acquired or maintained skills was an involvement of the temporal 
lobe with relative integrity of the frontal lobe. 
The functional efficiency of the working memory and episodic memory is another 
characteristic of the temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia, which was probably 
helpful in the visual and musical performances. The organization of a piece of music 
or a painting requires the working memory, while the retrieval of previous musical or 
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visual patterns demands the function of the episodic memory. In contrast, the 
semantic memory, requiring the integrity of the left anterior temporal lobe, was affected. 
Most patients in the group with distinctive visual or musical abilities showed an 
asymmetric left hemispheric degeneration. These findings are consistent with studies 
suggesting that a lesion of the left hemisphere does not necessarily mean a 
decimation of musical abilities (Sergent, 1993). 
Right hemispherical injuries, in turn, destroy the capacity to copy or to paint, even in 
previously experienced artists (Schnider, Regard, Benson & Landis, 1993). While 
cells of the inferior temporal lobe respond to specific visual stimulus properties such 
as shape, the role of the anterior temporal cortex in the processing of visual and 
musical information remains unknown. As suggested by Miller et al. (2000), 
increased artistic abilities in patients with anterior temporal and orbitofrontal 
degeneration let assume that these regions inhibit dorsolateral frontal and posterior 
temporal and parietal regions involved in visual and musical processes. 
Hereby, the authors postulated, that 
„the selective degeneration of left anterior temporal cortex led to decreased inhibition 
of the more right-sided and posteriorly located visual and musical systems, and 
dorsolateral frontal regions involved with working memory, thereby enhancing artistic 
interest and productivity“ (Miller et al. 2000, p. 462).  
Moreover, possibly innate brain asymmetries might have led to a predisposition to 
already existing or developing talents.  
While the patients introduced by Miller et al. (1996, 1998, 2000), mostly suffering 
from semantic dementia (see Footnote 30, p.104) as a subtype of frontotemporal 
dementia, evidenced no or only slight interest in art before the manifestation of the 
disease – that is, showed little or no artistic activities until then, did Mell, Howard and 
Miller (2003) describe the case of a practicing, talented 87-year-old artist, who 
developed progressive aphasia (see Footnote 30, p.104) in the course of 
frontotemporal dementia. 
With the progressive course of the disease, there occurred a regression of language 
and executive abilities; her paintings, however, seemed to be less controlled and 
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more original. According to the authors, the investigation of artistic development in 
the course of frontotemporal dementia gave therefore reason to assume that 
language skills would not only be unnecessary, but in certain cases of visual 
creativity rather inhibitive.  
Of course, in the case of a previously artistically active person the question arises, 
whether changes in art represented a logical and natural artistic development or had 
arisen secondary, in the course of frontotemporal dementia. The right-handed 59-
year-old artist described in the case study produced some of her best works in a 
period of about two years, during which she had already difficulties with written and 
spoken language. An MRI revealed a moderate bifrontal atrophy, slightly more 
pronounced on the left side, as well as a mild left temporal atrophy. In the course of 
the disease, however, the artistic output deteriorated distinctly. Figures she painted 
were distorted and less realistic. Overall, the work of this talented artist depicted a 
remarkable development over a period of 15 years of progressive aphasic syndrome 
(Mell et al., 2003, p. 1708).  
 "As language declined, paintings became wilder and freer”, did the authors describe 
the change. They continued: "Release from the constraints of formal workout became 
clear, and her pieces were no longer realistic, reflecting an intensely emotional and 
impressionistic style, with less detail" (p. 1709). 
The non-dominant posterior, right parietal and temporal cortices - areas usually 
spared in the case of frontotemporal dementia - appear to be of critical importance to 
the ability to accurately copy or draw mental images. According to Mell et al. (2003), 
a detachment of these brain areas from language dominant patterns of thought, 
organized by the dominant frontal and anterior temporal regions, seems to play a 
prominent role in the artistic achievements in the course of frontotemporal dementia. 
The release of the functions of the frontal lobes, associated with social restriction and 
awareness of rules, may also have been involved in the development of these late 
paintings. Similar linguistic and social deficits and artistic creativity were observed in 
autistic artists. 
The hitherto presented cases of increased artistic activity demonstrated mostly 
heightened involvement of the left anterior temporal lobe. Mendez and Perryman 
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(2003), on the other hand, have documented three artists with a predominant 
involvement of the right temporal lobe. The neurodegenerative disorder resulted in a 
reduced empathy and furthermore, in a noticeable modification of the way people 
were represented. The drawings of faces were partly distorted, seemed threatening, 
strange or resembled a skeleton (see Figure 20). It was less the artistic skills as such 
which appeared to be affected, as the drawings of objects and animals appeared 
unchanged, but rather the representations of human aspects. The patients showed a 
flattened affect, no insight into their disease, nor did they notice any changes in their 
artistic output. Their ability to cope with visual-spatial tasks remained unaffected, nor 
did any problems in the processing of faces occur. A fourth female artist suffered 
from a frontotemporal lobe atrophy and a bifrontal and bitemporal hypoperfusion 
without, however, revealing any changes in her artistic creation. 
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Figure 20: Caricatures of a patient with frontotemporal dementia. Figure A was completed many years before the onset of the 
disease.  Picture B and C were drawn within the first two years of dementia, and picture D at least three years after the onset of 
the disease (from: Mendez & Perryman, 2003, p. 46). 
 
In contrast to the observed enhancement of the artistic work in some patients with a 
more prominent left-sided temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia (e.g. Miller et 
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al., 1998), changes in the drawing of faces seem to be connected with a pronounced 
involvement of the right temporal lobe.  
To the three artists with changed artistic output, both family members and outsiders 
ascribed a loss of empathy and awareness for the emotions of others.  
Although the patients were able to interpret the facial expression of emotions 
correctly, they were apparently not able to react to them empathically. As their 
disease progressed, three of the patients drew human beings in an increasingly 
distorted way.  
Mendez and Perryman (2003) concluded, the underlying mechanisms “may be a 
decreased appreciation of emotional empathy from faces, possibly from greater right 
temporal involvement" (p. 49). 
In addition, Small-Fisman, Black & Lang (2003) described changes in a professional 
artist. His artistic work reflected characteristics of his cognitive profile, such as 
disinhibition, apathy, perseveration and left hemi-neglect. A decline in intellectual 
abilities was recorded, with the performance IQ being stronger affected than the 
verbal IQ. Significant deficits manifested themselves on the level of attention, 
initiation, and memory. MRI and SPECT revealed a generalized atrophy, with 
predominant involvement of the right hemisphere from the cortex to the brainstem 
and a strong hypoperfusion of the complete right hemisphere and left frontal regions. 
Corticobasal degeneration was assumed; the pathological findings of the deceased 
patient revealed however a frontotemporal dementia (Kleiner-Fisman, 2005). 
Simultaneously to a decrease of spatial orientation, changes in personality, such as 
increased irritability, loss of previous interests and a lack of insight into his disease, 
significant changes in the work of the then 68-year-old artist became apparent.  
The premorbid works of the illustrator and portrait painter were realistic 
representations in reserved tones and delicate shadings (see Figure 21). The change 
in the style manifested itself in thicker layers of color, a stronger coloration and in a 
far higher degree of stylization. The more abundant application of the colors was 
mainly found on the right side of the canvas. 
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According to the authors, the artist reported dissatisfaction with his work. He 
undertook repeated changes to improve the distortions he now perceived. For 
example, he began to make changes in the portrait finished a year ago, paying 
particular attention to the right-hand side (see Figure 21). Despite repeated 
modifications, the artist remained dissatisfied with his performance. He had neither 
been able to articulate the imperfections nor to correct them. In his premorbid state, 
the artist had never exhibited such an attitude towards his work.  
            
Figure 21: Works by an artist with prefrontal dementia. Painting A shows a work from his premorbid period of work, completed in 
1993, with a delicate shading and elaboration. Painting B represents a portrait that was revised one year after its original 
completion, with increasing distortion of the right side, 1998 (from: Kleiner-Fisman et al., 2003, p. 296). 
 
In contrast to the previous case studies describing the occurrence of frontotemporal 
dementia associated with artistic creation, the patient in the study by Kleiner-Fisman 
et al. (2003) displayed right hemispheric a selective involvement of dorsolateral 
frontal and parietal regions, which play a significant role regarding artistic skills. The 
authors pointed out that the works of the artist, after manifestation of the disease, 
reflected both new functional capabilities, the adaptation of perceived distortions by 
the application of stronger colors and duct, as well as the loss of functions, expressed 
by the hemi neglect. The later works, after the onset of the degenerative disorder, 
"reflected a different perceptual approach to interpreting his subject matter" (p. 298). 
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Two years after the onset of the disease and in the wake of the loss of interest and 
initiative, the artist discontinued any attempts to be furthermore artistically active. 
This may, according to the authors, have been associated with the context of the 
outstanding compromising of the right hemisphere and thus cross with a deep impact 
on motivation, self-perception, spatial attention and visual constructive capabilities.  
At the same time, the orbitofrontal damage might have been a reason for the blunting 
of his personality and the disinhibition, possibly due to a disruption of the affective 
limbic inputs. Moreover, the authors emphasized that the increasing abstraction in 
the work of the artist was accompanied by a growing frustration of the same and 
reflected, by no means, an expression of a deliberate stylistic intention. 
Expressions such as art creators, artists and the like are used to constant discomfort. 
The discomfort is mainly present when it comes to individuals who have made up to 
that time little or no effort in this direction. Nevertheless, all these individuals proved 
to be actively creative out of their initiative. Whether their work may now be 
considered as art or as degenerative processes, the disorder seems to affect their 
work massively or, though indirectly, to provide the impetus to do so. 
Furthermore, the question may be posed, as alluded above, whether one should 
continue to speak of art, if formerly recognized artists such as de Kooning obtained a 
new style in the course of the decrease in their cognitive capabilities or rather of 
changes in their artistic skills.  
In the case of de Kooning, diagnostic uncertainty remains since the neuronal 
substrate is unknown. If however, the frontal lobes are almost unaffected, as it is the 
case for example in the temporal variant of a frontotemporal dementia, is it then more 
justified to speak of art, because one may assume that the planning and 
remembrance of the works is hardly  
Furthermore, the creative factor seems mostly to be missing or significantly reduced. 
The artists often copy or paint from memory. Depending on the type of the 
dysfunction, symbolic or abstract elements are missing (in some cases of a 
frontotemporal dementia) or realistic representations are no longer possible, resulting 
in an ever-increasing abstraction (for lesions in posterior regions, such as in 
Alzheimer disease). 
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Are we then allowed to speak of artistic intention, if the options are limited to such an 
extent from the beginning? It is not the prominent goal of this research to discuss 
these issues. Neurodegenerative processes in the course of dementia appear to 
allow, however, looking at the nature of artistic and creative processes. An 
interpretation of changes in the style of a creative artist with psychiatric or 
neurological abnormalities, such as in the case of de Kooning, can, however, not be 
approached without obtaining and considering more detailed information on the kind 
of the impairments. 
It is, however unknown, under what conditions patients with frontotemporal dementia 
develop artistic abilities. In some cases, an asymmetric left hemispheric degeneration 
appears to lead to the release of untapped cognitive skills, in the sense of a 
"paradoxical functional facilitation" (Kapur, 1996). The obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms that occur partly as a side effect of such a dementia may likewise play a 
role. Thus, the release of creativity and originality is an unexpected and not yet 
sufficiently investigated feature of dementia. However, one should not forget that not 
necessarily every individual with a dementing disorder develops great creative power. 
Some of the patients in the study by Miller et al. (2000) were highly intelligent before 
the appearance of symptoms, so that talents may only occur in selected individuals. 
However, dementia does not necessarily mean the end of creativity, but may 
unexpectedly open up doors to interesting and new opportunities in the artistic 
development (Mell et al., 2003). As Miller et al. (2000) proposed it would however 
always make sense to promote visual and musical skills in the context of anterior left 
temporal injuries or dysfunctions. 
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Chapter 4 
CREATIVITY 
4.1 Introduction 
The following discussion focuses on the biological and neuropsychological aspects of 
creative processes; that is on human creative processes and their associated 
correlations. As introduction, the most important approaches to creativity research 
will be discussed. For a deeper analysis, refer to the significant articles of well-known 
scientists in Sternberg (1999).  
4.2 Approaches to creativity research 
Creativity research originated in J. P. Gilford’s lecture on “Creativity” at the American 
Psychological Association in 1950. Originating from the USA and induced by the 
“Sputnik shock” in 1957, when the then Soviet Union shot the first earth satellite into 
space, the topic has received constant attention. Its primary focus has been the 
social relevance of creativity and problem solution. However, Sternberg and Lubart 
(1999) noted that in the time from 1975 until 1994 only 0, 5 % of the listed articles in 
Psychological Abstracts had creativity as subject. Guilford (1970) explored the period 
from 1928 until 1967. He noted that, except for a short increase around the year 
1940 (by less than 0,3 %), only 0,1 % of the listed books and articles in the 
Psychological Abstracts dealt with creativity, even in the year 1955, “after which 
things began to happen" (p. 155). A change happened at first around the year 1960. 
At this time, a sharp increase (by around 0, 4 %) could be observed. In 1965, the 
increase was by 0, 7 %, and in 1969 already by 1, 4 %.  
Up to the present day, the approaches to creativity research vary immensely. 
Sternberg and Lubart (1999) exemplarily demonstrated the mystical, the 
psychoanalytic, the pragmatic, the psychometric, the cognitive and the social-
personality approaches and added as "seventh the approach of confluence theories."  
For an explanation and description of the different research methods see Table 3. 
The social-personality approach focuses on personality factors, motivational factors 
and the socio-cultural background as sources of creativity but ignores the underlying 
mental processes. Part of this approach is also the idea that creative individuals are 
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characterised by certain personality traits. Sternberg and Lubart (1999) assume 
furthermore that the still existing adherence to the mystical approach and the view of 
creativity as a spiritual process would be counterproductive to the scientific approach. 
In the same way, the authors consider the pragmatic approach as a hindrance in 
which they criticize the mostly missing empirical testing of the validity of ideas and 
the lack of a qualified theoretical background. The commercial aspect would come 
too much into the foreground. Likewise, they unfavorably mention the individual case 
studies of eminent creative personalities, mostly inherent in psychodynamic 
approaches and other earlier studies, by which one can hardly obtain generalizations 
and thus general valid statements. 
The uncontrolled situation causes a further problem. Only experiment and therefore 
the arbitrary manipulation of the variables allow for a conclusion of causal 
connections. Creativity research tried to clarify the following questions primarily: How 
does the cognitive process, underlying creativity, work? What are the personal 
characteristics of creative individuals? How does creativity develop and manifest 
itself throughout a lifetime? Which social environment is most strongly associated 
with creative performances (Simonton, 2000)? 
Since the access to highly creative persons, who are rather rare within the total 
population, is complicated, Guilford (1950) suggested a psychometric method by 
testing “ordinary” probands by means of paper-and-pen-tests. The tests are based on 
the assumption that the essential mental functions of creative thinkers would be 
shared to a certain degree by the biggest part of humanity. Thus, divergent brain 
challenges32 quickly became the predominant tool for measuring creative thinking; 
they made it possible to compare people on a standardised ‘creativity scale’. 
Although these simple, practical tests simplified the scientific procedure, they were 
considered as too trivial and inadequate for measuring creativity at all. To capture the 
statistical rareness of an answer in relation to all answers of the reference population 
objectively is only one of various possibilities to operationalise and measure the 
construct creativity. Besides, the question was raised, whether measurements within 
                                                          
32 In a divergent brain challenge, the test person has to find, for example, as many as possible purposes to use an everyday 
object like a paper clip. 
 
118 
 
the standard population would at all be apt to reveal any information about excellent 
and outstanding creative performances.  
Furthermore, the complex phenomenon cannot sufficiently be explained by uni-
disciplinary approaches since, as Guilford emphasizes, “creativity is not any one 
thing; it is many things and takes many forms" (1970, p. 157).  In an extreme case, 
the consequence of the mistaken assumption of understanding creativity as only one 
variable would result in the danger of trying to deduce from one single experiment the 
individual creativity level.   Policastro and Gardner (1999) suggested distinguishing 
between at least five various forms of creative behaviour. According to the authors, 
creative behaviour could manifest itself in the process of problem solution, in theory 
development or in the creation of a kind of permanent work within a symbolic system 
(e.g. ‘Guernica’ by Picasso or ‘The Third Symphony’ by Beethoven). Additionally, 
creative behaviour could appear in the performance of a ritualized work (e.g., the 
dance of Martha Graham) as well as in a performance characterized by a high 
uncertainty factor.  (That is a performance, where it is impossible to predetermine its 
details because the reactions of the participants are unknown – such as in political 
discussions, military fighting operations). 
Table 3: Description of different approaches in creativity research (based on Mayer, 
1999, p. 453). 
Research approach and paradigm Description 
Psychometric  
Description Development of a test for measurement of creativity 
Comparison Comparison of individuals with high and low measured 
values of creativity 
Reference Definition of the relations between measured values of 
creativity and other measured values 
Psychological  
Description Description of the cognitive process underpinning 
creative thinking 
Comparison Comparison between cognitive processes of creative 
and non-creative thinking 
Reference Determining inhibiting and supporting factors of 
creative thinking  
119 
 
Biographic  
Description Construction of a qualitative image of a single-case 
study of a creative person 
Carrying out a quantitative analysis of a single-case 
study of a creative person 
Comparison Construction of a qualitative description of common 
features in individual single-case studies of creative 
persons 
Carrying out a quantitative analysis of common 
features in individual single-case studies of creative 
persons 
Reference Identification of significant life events favouring the 
development of a creative person 
Construction of a quantitative analysis of important life 
events which support the development of a creative 
person 
Biological  
Description Description of biological correlates of creative thinking 
Comparison Comparison of biological characteristics between 
creative and non-creative individuals 
Reference Defining the effect of biological impairments on 
creativity 
Computational  
Description Construction of computer codes simulating creative 
productions  
Comparison Comparison of creative thinking and computer 
programs 
Reference Determining how changes within a program change 
the creative output  
Contextual  
Description Description of creativity in social and cultural contexts 
Comparison Description of the understanding of creativity in 
different cultures 
Reference Identification of techniques that may contribute to 
overcoming creativity barriers within a social context 
 
Identification of the evolution process of the design of 
human creativity 
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Another long-time discussed question is: Are the attributes (both internal and 
external) resulting in creative expressions within a particular domain the same as the 
ones evoking creative expressions within another domain? Is creativity, therefore, 
division-specific or a generalized attribute, as implied by psychometric creativity 
tests? Knowledge is an important factor in the realization of creative expressions. 
However, knowledge is division-specific and not easily to be transferred to other 
sections.  
At the same time, however, creative individuals display augmented particular 
personality and motivational characteristics of general importance. One may find 
relevant indications for both views. However, it may be assumed that creativity has 
both specific and general components. For further insight into this subject, refer to 
Sternberg, Grigorenko and Singer (2004).  
A question often arises that will only be briefly outlined here: Does a correlation 
between creativity and personality characteristics exist (see Section 4.4.3)? Creative 
people are often attributed various particular personality characteristics. Among 
other, parallels are drawn to pathological behaviour patterns (Eysenck, 1995). 
Eysenck postulated as described below (see Section 4.4.3), a direct correlation 
between his P-scale and creativity (Eysenck, 1995). Schizotypy (see Section 4.4.3) 
is, inter alia, associated with magical thinking and extraordinary perception 
experiences, but also with increased scores in correlation to creativity and right 
hemispheric activity (Fisher et al., 2004). This observation may raise the question 
whether creativity, in association with certain emotional, cognitive and personality 
characteristics may also cause a predisposition to psychical disorders.  
However, it is far more likely, that creativity as an expression of a personality 
dimension, which means as a characteristic (possibly as a predisposition to mental 
disorders as shown by the P-Scala of Eysenck), will only under certain personality 
characteristics (as those above-listed) evoke creative performance.  
Feist (1999) offers a review about the correlations between personality and creativity 
in arts and sciences. According to the author, artists exhibit in comparison to non-
artists more often particular personality traits. The following may serve as an 
example:  open-mindedness to new experiences, phantasy and imagination, 
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impulsivity and a relative low level of diligence, comparatively higher levels of anxiety, 
introversion, affective disorders, emotional sensitivity, nonconformity, autonomy, 
independence and irregularity, ambition, an urge to work, hostility, social 
incompatibility and social withdrawal. 
The investigation encompassed 113 artists and 181 scientists born between 1850 
and 1900 (among them only two females) of the German language area. 
4,8 % of the artists and 4 % of the scientists were affected by functional psychoses. 
Schizophrenic disorders were found only in artists (2,8 %) and manic-depressive 
disorders only in scientists. The danger of schizophrenia is, according to the author, 
three times higher for artists than for the normal population, whereas the danger of 
manic-depressive psychosis is ten times higher for scientists. 63, 7% of the artists 
and 75, 7% of the scientists showed completely inconspicuous findings.  
Juda (1953) concluded therefore “a psychic abnormality is not a premise for the 
mentioned exceptional performances” (p. 77). However, a “positive relation between 
psychic anomalies and greater talent […] might be feasible, at least to a certain 
degree” (p. 80).  
Post (1994) determined the lifetime prevalence for several psychopathologies of 
extraordinarily creative individuals retrospectively. He included in his study the 
biographies of 291 male scientists, among them composers, visual artists, writers, 
thinkers and politicians. (Females were excluded because of a lack of suitable 
biographies).  
If appropriate, the collected data were transformed into diagnoses by DSM-III-R 
criteria. Post (1994) concluded that most investigated individuals showed 
extraordinary but not pathological personality traits and slightly neurotic anomalies 
would likely show up more often than in the normal population. An increased number 
of severe personality anomalies was only notable in visual artists and writers. 
According to the author, functional psychoses were even less frequently present (1, 7 
%) than could be assumed by epidemiological studies. In addition, these were limited 
to affective variants and schizophrenic disorders were not presented at all in this 
sample. 
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According to Post (1994), creative performance, persistence, diligence and accuracy 
was common in all cases. Post concluded from his research results “certain 
pathological personality characteristics, as well as tendencies towards depression 
and alcoholism, are causally linked to some kinds of valuable creativity“(p. 22). 
However, it remains questionable whether one may speak of any causal correlations.  
 
4.3 Definition of creative performance 
 
Creativity, like a latent personality characteristic, can only be defined by creative 
achievements. Eysenck (1995) distinguishes “creativity as trait and as achievement”.  
He considers it a paradox that “creativity as a psychological trait is apparent in all 
people, to varying degrees, while creativity in the sense of great achievement seems 
confined to singularly few" (p. 36). In order to avoid the use of creativity in several 
meanings, he suggested using the term ‘originality’ instead of  ‘creativity as a trait’.  
Thus, the question arises of which criteria a creative achievement consists and what 
factors promote or inhibit creative performances.  
Creativity is commonly defined as “ability to act extraordinarily (originally) but 
appropriately” (Zimbardo, 1999, p. 574) and is both of individual and social 
significance. For further definitions of creativity, see Pimmer (1995). Therefore, a 
performance can only be classified as creative if it is original (or infrequent) and at 
the same time adequate for solving a problem. K = O x A (K = creativity; O = 
originality; A = adequacy). If one of both multipliers equals zero, it is not a creative 
performance. 
The majority of studies for determining creativity bases on this assumption and 
measures the individual at a correlating norm population. Judging by the 
appropriateness of the act, activities are distinguished as creative, senseless or even 
psychotic. However, the verdict always underlies a value judgement based on the 
respective cultural and temporal context. The problem about creativity tests is their 
low, but essentially constitute reliability. (Reliability is tested by repeated 
measurement and only satisfactory if the results are consistent under possibly equal 
conditions). Subsequently, there are very broad confidence intervals that strongly 
decrease the significance.  
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Guilford saw creativity in the domain of intelligence and wrote “one of the most 
important aspects of intelligence is creative-thinking ability" (1970, p. 150). Within his 
expandable “Structure-of-Intellect Model,” Guilford (1956, 1966) suggested three 
basic dimensions of intelligence, which together form a cube and give by their 
combination 120 factors. These three dimensions divide themselves in operations 
(cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation), 
products (units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, implications) and 
contents (figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioural). The ability of divergent 
thinking relevant to creativity constitutes one of the five operations and therefore may 
be understood as an integral part of intelligence. For the question, whether creativity 
is a part of intelligence and vice versa, refers to the review by Sternberg and O’Hara 
(1999). 
The research team, led by Guilford, found four key features of creative behaviour: 
■    Sensitivity to problems 
■    Fluency of ideas 
■    Flexibility 
■    Originality 
Wagner (2000) defined the following parameters as central characteristics of 
creativity: 
■    Fluctuation 
correlates with Guilford’s fluency of ideas and characterizes the ability to create as 
many ideas as possible to one topic or to link one idea to as many as possible topics. 
Usually, this ability is tested by word association tests. 
■    Flexibility 
characterises the ability to switch without difficulty between different topics.  
■    Originality 
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is understood as “novelty for oneself and remaining by oneself” (Wagner, p. 50) 
despite possible aversive circumstances. 
■     Sensitivity 
Guilford understands sensitivity as sensitivity to problems. Wagner (p. 53) describes 
sensitivity about art as the “ability to perceive, react to and express adequately the 
social changes, trends, fashions and currents that are in the air.” 
■    Complexity preference 
is characterized by Wagner (p. 56) as “all conjunctions within the world“.  
■    Elaboration skills 
describe the ability to arrive from a concept to a concrete plan. 
Creativity also implies a synthesis, in the sense of associating contents that are not 
necessarily associated a priori. At the same time, Guilford compared simple linear 
(convergent) thinking with divergent thinking. Intelligence tests primarily measure 
convergent thinking. Tests for the measurement of creativity were deduced, inter alia, 
from projective methods (e.g. Rorschach-test, see Figure 22). At projective methods, 
the individual has to respond freely to a particular material and describe emerging 
associations that are judged neither as right nor wrong. From the reactions and 
statements, one tries to deduce the underlying motivation and personality structures. 
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Figure 22: Rorschach symbol I 
 
In relation to problem-solving skills, a divergent production means that as many 
solutions as possible should be produced. On the contrary, a convergent production 
requires only one right solution. Therefore, the solutions in a creativity test are not 
only right or wrong, but also more or less creative, measurable by the above-
mentioned characteristics. In terms of quantity, it means the extent of originality 
(infrequency) and fluctuality, in terms of quality, the extent of flexibility and 
elaboration. 
As aforementioned, knowledge provides an additional important aspect enabling 
creative performances (Weisberg, 1999) and therefore also memory and motivation 
(Collins & Amabile, 1999). In combination with the traits described by Wagner (2000), 
creative performances become possible (Wagner, 2000). 
Eysenck (1995) described creative performances as a multiplicative function of 
cognitive, environment-related and personality variables (see Figure 23). 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
Cognitive   Intelligence    
Variables   Knowledge   } 
    Technical abilities   
    Specific talent 
 
Environment-Related  Political-religious factors   Creative 
Variables   Cultural factors  }  Performance 
    Socio-Economic and 
    Educative factors 
 
Personality-Related  Intrinsic Motivation 
Variables   Confidence   }  
    Non-Conformity 
 
Figure 23: Creative performance as a multiplicative function of cognitive, environment-related and personality variables 
(Eysenck, 1995, p. 39). 
 
4.4 Biological aspects of creativity 
“Creativity is a rare trait“, wrote Martindale (1999, p. 137). He reasoned that creativity 
requires the simultaneous occurrence of multiple characteristics (e.g. intelligence, 
perseverance, unconventionality, the ability to think in a certain way). None of these 
characteristics would be rare for itself, but rather their co-occurrence in one person33. 
Therefore, one may also assume that all these characteristics have a biological 
basis. 
Access to creativity is mostly descriptive and rarely explanatory. It remains doubtful 
how the underpinning processes, foremost the biological and neuropsychological 
aspects, are designed. However, the genetic approach, although of biological nature, 
shall be ignored in the following observations. Galton has early dealt with this issue in 
his work ‘Hereditary Genius’ (1869). Genes influence behaviour only indirectly by the 
gene expression. In addition to genetic factors, environmental factors are usually of 
great importance as well. It is hardly possible to separate the relevant factors from 
each other completely. Furthermore, the so-called regression to the mean34 plays a 
role in heritable mental and physical characteristics.  However, the level of activation 
                                                          
33 For the distinction between "creativity as trait and as achievement" (Eysenck, 1995), see Section 4.3. 
34Regression as a statistical expression means that the estimated standard values of the dependent variable are closer to the 
sample medium value than the related sample medium values of the independent variable. Illustrated by the example of the 
body size, this would mean that very tall or very small parents mostly beget descendants, which are slightly smaller in the first 
case or somewhat taller in the second instance. 
 
127 
 
seems to be of central importance in creative performance. Kris (1952 / 1977) spoke 
in the proper sense also of various forms of the activation level by comparing both 
forms of psychic energy: the primary process and the secondary process. 
 
4.4.1 Primary process related and secondary process related cognition 
 
Firmly committed to the psychodynamic approach, Kris (1952/1977) focused on the 
psychic energy and the relationship between the Ego and Id35. 
This relationship of Id and Ego would also encompass the relationship between the 
primary and secondary process.  
This distinction of forms of psychic energy, attributed to Freud, bases on the 
assumption that in its first form the energy is free and unconstrained and in its 
second form controlled by the Ego. Kris hypothesized that creative individuals switch 
more easily between primary and secondary process related thinking. 
 “The ability of easily gaining access to the material of the Id without being 
overwhelmed by it, of maintaining the control over the primary process, as well as 
probably especially the ability of going through a quick or at least adequately quick 
change between the levels of the psychic function, indicate psychological 
characteristics of particular, yet complicated form” (Kris, 1977, p. 23). 
Primary process related thinking is characterized by a reduced consciousness level, 
as, for example, in dreams and fantasies; it works rather imaginatively and 
associatively and is linked to the unconsciousness, the Id, and the pleasure principle. 
Secondary process thinking in turn is conscious, verbal and realistic, subject to the 
Ego and the reality principle. Therefore, the regression to an associative primary 
process related state would facilitate the discovery of new combinations of mental 
elements. Kris attributed this phenomenon to an Ego-Regression.  
“Topically we encounter the Ego-Regression – the regression of the Ego-function to a 
primitive stage – not only when the Ego is weakened - as when we sleep or are 
falling asleep, in phantasy, in an ecstasy or psychoses – but also in creative 
processes of various kinds” (Kris, 1977, p. 187). In contrast, creative elaboration 
                                                          
35 According to Freud, personality is divided into the Id, the Ego, and the Super- Ego. 
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requires returning to a secondary process related state. As a side note, Kris was 
convinced “scientific thinking never can strictly be separated from the realm of the 
unconscious”. He also believed “there exists an intimate relation between these 
higher functions of the spirit and unconscious wishes and desires including their early 
childhood roots” (1977, p. 168). Therefore, Kris underlined the “Id-aspect of scientific 
thinking” (p. 169). Besides, he assumed that the excitement, partly connected with 
productive thinking, was of libidinous nature. Freud believed that the pleasure 
principle was most likely overcome in science “that also offers intellectual pleasure 
within the work and promises limited practical benefit” (1911 / 1943, p. 236). Finally, 
Freud wrote:  
“Art accomplishes in a peculiar way a reconciliation of both principles [the pleasure 
principle and the reality principle]. The artist is primarily an individual, who turns away 
from reality, because he is not able to befriend its request to renounce one’s drive for 
satisfaction initially, and thus, he allows his erotic and ambitious desires fulfilment in 
fantasy life. But due to his unique gifts, he finds his way back from this fantasy world 
into reality by creating his fantasies into new kinds of realities which other people 
approve as valuable portrayals of reality” (1911 / 1943, p. 236).  
Thus, Freud described – as also postulated by Kris – the ability, inherent in artists or 
creative individuals like scientists, to switch with greater flexibility between primary 
and secondary process related processes. 
Martindale and Dailey (1996) emphasized the necessity to release the theory of Kris 
from an excessive psychoanalytic burden and to perceive the continuum between 
primary process and secondary process not as a psychoanalytic construct, but as 
purely descriptive, as a form of conscious thinking. The authors investigated on one 
hand the relationship between creativity and primary process related thinking and on 
the other hand, the relationship between psychoticism, openness to new experiences 
and creativity, as well as primary process related thinking36. The subjects of the study 
had to construct a story whose primary process-related content was determined by a 
system for content analyses (Regressive Imagery Dictionary), created by Martindale. 
                                                          
36 Conspicuous manifestations of primary processual operations are associated with clinically conspicuous behaviour, such as 
with schizotypal and resident disorders that cause a loss of reality. McCrea (1987) in turn recognizes a connection between the 
personal characteristic of openness to new experiences and creativity. 
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The creative potential of the subjects was measured by various tests: a word 
association test, a test for measuring deductive thinking, and the assessment of the 
creativity level of a written story by two independent reviewers. In addition, Martindale 
and Dailey (1996) used personality tests. The different measurements of creativity 
correlated positively but not significantly, (which, in fact, casts doubt on the construct 
validity of such tests). The correlations between the creativity measurements, the 
primary process-related content and the personality tests revealed a positive and 
significant correlation between creativity measurement results and the primary 
process-related content. The more creative a test person was rated, the more 
primary process related contents reflected his or her narration. The correlations 
between the individual creativity measurement results and psychoticism were partly 
positive but not significant. However, significant was the positive correlation of the 
measurement results with extraversion (at Eysenck’s Personality Questionnaire, 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, however, not at the NEO Personality Inventory by Costa 
& McCrae, 1985). No correlation between the creativity measurement results and an 
openness to new experiences could be observed. 
An exploratory factor analysis led to an extraction of two unrotated factors. Their 
loadings showed that the creativity measurements, the primary process-related 
content, psychoticism and extraversion formed a cluster by high loadings on one 
factor and low ones on the other. Disinhibition is instanced as a probable connecting 
moment of these characteristics. On behalf of the relatively low number of random 
sampling (N = 37), the authors themselves, suggested to interpret these results 
rather as indicative.  
4.4.2 The importance of the activation level 
 
Between arousal and performance exists a retrograde u-shaped relation. The 
relationship between arousal level, complexity factor and performance describes the 
Yerkes-Dodson law (1908). According to this law, the performance level decreases 
during difficult tasks as soon as the arousal level increases. On the contrary, the 
performance level increases during simple tasks when the arousal level increases. In 
this respect, there exists an optimal activation level for every task. Individuals differ in 
their habitual activation level. At the same time, there exists a correlation between 
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the cortical activation, measured by EEG, and the state of consciousness (see 
Section 1.9.1) as wave amplitude and frequency of the waves are changing. The 
occurrence of slow and high waves is characteristic for a low activation level, the 
presence of faster and smaller ones for an increasing activation level. Martindale 
(1999) concluded, when creative individuals showed a larger variability on the 
primary-secondary-process-continuum (see Section 4.4.1), they would also 
demonstrate this variability at the activation continuum. Martindale postulated that an 
average activation level is optimal for secondary process-related states while both a 
high and a low activation level associate with primary process-related states. 
According to Martindale (1999), a lower activation level would be associated with 
primary process-related processes and, as a result, promote more extensive 
associations, and thus creative performance. 
Hull (1943) was able to show that at a progressive increase of the actual activation 
level, the behavioural variability – a prerequisite for creative performance- decreases.  
This phenomenon is readily comprehensible since one is hardly prepared to try out 
new solutions in stressful situations, but rather resorts to proven patterns of 
behaviour. However, it renders speed components of some tests problematic. Time 
pressure is not conducive to creative expression. 
Mendelsohn (1976) postulated that creative individuals possess a wider attention 
span, thus being able to pay attention to several elements at the same time 
(defocused attention), which in turn facilitates combining various previously 
uncorrelated elements. Ansburg and Hill (2003) proved that creative thinkers used 
peripherally presented stimuli more efficiently than analytic thinkers did. A diffuse, 
defocused attention increases the probability of perceiving unexpected stimuli and 
thus the access to distant associations.  
Defocused attention is at the same time a characteristic of primary process-related 
cognition. As described above, it is associated with a reduced cortical activation.  
Correlations between activation level (measured, for example, by PGR – psycho-
galvanic reflex) and psychometric creativity performances turn out most of the time 
highly positive because a higher habitual activation level associates with an 
increased attention span. In a study on vigilance performance, in which the attention 
span plays inherently a central role (Gange, Green & Harkins, 1979), introverted 
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persons proved to have an advantage over extroverted. The result was partly 
attributed to the fact that introverts produce mostly more orientation reactions than 
extroverts do. Eysenck (1967) postulated that introverted persons in contrast to 
extroverted individuals are characterised by a higher cortical arousal level. 
Martindale, Anderson, Moore and West (1996) pursued the hypothesis that creative 
individuals possessed a lower habituation level37 than less creative individuals. The 
persistence in pursuing their goals attributed to creative persons is associated with 
this lower habituation level. Tests measured the creative potential of 24 subjects. 
Subsequently, their skin resistance was measured at the presentation of sequences 
of white noise of 60 dB. The more creative test persons demonstrated a significantly 
higher amplitude of skin resistance and a lower habituation rate. Consequently, the 
creative individuals reacted physiologically stronger to the stimulus. Within the group 
of highly creative individuals, the positive amplitude increased during the 
presentation sequences, whereas it decreased in the less creative group.  The lower 
habituation rate was interpreted in the light of Sokolov’s (1963) habituation theory,38  
according to which a longer period would be needed to form and test a neuronal 
model. The authors conclude that if the positive amplitude is to be understood as 
orientation reaction, the increase over the sequences in the highly creative group 
could be interpreted as a sign that in this case the attention to incoming stimuli was 
also maintained after the formation of a neuronal model. The authors further 
concluded that creative individuals are rather motivated to look for new stimuli than to 
avoid repetition. However, one could not assume that this was the opposite pole of a 
continuum. A slower habituation rate could also repeatedly be observed in 
schizophrenics (Akdag et. al., 2003) and introverts (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37The habituation to an unchanging stimulus by a decrease of attention. 
38 According to Sokolov’s theory of habituation, the reaction eliciting feature of a stimulus is stored in the form of a neural model; 
newly incoming stimuli are compared with the stored models of the stimulus; the extent of the deviation then determines the 
orientation reaction. The neural model is continuously adjusted to the stimulus. 
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4.4.3 P-Scale of Eysenck, cognitive inhibition and schizotypy 
 
Eysenck (1995) postulated a close relationship between creativity and psychoticism39 
and wrote, "Creativity is not an ability, but a cognitive style closely related with 
psychoticism“(1995, p. 279). Eysenck suggested in his P-E-N model, additionally to 
neuroticism (N) and introversion-extroversion (E), the so-called psychoticism (P) as a 
third fundamental personality dimension, ”which is a dispositional variable or trait 
predisposing people to functional psychotic disorders of all types" (1995, p. 203). It 
must be distinguished from psychosis in the psychiatric sense, which is opposed to 
creative output. ”It appears to be psychoticism in the absence of psychosis that is the 
vital element in translating the trait40 of creativity (originality) from potential into actual 
achievement" (p. 236). The P-Scala of Eysenck was developed to measure 
psychoticism in healthy subjects, such as non-psychotic groups. 
Both creativity and psychoticism were based on a cognitive style, which he called  
‘over-inclusiveness’, correlated with a low association gradient that allowed a broad 
range of interpretation of relevance with regard to stimuli. The ‘over-inclusiveness’ 
could be traced back to a lack of inhibition, which in turn is characteristic of 
psychotics, individuals with a high P-value, creative persons and geniuses. A part of 
this would be, for example, the loosening of thought associated inter alia with 
schizophrenia, but also with creativity (inter alia relevant in word association tests 
and deductive brain challenges). Further characteristics of the cognitive system 
would cause the distinction between a psychotic patient and a genius, for example, 
the ability to reject too remote and inadequate answers (see Figure 23, p. 124). Thus, 
Eysenck (1995) interpreted creativity as a disinhibition syndrome that is associated  
with a weakening of the frontal cortex function (the moderator function) and at the 
same time a relative enhancement of subcortical activities. Consequently, arising 
action stimuli are not inhibited (e.g. aggressiveness, egocentric interests) whereby 
Eysenck postulated a positive correlation between creativity and his P-scale again. 
                                                          
39 Psychoticism (P) is described by the following features: delusions, hallucinations, delusion of reference, sudden mood swings, 
thinking and memory disorders, increased suicide impulses, lack of social contact, fundamental distrust towards the world, and 
others. 
 
 
40 See Footnote 33, p.126. 
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Cognitive inhibition plays a significant role in information processing. Irrelevant 
information is selectively excluded. One assumes that this process bases on 
processes facilitating balance in terms of task-relevant stimuli and the inhibition of 
task-irrelevant stimuli. This process of attention control correlates inter alia with the 
activation level.  Cognitive inhibition may be measured experimentally, for example, 
by negative priming41.  
A schizophrenic disorder causes a weakening of the inhibitory selection mechanisms 
and characteristic disturbances in thinking and perception, whereby the clarity of the 
consciousness and intellectual abilities are mostly not affected.  
“In the typical schizophrenic thought disorder, secondary and unimportant aspects of 
an overall concept are prioritized, that play only a minor role in normal psychical 
activities; they are used in the place of important, situational appropriate elements” 
(International Classification of Psychiatric Diseases, ICD-10, p. 104). 
According to Eysenck (1995), a small association gradient may result from a lack of 
cognitive inhibition as measured by negative priming. Eysenck recognizes an indirect 
evidence for his theory in some research findings (cf. Eysenck, 1995). They have 
shown that individuals with a high P-value are creative, had a small association 
gradient and low negative priming values.   
“This, of course, is precisely what is characteristic of the mechanism needed to 
explain the overinclusiveness of schizophrenics and high- P scorers; the failure of 
negative priming and/or latent inhibition to limit associational spreading (flat 
associational gradient) would appear to account for the prominent symptoms of 
psychotic cognition and the major feature of creativity” (Eysenck, 1995, p. 252). 
Thereby, the correlation between psychopathology and genius may be explained. As 
aforementioned, a low association gradient, caused by a lack of inhibition, is not in 
                                                          
41 Typically, negative priming is realized in an experiment by the “Stroop Colour Naming” task (colour-word-interference). A 
colour word (for example red) is presented in another colour (for instance written in green). If the font colour is to be named, 
normal subjects show a slowed reaction. If the task is defined as ignoring the word and only naming the colour of the font, and if 
the next word is written in red, the reaction is also slowed down. At priming, sequence elements are pre-activated. If a word is to 
be ignored, it gains negative attention that inhibits correlating cognitions. Thus, the irrelevant stimulus acts as a prime in terms 
of later recognition and importance, but in a negative sense, which partly inhibits such a reaction. Individuals with schizophrenic 
or schizotypal disorders (see Footnote 46, p. 138) demonstrate no retarded answer latency, what is interpreted as a sign of a 
reduced cognitive inhibition. 
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itself sufficient to produce a creative performance. Other components also play a 
significant role in this process (see Figure 23, p. 124).  
Carson, Higgins and Peterson (2003) analysed how a high intelligence quotient in 
correlation with reduced latent inhibition influences creative output. A meta-analysis 
carried out on a young random sample with high intelligence quotients demonstrated 
that subjects with permanent highly creative performances displayed significantly 
lower latent inhibition values than subjects with comparatively little creative 
performances. Subjects with extraordinary creative performances in a certain field in 
turn showed lower latent inhibition values with a seven times higher probability than a 
less creative control group42.   
If one assumed the existence of both quantitative and qualitative differences in the 
cognitive processes among individuals with highly creative performances in a 
particular domain and other intelligent thinkers, the relative decrease of the latent 
inhibition would be a potential source of these qualitative differences. This decrease 
in turn could increase the amount of available mental elements as a part of the 
process of creative discovery. Highly creative individuals apparently do not pre-
categorize stimuli, in the same way, as less creative individuals do. 
Since several studies have pointed out that a reduced latent inhibition is, on one 
hand, a predisposing factor for psychosis and, on the other hand, for creativity, the 
question arises what differentiates a psychotic from, for example, a poet? Carson et 
al. (2003) postulated in this context that some psychological phenomena ”might be 
pathogenic in the presence of decreased intelligence, psychometrically defined, but 
normative or even abnormally useful in the presence of increased intelligence" (p. 
500). Studies have shown that the correlation between creativity and intelligence is 
no longer significant from an intelligence quotient of about 120 onward (cf. as a 
review Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). This threshold theory indicates that an intelligence 
quotient of about 120 is probably necessary but not sufficient for creative 
performance. - Or, to put it in another way, highly creative individuals often have a 
                                                          
42  The creativity was measured with the following scales. Creative Achievement Questionnaire, a questionnaire, developed by 
the authors, regarding lifelong creative performances in a certain field. (Sample question: My work has won a prize or prizes at a 
juried art show): a test to analyse divergent thinking (Torrance, 1968) as well as a personality questionnaire, Creative 
Personality Scale (Gough, 1979). 
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high intelligence, but highly intelligent individuals are not necessarily highly creative. 
The eminently creative participants of the study by Carson et al. (2003) had an 
average intelligence quotient above this threshold (M = 128.6, SD = 8.3). On the 
contrary, the control group had an intelligence quotient under this limit (M = 118.3, 
SD = 11.9).  A regression analysis demonstrated that negative latent inhibition values 
and positive IQ values explained a third of the variance of the creative performance 
values. This result would in turn support the theory that both qualitative differences 
(for example, the lack of the ability to filter out irrelevant stimuli) and quantitative 
differences (for example a high intelligence quotient) underlie creative versus 
ordinary cognition. The interaction between latent inhibitions and the intelligence 
quotient was highly significant. Therefore, the intelligence quotient could be a 
moderating variable and overcome a ‘deficit’ in earlier, selective attention processes 
with a highly effective mechanism on a later, controlled level of selective processing. 
Presumably, an extremely creative individual was privileged in as much as he or she 
had a greater amount of unfiltered stimuli available that heightened the number of 
original new combinations. Therefore, Carson et al. (2003) conclude “a deficit that is 
generally associated with pathology may well impart a creative advantage in the 
presence of other cognitive strengths such as high IQ" (S. 505). 
Cognitive inhibition and negative priming have by their nature a biological basis that 
is possibly related to dopaminergic transmitters.  For example, the neurobiological 
reasons for the schizophrenic disorder become apparent in a hyperactive mesolimbic 
dopamine system and, furthermore, in a disorder of the medial temporal and 
prefrontal cortex regions (Birbaumer & Schmidt, 1999). Serotonin in turn often has 
inhibitory effects on the central nervous system and thereby possibly a reducing 
effect on creative performances. As a summary, see the model of a causal theory of 
creativity by Eysenck in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24: Eysenck’s causal theory of creativity (by Eysenck, 1995, p. 280) 
 
 
The research results of Merten and Fischer (1999) support Eysenck’s theory of a 
positive correlation between psychoticism (high P-value), creativity and behaviour in 
the word association test. 40 writers and actors, postulated as creative, were tested 
in a word association test under several conditions43. 
The control group consisted of 40 individuals with schizophrenic disorder and 40 
subjects from a ‘normal group’. In the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire EPQ 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), the creative individuals had an increased P-value in 
relation to the normal group. At the same time, their answers were more original in 
the free response condition than those of the normal group were. In contrast to the 
group of schizophrenics, the group of creative individuals produced the most original 
associations in the individual response condition. This result confirms the ability of 
creative individuals in comparison to psychotics to reject inadequate answers as 
postulated by Eysenck. 
A study (Abraham, Windmann, Daum & Güntürkin, 2005) analysed the specific 
creative cognitive processes in the context of important dimensions for creative 
performances – such as originality and adequacy – and compared them to 
psychoticism. The researchers assumed that a higher level of psychoticism would 
                                                          
43 In contrast to traditional word association tests, they collected not only free associations (free-single-word-association), but 
added a common response condition. The participants had to find associations, which were as conventional as possible and, in 
the opinion of the individuals used by a majority of people. In the individual response condition, the test persons were supposed 
to convey associations in response to the stimulus, which, in the opinion of the individual, nobody else would think of.  
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result in a higher dimension of conceptual expansion (expressed as a wider 
association gradient by Eysenck) but would be completely unrelated to the adequacy 
of the idea. The authors postulated a correlation between psychoticism and creativity 
based on associative thinking and broader, but weaker top-down controlled activation 
patterns. They expected that a higher extent of psychoticism led to a higher 
performance in a test measuring the conceptual expansion and to a higher degree of 
originality in a creative imagination task, but not necessarily to a higher degree of 
practicability (adequacy) within the creative imagination task44.  Eighty subjects were 
presented with Eysenck’s Personality Questionnaire in a revised form (EPQ-R; 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991). By means of a median split, the sample was divided into 
a group with low and a group with high P-value. The conceptual expansion was 
analysed by the Ward (1994) ‘animal-task’45.The proband group with a higher P-
value reached significantly higher values (p = 0.22) regarding conceptual expansion 
than the group with lower P-values. They also displayed significantly higher values (p 
= 0.45) regarding originality in the imagination task. However, no significant 
differences could be observed between the two groups regarding the practicability-
value (p = .88) and the total value in the creative imagination task (p = .297). A low 
but significant correlation was found between the total value “conceptual expansion” 
and psychoticism (r = .285, p = .01). One may interpret this result as follows: The 
higher the P-value, the higher the conceptual expansion. Regarding psychoticism, 
the total value, and the practicability-value of the imagination task, no significant 
correlations were found. Likewise, regarding psychoticism and the originality scale in 
the imagination task, only a low but significant correlation (r = .234, p = .037) could 
be reported. 
To that extent, the original assumptions could be verified, but its effects were not too 
robust. Similar to Eysenck’s idea, individuals with a higher P-value seemed to be able 
to develop broader concepts due to a broader association gradient. At the same time, 
they were able to generate more original ideas than individuals with a lower P-value 
did. Abraham et al. (2005) associated this result with a more diffuse top-down 
                                                          
44 In the imaginative task (Finke, 1990) predefined elements had to be put together to an object that had to correspond to a 
predefined function.  
45 In the ‘animal task’, the test persons are asked to imagine and draw animals that live on a planet completely different from the 
earth. The task is evaluated by the fact in how far fundamental characteristics of usual animals were applied or rather not (= 
creative). 
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managed control. Probably, psychoticism increases only the originality aspect of 
creative cognition, whereas the aspect of adequacy or functionality remains 
unaffected. However, as mentioned above, a high originality degree is not to be 
equated with a high creativity degree. The solution of the imagination task seems 
rather be associated with processes corresponding to a scientific concept of 
creativity, demanding both originality and functionality. The task of conceptual 
expansion requires less than the imagination task in terms of functionality. Therefore, 
it may rather comply with an artistic understanding of creativity. 
Recent studies are dedicated, inter alia, to individual differences within the normal  
population regarding schizotypy46, a personality construct related to psychoticism, 
and creativity.  
Green and Williams (1999) investigated the hypothesis that increased creativity of 
individuals with a higher level of schizotypy might be explained by reduced cognitive 
inhibition. They presented 72 non-clinical probands with a test battery for measuring 
their degree of schizotypy (Schizotypal Traits Questionnaire, STA, by Claridge & 
Broks, 1984) as well as measuring divergent thinking. Besides, they received a 
negative priming task47 in order to measure their cognitive inhibition. 
The researchers found a significant but rather low positive correlation between 
schizotypy values and the number of extraordinarily original answers to the divergent 
brain challenges. In contrast to the results of other studies, it was not possible to 
verify the association between decreased cognitive inhibition, detected by the 
negative priming task, and schizotypy.  These findings may be related to problems 
with the negative priming task (for example, to recognise the connection between 
stimuli presented before and afterwards), or with special characteristics of schizotypal 
manifestations. Therefore, cognitive factors might have played a less important role 
than motivational ones. 
                                                          
46 One may understand schizotypy both as a hypothetic, not directly observable, multidimensional construct that includes an 
underlying personality organisation with a tendency to develop psychoses, or as a phenotypical manifestation, a specific 
personality organisation (see Daneluzzo, Stratta & Rossi, 2005). In the latter case, both a pathological and a ‘normal’ 
manifestation are possible. A schizotypal disorder, that means as pathological manifestation, designates “a disorder with 
eccentric behaviour and anomalies of thinking and mood that seem to be schizophrenic, although there never occurred any 
clearly characteristic schizophrenic symptoms.” (ICD-10, p. 113). 
 
47 See Footnote 41, p. 133. 
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Likewise, in the study by O’Reilly, Dunbar and Bentall (2001), a correlation of 
schizotypal dimensions and divergent brain challenges became only apparent when 
comparing a group of students from the humanistic with a group of students from the 
artistic field (N=100). The authors could not observe such a correlation within the 
group of students from the same field of study.   
Subsequently, schizotypal characteristics play possibly only an important role in 
deciding to choose creative ways, but do not directly contribute to divergent thinking. 
Although Merten and Fischer (1999) were able to prove a higher P-value in creative 
individuals than in the normal group, they were not able to observe any direct relation 
between a high P-value and a high originality value within the group of creative 
individuals. 
There exists no conclusive evidence about any correlations between creative 
expressions with certain personality traits or a specific cognitive style. Eysenck 
(1995) himself points out that his conclusions have only indirectly been verified and 
that further studies are required. However, I will not go into further details of this issue 
but rather focus on the main subject of this research paper, the neuropsychological 
correlations of creative performances.  
4.5 Neuropsychological correlates of creative performances 
Creativity as a fundamental activity of human information processing is based – as is 
to be assumed - on normal mental processes (see Ward, Smith & Finke, 1999). It is, 
therefore, a part of cognitive science and, in a closer sense, of neuroscience. The 
integration of today’s understanding of brain functions and theories of creativity is, 
therefore, a necessity. Neuroscientific attempts to explain creative performance focus 
on hemispheric asymmetries, gender differences and the comparison between high 
creative and less creative individuals. These theories shall be discussed in the 
following section. Dietrich (2004) presented a frame theory of creativity, which 
includes psychological, cognitive and neuroscientific studies. 
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4.5.1 Different forms of creative insight and the importance of prefrontal cortex 
functions  
 
Dietrich (2004) postulated four different kinds of creative insight, each attributable to 
different neuronal circuits. By definition, creative insight takes place in a state of 
consciousness.  Based on the assumption that the working memory provides the 
content of what is accessible to the consciousness, each of the four different circuits 
would end there.  The location of the working memory in turn associates with the 
prefrontal cortex. 
As suggested above, an essential assumption of this frame theory is that “neural 
circuits, that process specific information to yield non-creative combinations of that 
information, are the same neural circuits that generate creative or novel combinations 
of that information" (Dietrich. 2004, p. 1011). The author underlined the importance of 
the prefrontal cortex. One should however not understand it as “the location of 
creativity” but as something that “contributes highly integrative computations to the 
conscious experience, which enables novel combination of information to be 
recognized as such and then appropriately applied to works of art and science" (p. 
1012). 
Information processing is understood as a hierarchically structured process; at its top 
is the prefrontal cortex, the neuronal base for higher cognitive functions (e.g., Frith & 
Dolan, 1996). Theories on neuronal correlates of consciousness similarly emphasize 
the importance of the functions of the frontal, and in a narrower sense, the prefrontal 
cortex for higher attributions (e.g., Crick & Koch, 1998). Two different neuronal 
systems extract various types of information from the environment. The emotional 
brain adds an assessment of the incoming information that allows the evaluation of a 
certain event regarding its biologic importance. A detailed characteristic analysis 
proceeds separately and parallel and creates the basis of cognitive processing. Both 
forms of information processing base on a functional hierarchy; within its structures of 
increasingly higher order, increasingly demanding computations take place. These 
two functional systems may be differentiated both by anatomical differences and 
probably also by their form of information processing. The processing of affective 
contents takes mainly place within the limbic structures, starting with the amygdala, 
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proceeding to the cingulate cortex until it reaches the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
Within these structures, complex feelings develop, and furthermore, complex social 
situations are assessed. Cognitive processing involves another part of the limbic 
structure, mainly the hippocampal formation and the temporal-, parietal- and occipital 
cortex. The selective attention that is necessary for information processing is also 
supported by these structures. Between these two information-processing systems, 
diverse connections occur repeatedly and on several levels. However, it seems that 
the complete integration of emotional and cognitive information occurs within the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This region plays a significant role in executive 
functions. Information, which has already been processed on a high level, is 
integrated. Action planning takes place here inter alia and is initiated (neuronal 
structures can activate the motoric system on each level of the functional hierarchy) 
while the primary output is the motor cortex. 
The prefrontal cortex, separated by the central sulcus from the temporal-, parietal- 
and occipital lobes, does not receive any direct sensory input but has high integrative 
function. It is involved in short-term memory, time integration and the maintenance 
and direction of attention. The prefrontal cortex functionally separates in the 
ventromedial and dorsolateral cortex (e.g. Fuster, 2002). The dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is strongly linked with the regions of the temporal-, parietal- and occipital lobe 
whereas the ventromedial prefrontal cortex strongly ties with the amygdala and 
cingulate cortex. Lesion studies indicate that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex plays 
a significant role in the integration of values and social standards of an individual 
culture. The links to the limbic system may be vital in the assessment of personal 
consequences of one’s behaviour, and the resulting feelings may provide an 
essential precondition for logical and rational decisions. Dietrich (2004) concluded  
”given that creativity is both novel and appropriate, it would appear that the ability of 
the prefrontal cortex to evaluate propriety must be critical to assessing whether a 
particular new idea is creative as opposed to merely new“ (p. 1013). 
In her frame model of creativity, Dietrich (2004) suggested two different processing 
modes from which creative thoughts may arise: rational or deliberate, as well as 
spontaneous. Creativity may be the result of defocused attention (see Martindale, 
1999 and Section 4.4.2). However, according to the author, the ability to pay rational, 
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controlled attention to adequate information has to be a precondition of creative 
thinking and a result of an intentional, constructive problem-solving process. 
Consequently, targeted aesthetic or scientific behaviour depends on the prefrontal 
activity. Dietrich (2004) concluded that creativity required cognitive abilities, such as 
“working memory, sustained attention, cognitive flexibility, and judgment of propriety) 
that are typically ascribed to the prefrontal cortex “(p.1014). The central role of the 
prefrontal cortex regarding creative thinking was also confirmed by the studies which 
will be subsequently described. 
Dietrich (2004) postulated four basic types of creativity:  
”Novelty production can occur in emotional structures or in cognitive structures, and 
crossing the type of information with the two modes of processing (deliberate or 
spontaneous) yields the four basic types" (p. 1015).  
However, this was not meant to signify that a creative act presented the 
manifestation of one of these kinds in a pure form. These four types of creativity 
rather represented essential elements of information processing, and creative 
behaviour was ultimately the result of a combination of these basic psychological 
processes. After the generation of a new combination, a value assessment had to 
take place in the prefrontal cortex in order to form a creative idea. Thus, all four types 
of creativity would share a “final common pathway", independent of the circuit, from 
where the generation of the novelty arose. The author saw the role of the prefrontal 
cortex within the creative process as tripartite. First, the prefrontal cortex was 
involved in allocating the working memory’s buffer in the realising process of the 
creative idea. Information not represented in the working memory is not consciously 
perceived and can therefore neither be reflected nor reported on (e.g. Gazzaniga, 
Ivry & Mangun, 1998). Unconscious new combinations might result in a new 
behaviour, because – as mentioned above– neuronal structures can activate the 
motoric system at each functional level. However, creatively more sophisticated 
behaviour was based on the prefrontal integration, by the manifestation of 
unconscious new thoughts in the consciousness. Secondly, the prefrontal cortex was 
involved in the assessment of ideas that had become conscious. It selects what ideas 
to reject or pursue. Thirdly, the prefrontal cortex was responsible for the 
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implementation of the expression of the creative insight by adjusting the action 
planning to inner goals. 
As already described, Dietrich (2004) proceeded from two different processing 
modes, deliberate and spontaneous, which enabled creative insights. In general, one 
assumes that attention is the result of a limited capacity for information processing. 
Mental states, such as a defocused attention or mental absent-mindedness might 
simply be the unavoidable result of constant demands on the attentional system to 
process information selectively. In parallel to the conscious processing an 
unconscious processing seems to take place (e.g. Gazzaniga et al., 1998), 
generating permanently new information combinations, independent of the status of 
attention control. Proceeding from the assumption that the attentional network of the 
prefrontal cortex is the mechanism that selects and limits the conscious content, 
Dietrich postulated (2004):  
“[…] that the main difference between deliberate and spontaneous modes of 
processing is the method used to represent the unconscious novel Information in 
working memory. While deliberate searches for insights are instigated by circuits in 
the prefrontal cortex and thus tend to be structured, rational, and conforming to 
internalized values and belief systems, spontaneous insights occur when the 
attentional system does not actively select the content of consciousness, allowing 
unconscious thoughts that are comparatively more random, unfiltered, and bizarre to 
be represented in working memory” (p. 1016). 
The prefrontal cortex and, in particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex seem to play 
a decisive role in retrieving information from the long-term memory within the 
temporal-, parietal- and occipital cortices (see reviews by Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; 
Hasegawa, Hayashi & Miyashita, 1999). Thereby, the prefrontal cortex had the 
function of a search engine that extracts information from the long-term memory in 
order to represent it temporarily in the buffer of the working memory. This information 
could give rise to new combinations, which would however probably be consistent 
with the foresight and former experiences of the respective individual; this, in turn, 
might have an adverse impact on the problem-solving process. Although the method 
of considered, deliberate processing allowed concentrating the attention on a 
particular problem, it limits the solution area because the possibility of creating new 
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associations is confined to the limited capacity of the working memory. Creativity 
based on spontaneous insight differed from this qualitatively because the initiation 
does not take place in the prefrontal ‘search engine’, subject to qualitative (due to 
existing mental paradigms) as well as quantitative limits (due to the confined 
capacity). In moments of the down-regulation of the attentional system, thoughts 
unlimited by social standards and filters of conventional rationality can manifest 
themselves within the working memory (Dietrich, 2004). In such mental states, 
conscious thinking would be characterized by an unsystematic drifting; furthermore, 
the thought sequences manifested themselves within the consciousness in a 
disordered way; this in turn allowed the emergence of loose associations. The 
assumption would be consistent with the idea that creativity might be a stochastic 
combinatorial process (Simonton, 2003). However, the fact that long-term memories 
are stored in associative networks was not to signify that these thoughts were 
completely irrational and random.  
Consequently, according to Dietrich (2004), a deliberate or spontaneous processing 
mode or both together may determine the consciousness content.  Both of these 
modes can perform computations in both cognitive and emotional structures. See a 
schematic diagram referring to the resulting creativity types in Figure 25. 
 
                         
Figure 25: Illustration of the four basic types of creative insight; each managed by a different neuronal circuit. Creative insights 
can originate by two processing modes, deliberate or spontaneous. These modes can in turn each implement neuronal 
computations in structures contributing to emotional contents or implement a cognitive analysis. The crossing of the two 
processing modes with the information types provides the four basic types of creativity (from Dietrich, 2004, p. 1018). 
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Dietrich (2004) underlined that it is not to be assumed that creative insights would be 
of only one particular type. These four types had rather to be understood as extremes 
of two dimensions, ‘deliberate / spontaneous’ and ‘cognitive / emotional’. Creative 
performances resulted from a mixture of these four essential components. 
The association of “deliberate mode-cognitive structures” meant neuro-anatomically 
that the prefrontal cortex stimulated insights of this type. The frontal attentional 
network was involved in the search for task-relevant information within the structures 
of the temporal-, parietal- and occipital cortex. In turn, these activations were put at 
the disposal of the working memory, so that a manipulation of this information by 
prefrontal circuits, enabling several other higher cognitive functions, could follow. 
Furthermore, it one might assume that the hippocampal formation played a role in 
retrieving information from the memory. As a prototype of this creativity form, Dietrich 
(2004) instanced the methodical approach, which led to the discovery of the DNA 
double helix structure and the systematic approach in Thomas Edison’s inventions. 
The quality of this type of creative insight closely associates with two factors. One 
precondition for this type of creativity is the availability of domain-specific knowledge. 
Expertise play a considerable role. However, expertise alone does not suffice to 
enable creative performances; therefore, the ‘flexibility’ of the prefrontal cortex was 
decisive. This factor would constitute the domain-independent characteristic of 
creativity. 
The frontal attentional network stimulated the combination of the “deliberate mode – 
emotional structures”.  However, it would not look for relevant information within the 
structures of the temporal, parietal and occipital cortex, the attentional resources 
were rather directed to affective memory contents in emotional structures. Although 
the amygdala massively projects into the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the same 
does not apply vice versa (Dietrich, 2004). Therefore, it was improbable that insights 
based on fundamental emotions could be gained deliberately or purposefully. 
However, neuroanatomical limits are not present in the case of insights based on 
complex social emotions, since the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has abundant links 
with both the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the cingulate cortex. A prototypical 
example of this type of creativity is the insight obtained during psychotherapy.  
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During associative unconscious thoughts in turn, the neuro-anatomic origins of the 
combination “spontaneous mode – cognitive structures” would be located in the 
structures of the temporal, parietal and occipital cortices. Based on the periodic 
down-regulation of the frontal attentional system it is possible that such thoughts 
became conscious on behalf of the spontaneous representation in the working 
memory. Since, in general, no apparent effort or intention is associated with these 
intuitive insights, one often describes them as mysterious. Proverbs like “light 
dawned on me” or similar phrases symbolize this state. The stagnation often 
experienced during a problem-solving process, may be solved by dealing with other 
things. During that time, an incubation phase occurs, whereby the solution often 
appears spontaneously in the consciousness. It is plausible that this incubation 
initiates a spontaneous processing mode. The way August Kekulé (1829 – 1896) 
discovered the meaning of the benzene ring may serve as an illustration. He sunk in 
a half dream and suddenly saw the solution to the problem in front of him, namely in 
the form of a snake that bites itself in the tail. This type of creative insight or the 
creative brainwave also depends on the expertise, because only relevant information 
stored in the memory can appear in the working memory during moments of 
defocused attention. 
The link “spontaneous mode – emotional structures” is activated when the neuronal 
activity of structures, processing emotional information, is spontaneously represented 
in the working memory. Since, as already mentioned, the conscious information 
processing is subject to strong confinements regarding time and capacity, one 
assumes that neuronal structures “contend” with one another for access to the 
consciousness. Emotions representing significant biological events send particularly 
“loud” signals. In this respect, it seems hardly surprising that intense emotional 
experiences may evoke a strong desire for creative expression. Artistic expression is 
a prototype of this combination. Dietrich (2004) cited as an example Picasso’s 
“Guernica”. The experience of a sudden awareness of a spontaneously generated 
emotional information could probably evoke a radical effect. This mechanism possibly 
causes revelations, epiphanies and other religious experiences. “While the emotional 
nature of the insight certifies its importance, the unintentional nature of the insight 
adds to the conviction that such experiences must contain “universal truth“, writes the 
author (p. 1020). Since emotions did not require specific knowledge, were these 
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insights, based on emotional processing, not domain specific. However, the 
adequate implementation of these insights may require peculiar abilities. 
Dietrich’s frame theory can contribute to the clarification of the correlation between 
creativity and knowledge. According to her theory, creativity and knowledge activate 
different circuits. While knowledge is primarily stored within structures of the 
temporal, parietal- and occipital cortex, creativity is facilitated by cognitive abilities 
that, in turn, are mainly determined by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Subtle 
modifications in the function of such circuits would probably be responsible for the 
different manifestations of cognitive abilities and talents in the standard population. 
An optimal creative output in a knowledge-based field would thus require 
extraordinarily competent circuits, both within the prefrontal cortex and within the 
temporal-, parietal- and occipital cortex. 
 
A further correlation results from the above-described relation of age and creativity. 
The prefrontal cortex is the part that has developed or is developing the last, in both 
its phylogenetic and ontogenetic functions. In human beings, for example, its 
complete maturity takes approximately until the early twenties. At the same time, it 
seems that prefrontal functions are one of the first to deteriorate in later age (Dietrich, 
2004). For example, the ability of adjusting to changed rules48 declines after mid-life 
in a linear function to the age (Axelrod, Jiron & Henri, 1993). Elderly individuals, 
therefore, seem to be less able to inhibit taught-in rules. They are less independent 
regarding direct stimuli from the environment or memory contents stored in the 
structures of the temporal, parietal and occipital cortex than younger ones. Therefore, 
Dietrich (2004) states, “one would aspect creative achievement to peak in mid-life at 
the height of prefrontal capacity” (p. 1021). Historiometric analyses prove to be 
consistent with this pattern (Simonton, 1999). A further, probably complicating factor 
resulted from the fact that mental states enabling the spontaneous processing mode - 
such as daydreams - are strongly decreasing with increasing age (Singer, 1975). 
“Thus, in addition to perseveration, the deliberate processing mode, which favors 
solutions that tend to be consistent with a person's belief system, becomes the more 
dominant problem solving mode of thought” (p. 1022), the author concluded. 
                                                          
48 Measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
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Dietrich provided a frame theory of creativity that associated the currently prevalent 
understanding regarding the functional neuroanatomical foundations of normative 
information processing with the results of creativity research. In summary, she 
postulated that creativity was the outcome of a factorial combination of four different 
mechanisms. According to her findings, neuronal circuits evoking the generation of 
new combinations can occur during two separate kinds of thoughts (deliberate and 
spontaneous) and two types of information (emotional and cognitive). Independent of 
their origin, neuronal circuits in the prefrontal cortex would be responsible both for the 
process of realizing and evaluating a novelty and for its implementation into creative 
behaviour.  
 
4.5.2 Creativity, hemispheric specialisation and gender specific differences 
 
It has been often postulated that creativity is primarily linked with right hemispheric 
activity. The left hemisphere is generally associated with sequential, verbal and 
analytical processing, the right one with holistic, non-verbal and parallel processing. 
This observation is not to signify, however that only one of each hemisphere was 
active. Most of the time, both hemispheres are interacting, although both can work 
independently from one another. For instance, the interaction is interrupted if the 
corpus callosum in split-brain patients has been split or by a temporary anaesthesia 
of one hemisphere when a barbiturate is injected into the contralateral arteria carotid 
for experimental purposes (Wada-test). Therefore, the latter would be possibly a 
significant method for understanding the pattern of the allocation of cognitive 
performances in the hemispheres, both in artists and in (non-artistic) creative 
individuals. Concluding from the chirality alone to the organizational pattern of both 
brain regions is not sufficient.  In order to determinate the hemispheric dominance, 
one also applies the method of dichotic listening (see further below). 
Among others, Petsche (1996) and Jausovec (2000) researched the 
neuropsychological underpinnings of creativity by means of coherence analyses. In 
this context, they also investigated the issue of the hemisphere specialization.  
The authors described correlations between various EEG-parameters and creativity 
components, examining the data for all possible pairs of electrodes statistically. 
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Weinstein and Graves (2001, 2002) investigated the correlation between hemispheric 
dominance, creativity and schizotypy. They determined the hemispheric dominance 
by a dichotic listening task combined with the signal detection theory. Razumnikova 
(2004) in turn analysed gender specific differences during a divergent brain 
challenge. 
 
Petsche (1996) was able to demonstrate that creative thinking, independent whether 
verbal, visual or musical, is characterised by an increased coherence between 
occipital and front polar electrode positions in relation to the resting-EEG, both ipsi-
and contralateral. His findings proved an increased functional cooperation between 
these two regions.  
In his investigation, Petsche presented the verbal task of creating a short story with 
ten selected and memorized words. In both genders, (10 female, 20 male, all right-
handers), the left hemisphere was more strongly involved. However, verbality is 
clearly located in the left hemisphere in right-handed persons, to which the result of 
the test may probably partly be due. Right temporal regions were also significantly 
involved, more largely in female than male probands and more in the delta band than 
in the theta band.  
The visual task consisted, among other, in creating an imaginative picture. The given 
task, in which 38 probands (half of them female painters) participated, was identical 
to the one in the study by Kaplan (1998; see Section 3.6). In that case, the above-
mentioned increase of coherence between occipital and frontal areas had been 
observed in all frequency bands. 
 
The third task (fulfilled by seven male composers) was to compose a short piece of 
music imaginatively. During its implementation, cooperation between distant brain 
regions (mainly parietal and frontal) in both hemispheres, however asymmetrical, was 
observed. Composing a musical piece evoked a far stronger coherence increase 
than listening to one. 
 
By means of functional magnetic resonance tomography, Zhang, Goel and van den 
Broek (2006) evidenced that activations occur within the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(BA 47) in the generation of creative mental imaginations. The probands were 
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supposed to create meaningful mental imaginations to different statements. They 
were allowed to attribute equal or similar characteristics (e.g. “a flower that is a 
rose“= regular condition) or entirely different characteristics (e.g.  ”a cleaner that is a 
chair“= creative condition) to respective terms. The evoked activation of both 
conditions and the baseline (rest condition) were compared with one another.  The 
creative condition showed, in comparison to the baseline, a strong activation in the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47), in the right medial frontal gyrus and an 
involvement of the occipital cortex. A strong activation of the right superior frontal 
gyrus and the right medial frontal gyrus, as well as an involvement of the occipital 
cortex, could be observed in the regular condition, deducting the baseline.  At the 
comparison of the creative condition with the regular one, the right inferior frontal 
gyrus demonstrated significantly higher activations, also under consideration of 
different reaction times and different conditions. 
 
Razumnikova (2004) investigated gender-specific differences in the activation pattern 
during a divergent brain challenge by means of EEG. A different hemispheric 
organisation could be observed in women and men. The data of 16 cortex electrodes 
of 63 right-handed probands (27 female) were analysed by means of spectral- and 
coherence analysis of the six frequency bands (theta1, 4 – 6 Hz; theta2, 6 – 8 Hz; 
alpha1, 8 – 10 Hz; alpha2, 10 – 13 Hz, beta1, 13 – 20 Hz; beta2, 20 – 30 Hz). 
Razumnikova divided both genders into two sub-groups, depending on whether they 
could master the task (“There are hundreds of poisonous snakes in the zoo. How will 
it be possible to measure the length of each snake? “).  Task-induced differences in 
the EEG-data appeared exclusively within the alpha-1 and beta-2 bands. The 
creative male probands showed a strong increase in the amplitude and 
interhemispheric coherence in the beta-2 band, while the female creative probands 
demonstrated higher local increase regarding the beta-2 band and coherence. 
Furthermore, the creative female probands showed a topographically more extensive 
task-induced desynchronization of the alpha-I-rhythm than the creative male 
probands who exhibited stronger infer-hemispheric coherence.  
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Weinstein and Graves (2002) proceeded from the theoretical assumption that more 
active involvement of the right hemisphere, analysed by dichotic listening49 tasks and 
a lateralised lexical decision task50 in connection with signal detection theory51, would 
cause higher creativity- and schizotypy-values. Based on a previous study (Weinstein 
& Graves, 2001), 60 test persons were presented with several scales for measuring 
creativity and schizotypy as well as with a lateralized lexical decision task and a 
dichotic listening task. For distinguishing the perception performance about stimulus 
sensitivity and response criterion, they applied the signal detection theory. The often 
propagated correlation between creativity, schizotypy and right hemispheric activity 
has already been pointed out in Section 4.4.3. Weinstein & Graves (2001) 
postulated, among other things that the common factor, which could explain 
individual variations of these three variables, might be differences in the semantic 
processing. For example, associations, which are further distant or more global, 
might be favoured, possibly due to a relaxation of the response criterion and the 
subsequent disinhibition of weaker associations.  
According to this assumption, a higher accessibility of more distant or less frequent 
semantic associations may result both in higher creativity values of certain tests 
(such as the Remote Associates Test by Mednick, 1959) and in higher values of a 
positive symptomatic of schizotypy (e.g. magic thinking and unusual perceptual 
experiences). The underlying neuropsychological base would then relate to a pattern 
of cerebral activity, by which the left hemispheric dominance would be relatively 
weakened, and the accessibility to the right hemispheric processing strengthened.  
                                                          
49 In the method of dichotic listening, a proband receives over the headphone simultaneously differing information in each ear. In 
the presented test, consonant-vowel-combinations were performed for 300 ms each. In total 30 dichotic pairs, based on six 
different consonant-vowel-pairs (ba, pa, ga, ta, da, ka) were each presented three times, each time with another visual cue 
stimulus. The cue stimuli were the original consonant-vowel-pairs. The probands were supposed to indicate whether a cue 
stimulus was identical with a perceived acoustic stimulus and if so, on which ear it has been perceived. 
 
50 Regarding the lateralised lexical decision task, the stimulus material consisted of 15 English words with four characters and 
45 meaningless word, also consisting of four characters. Per testing, one word each was presented from the right and from the 
left of the fixation point simultaneously for 150 ms. In one half of the testings, a combination of a real and a meaningless word, 
in the other half of the rounds two meaningless words were shown. Each word appeared both within the right and within the left 
visual field in randomized order. The task consisted in deciding whether a real word was presented right or left or whether no 
real word was presented at all. 
 
51 The signal detection theory by Green & Swets (1966) focuses on the process of the assessment of the presence (hit or 
mistake) or absence (wrong alarm or correct rejection) of a stimulus. From this result two processes of signal detection, on the 
one hand a sensory process that shows the sensitivity of an individual regarding the stimulus strength and on the other hand the 
following decision process (criterion) that provides information about the answer tendency of the each individual, based on a 
combination of the percent values of the hits and the wrong alarms. The presence of a stimulus causes the firing of some 
neurons. The decision would be based, in a certain way, on a comparison of the neuronal activity. An individually determined 
response criterion would be decisive. Depending whether the activation transcends (by a yes) or undercuts (by a no) the 
threshold, a specific answer results.  
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The nature of the individual differences could, therefore, either be neuroanatomical or 
functional, as in the response criterion of the signal detection theory or a combination 
of both. Thus, the results of the previous study (Weinstein & Graves, 2001) indicate 
that individuals with an increased creativity value have a lower response criterion to 
stimuli presented to the left visual field (right hemisphere) than to stimuli presented to 
the right visual field (left hemisphere).  
One might have to assume that the mechanism, which increases the accessibility to 
the right hemispheric processing, is at least partly involved in the decrease of the 
criterion regarding the acceptance of the right hemispheric information. 
 
A meta-analysis of both studies (Weinstein & Graves, 2001, 2002) confirmed a 
correlation between schizotypy and creativity. Although the study from the year 2001 
demonstrated a correlation between schizotypy and laterality, such a correlation did 
not reach statistical significance in the more recent study (Weinstein & Graves, 
2002). However, the meta-analysis demonstrated a significant correlation between 
these two variables again. It was possible to verify the assumption that creativity is 
related to an increased right hemispheric sensitivity or, respectively, to a heightened 
‘attention’ to the hemispheric information. 
 
The results of dichotic listening showed a high correlation between a better right 
hemispheric localization ability (an increased sensory sensitivity when music is 
played to the left ear) and creativity. A general weak answer criterion, independent of 
laterality, showed a significant correlation with increased schizotypy. 
 
Probably due to the degree of difficulty of the dichotic listening task, half of the 
probands had to be excluded because of a too small number of hits regarding the 
localisation of the stimuli. As a result, the sample turned out to be relatively small. A 
dichotic listening task had not been conducted in the previous study (Weinstein & 
Graves, 2001). The answer criterion, analysed by the signal detection theory, proved 
to be an important variable. The correlation between a different laterality in the lexical 
decision task, response criterion and creativity (in the Remote Associates Test) was 
significant in both studies. The meta-analysis of both studies also demonstrated an 
important correlation between criterion and schizotypy. As just described, the test for 
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dichotic listening also showed significant results with regard to the criterion and 
schizotypy. Consequently, these findings imply an important correlation between 
positive symptoms of schizotypy (magical thinking and unusual perceptual 
experiences) and the response criterion, namely regarding different sensory 
modalities (visual and acoustic). Accordingly, the personality variable schizotypy was 
possibly rather connected with functional (strategy) than structural (ability) individual 
differences. The negative symptoms of schizotypy (social anhedonia) did not 
correlate significantly with any of the other variables. It appears therefore that 
individuals with a generally lower response criterion, particularly with a lower criterion 
for right hemispheric processes, exhibit higher positive schizotypy values, which are 
reflected in a stronger tendency to magical thinking, more distinctive unusual 
perceptual experiences and furthermore, in greater creativity of finding further remote 
associations. This lower criterion could now be useful to find actual connections 
between concepts, but it may also lead to wrong causal attributions and hallucinatory 
perceptual experiences. 
 
The authors concluded that individual differences regarding the extent of schizotypy 
and creativity would possibly reflect differences in conscious and attention focused 
processing versus a predisposition to unconscious and defocused processing. The 
cognitive differences would partly be based on a functional reduction of the left 
hemispheric consciousness system. Therefore, one should not speak of a dominance 
of the right hemisphere, but rather of a less pronounced dominance of the left 
hemisphere facilitating the access to unconscious processes.  
 
Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2005) also claim to have observed a connection between 
unconscious processes and increased creative performance in a semantic task. They 
assumed that after the specification of the instruction and a following distraction, 
unconscious processes would occur. The implementation of the task followed in the 
conscious condition, directly after the instruction or after some minutes of time for a 
conscious reflection.  Since unconscious processes are rather associated with right 
hemispheric activity, one might indirectly conclude a stronger access to the right 
hemispheric information. Unconscious processes in turn are attributed to primary 
process-related thinking (see Section 4.4.1). If Kris (1952/1977) proceeded from the 
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assumption that creative individuals can switch easily between primary and 
secondary process-related thinking, it might be reflected in their ability to have a 
stronger access either to the right or left hemispheric information or to both, as a 
respective task demands. Evidence could be gained by studies that analyse different 
stages of a creative process under reversible inactivation of one hemisphere. 
Shemyakina and Dan`ko (2004) examined as described below (see Section 4.5.5), 
differences in the local and spatial EEG-synchronisation during the performance of a 
verbal creative task in connection with induced emotions. The differences regarding a 
complex task versus a simple creative task were caused without emotional induction 
mainly by activations within the medial and posterior temporal regions of both 
hemispheres. On the whole, the distribution of the spatial interactions and the 
strengthening of a large amount of inter-hemispheric functional connections during 
the performance of the creative tasks under emotional induction corresponded to an 
involvement of both hemispheres. 
Both hemispheres are interacting as already mentioned, under normal conditions 
during the majority of higher cognitive functions. The question, whether creativity is 
mainly associated with right hemispheric activity, is yet to be answered. Presumably, 
the task-relevant kind of creative activity will also play a role in this process. In verbal 
creativity tests, a stronger right hemispheric activation is less probable than in 
nonverbal tests because verbal expression is left located in most right-handers. 
Besides, the question arises in which phase of the creative process, does the 
hemispheric dominance play a role, during the inspiration phase or the elaboration 
phase? Martindale, Hines, Mitchell and Covello (1984) pursued this question. They 
were able to observe a higher level of right hemispheric activity, both with regard to 
creative inspiration and creative elaboration. 
 
4.5.3 Activation patterns of differently pronounced creativity degrees 
 
Jasouvec (2000) analysed differences in cognitive processing during problem-
solution processes in the context of creativity and intelligence. By means of EEG, 
coherence- and amplitude dimensions of the lower (8.3 – 10.3 Hz) and upper (10.3 – 
12.3 Hz) alpha band were measured in more and respectively in less intelligent 
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creative individuals. Studies indicate that the lower alpha band is connected with 
attention processes and the upper alpha band with semantic memory processes (see 
Klimesch, 1999). An alpha desynchronization is associated with higher mental 
activity. The allocation of the respective group was conducted with the help of 
intelligence- (WAIS) and creativity tests (Torrance, 1974). The probands (students) 
were subdivided into four groups: the so-called talented group had high intelligence 
and high creativity values; the creative group had high creativity values, but only 
average intelligence values; the so-called intelligent group had high intelligence, but 
only average creativity values; and finally, there was the average group, which 
showed the same values in both tests. One proceeded from the assumption that a 
different level of intelligence and creativity would be reflected in the kind of solutions 
to open and closed problems and eventually in the EEG-pattern. 
Two experiments characterized by various types of problems (well defined or poorly 
defined) were carried out52. Experiment 1 included well-defined problems of different 
complexity, which implied the use of a gradual problem-solving process. The 
complexity was determined by the amount of elements within the problem space. 
Therefore, it was assumed that differences in the EEG-pattern would mainly become 
manifest in relation to intelligence and were less determined by the degree of 
creativity. The probands (N = 49) were divided into respective groups on the basis of 
their test results. The statistical analysis of the behavioural data showed a significant 
group effect regarding the intelligence level and confirmed the above assumption. 
The highly intelligent probands exhibited significantly better values in comparison to 
the average intelligence probands; the degree of creativity had no influence. The 
EEG-patterns reflected the results of the behavioural data, although the effects were 
not equally robust. The differences were primarily determined by the intelligence 
degree. Talented and intelligent individuals had higher alpha-power values53 than the 
average and creative group. The coherence measurements showed for the highly 
intelligent group, in comparison to the average intelligent group, stronger cooperation 
between brain regions, mainly within the right hemisphere. The differences in the 
                                                          
52 In a well-defined problem the initial state, the target state and the allowed operations in order pass from one to the other, are 
clearly explained. In a bad defined problem, in turn, the initial state, target state and / or the necessary operations are not clearly 
determined. The factors initial state, target state as well as the allowed operations define the problem space. 
 
 
 
53 See Footnote 4, p.14. 
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creative group were far less pronounced, but they had a larger amount of couplings 
between brain areas, primarily in the frontal brain areas. 
Experiment 2 focused on creative problem solution. It was assumed that average 
creative probands in comparison to the creative proband group evidenced a lower 
alpha activity. The division of the sample (students, N = 48) was carried out 
according to experiment 1. During the EEG-registration, the probands had to work on 
four tasks of two different problem types. Within the ‘dialectic problem’, both problem- 
and solution space were open. The ‘divergent problem’ in turn had a more defined 
problem space but left the solution possibilities open. It corresponded with the 
divergent brain challenges of creativity tests. The answers had only to be thought of. 
Gifted (highly creative and highly intelligent) and creative individuals had in the lower 
alpha band higher power-values than the average and the intelligent group, whereby 
the talented group had the highest alpha-power-values. Highly significant results 
were also observed for all 19 electrode positions for both kinds of problems. Similar 
results could be recorded for the upper alpha-band. 
Experiment 2 showed about the coherence measurements within the lower alpha-
band, that both of the highly creative groups in comparison to both of the average 
creative groups exhibited, in general, higher inter- and intra-hemispheric cooperation 
between brain areas. During the solution of dialectical problems, the manifestation 
was particularly evident within frontal regions and between frontopolar and parietal, 
temporal as well as occipital areas. The highly intelligent group in turn showed the 
largest amount of decouplings, mainly in the left hemisphere, while the creative group 
presented the most pronounced cooperation of brain areas between the middle 
parietal (Pz) and both frontopolar regions. A similar coherence pattern could be 
registered within the upper alpha-band. In general, the dialectical problems required 
the highest degree of creativity and caused at the same time the highest amount of 
group differences within both alpha-bands. 
In total, Jausovec (2000) could observe that during an EEG-registration, highly 
creative probands showed lower mental activity during the solution of various creative 
tasks than the average creative probands. Similar observations could also be made 
within the highly intelligent group while solving well-defined problems that required 
convergent thinking. As expected, the degree of creativity played only a minor role in 
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that case. This result is again an indication of the fact that intelligence and creativity 
symbolize different abilities, which is also reflected by the neurobiological activity. At 
the same time, in both cases a lower mental activity is connected with a higher 
degree of intelligence or creativity or both. The negative association between 
expertise, ability or intelligence and brain activity at the solution of thematically 
relevant tasks could already be observed several times (e.g. Petsche, Kaplan, von 
Stein & Filz, 1997) and represents in the sense of the neuronal efficiency 54 no 
novelty.  
 
Additionally, the highly creative probands exhibited a stronger cooperation between 
different and also distant brain areas, namely mainly in the lower alpha-band, while in 
the upper alpha-band more decouplings were observed. During the solution of 
divergent problems that required a higher degree of creativity, the highly intelligent 
probands evidenced in turn more decouplings in the lower alpha band as well as 
extended coherences in the upper alpha band, while an intensified decoupling of 
brain areas in the lower alpha-band was registered. Assuming, as already described 
above, that the lower alpha-band correlates with attentional processes and the upper 
alpha-band with semantic memory processes, this could mean, 
“HIQ [high intelligent individuals] solved creative problems more by relying on 
semantic memory processes, whereas creative individuals to a greater extent relied 
on processes related to attention and episodic memory. One might further speculate 
that this could point to more primary processes being less consciously controlled in 
Creative individuals when confronted with ill-defined Problems” (Jausovec, 2000, p. 
234). 
Starting from the premise that an increase in coherence occurs task specifically 
(Petsche, 1996), a higher coherence between far remote cortex areas possibly 
correlates with further remote associations or with a lower association gradient, 
respectively with a wider attention span, which is appropriate for divergent problem 
                                                          
54 The neural efficiency hypothesis by Richard Haier postulated that below-average intelligence is connected with an inefficient 
or incomplete "neural pruning" (neural adjustment). Highly Intelligent individuals require a lower metabolic rate to implement 
cognitive tasks, which is reflected in a reduced blood flow in the respective brain areas and can be measured by fMRI or PET. 
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solving. The task specific, spatially focused activation of highly intelligent individuals, 
which may manifest in higher decouplings, provides in turn an advantage for the 
solution of common convergent brain challenges by a more optimal distribution of the 
attentional resources. 
Carlsson et al. (2000) examined the regional cerebral perfusion by measuring the 
correlation between creativity and hemispherical asymmetry. The probands were 
subdivided into two groups (N = 24) by pre-tests, depending on whether they could 
reach very high or low values in a creative functioning test (= CFT)55. The regional 
cerebral perfusion was measured during a resting phase and three different verbal 
tasks (automatic speech, word fluency and a divergent brain challenge56. 
Regarding the divergent use of objects, the highly creative group demonstrated, in 
relation to the rest condition, an increase of bilateral activations in prefrontal regions, 
while the low creative group exhibited an increase of activations in the left 
hemisphere primarily. However, the comparison between the two groups regarding 
the number of different categories for the use of bricks within the divergent brain 
challenge did not yield any significant findings. This result may be due to the 
instruction, where they asked for both conventional and unconventional purposes of 
use, or it may be caused by the validity of the creativity test. However, the “ideational 
flexibility” of the CFT had been significantly correlated with the divergent brain 
challenge insofar as probands who presented a smaller number of picture 
interpretations within the CFT also offered smaller number of categories regarding 
the use of bricks. The unusual stress inducing experimental situation might have 
been a further reason for the reduced number of creative answers to the divergent 
brain challenge. 
                                                          
55 The Creative Functioning Test = CFT was developed in order to test the visual perception of creative individuals. As stimulus 
a still life was tachistoscopically presented that facilitated manifold interpretations because of its diffuse contours. Within the 
ascending sequence, the same stimulus is presented several times, starting with 0.2 s until 3,62 s, and is then presented 
repeatedly in a temporal descending sequence until it can no longer be recognised as such. It is assumed that highly creative 
probands will continue to provide subjectively formed interpretations within the descending sequence, although the stimulus 
could already completely be perceived within the ascending sequence. Low creative probands, in turn, would rather inhibit 
further subjectively coloured interpretations after recognizing the stimulus or at least not make use of it consciously anymore. 
 
 
56 Within the divergent brain challenge as many as possible uses for bricks were supposed to be found, namely both normal and 
unusual ones. 
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The comparison of the absolute perfusion under all conditions attested consistently 
higher values to the highly creative group than to the less creative one, with particular 
accentuation of the rest condition. Compared to the other three states, the highly 
creative group demonstrated the highest perfusion during the rest condition. This 
phenomenon may be associated with an a priori higher arousal within physiological 
measurements in creative individuals, as, for instance, postulated by Martindale et al. 
(1996) (see also Section 4.4). In contrast, the low creative group showed the lowest 
activity during the rest condition. 
When the average perfusion during the word fluency task was subtracted from the 
average blood flow during the divergent brain challenge, significant results were 
yielded regarding three different compared prefrontal brain areas. 
Within anterior prefrontal areas, the highly creative group exhibited a bilateral 
increase of activation, while the low creative group presented a right side decrease of 
activation and an unchanged activation in the left. In frontotemporal areas, in turn, 
the highly creative probands did not demonstrate any changes bilaterally, but the low 
creative group of probands showed a bilateral decrease of activation, with 
accentuation of the right side. In the highly creative group, superior frontal areas 
revealed an increase of activation in the right hemisphere, but no change in the left 
side, while the low creative group manifested a bilateral decrease of activation. 
Thereby, it was possible to observe that the highly creative group presented bilateral 
increases or an unchanged activation in all three prefrontal areas. The low creative 
group, in turn, predominantly revealed decreases in activation; a consistent activation 
level was only manifest in the left anterior prefrontal region. 
The importance of the frontal lobes for creativity, their executive as well as directive 
functions, were described above in Section 4.5.1 and found support in the related 
study. Carlsson et al. (2000) proceeded from the assumption that verbal tasks, which 
became increasingly complex, would also lead to an increased activation within both 
groups. The groups would only differ from one another in the divergent brain 
challenge. It was assumed that the divergent brain challenge activated creativity-
inherent visual-spatial right hemispherical functions, thereby causing a more 
accentuated bilateral activation in the highly creative group than in the low creative 
group. This was actually observed and proved to be true. 
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However, the pre-selection of the probands and the resulting subdivision in a highly 
creative and a low creative group by specification of the creativity test CFT (see 
Footnote 55, p.158) remains questionable. 
Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether one may thereby validly differentiate 
between various creativity forms. However, this question arises indeed at all creativity 
tests. The CFT certainly does not require a form of creativity that implies a rational or 
analytical approach. 
 
4.5.4 Activation patterns in different cognitive strategies 
 
Divergent thinking is considered as a process underlying creative productivity. Mölle 
et al. (1996) were able to prove by the associated EEG-activity that divergent thinking 
differs from convergent, analytical thinking. An individual instructed to produce as 
many unusual, unique ideas as possible regarding a given topic, will probably try to 
establish new associations between representations (objects or episodes) by 
switching between different thoughts. Proceeding from the assumption that the 
activity of competing neuronal cortical cell complexes results in an increased 
dimensional complexity, a divergent brain challenge was supposed to increase the 
dimensional complexity in comparison to a convergent one. During a convergent 
brain challenge, it is useful to suppress irrelevant information, whereby the 
occurrence of simultaneous activations of cell complexes and thus also the 
competition between them will be reduced. 
The female probands (N = 20) were tested during the mental processing of divergent 
and convergent brain challenges57 as well as during mental relaxation. The 
monitoring took place with the help of 10 scalp electrodes, according to the 10-20-
system of Jasper (1958). The average values of the dimensional complexity were 
determined for the respective conditions and electrodes, and subsequently analysed 
by a variance analysis in repeated measurements. 
                                                          
57 During the divergent brain challenge, a hypothetic situation was determined (e.g.: Because of a new invention, people no 
longer need to eat.) The female probands were supposed to create from this sentence as many as possible unusual 
consequences. The convergent, arithmetical tasks required the use of logical thinking operations. During the mental relaxation, 
the female probands should imagine a relaxing situation (‘sun, beach, sea’). The solutions were written down. The EEG-analysis 
was limited to the thinking periods. 
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The results revealed that divergent thinking in comparison to divergent thinking and 
mental relaxation led to an increased EEG-complexity, which was especially 
pronounced in the central and parietal cortical areas [F(18, 342) = 4.21, p < .001]. 
Over frontal areas, the EEG-complexity during divergent thinking and mental 
relaxation was comparable but reduced during convergent thinking. These findings 
attest to a loosened attention control during creative thinking. The observed general 
increased EEG-complexity during divergent thinking in comparison to convergent 
thinking is supposed to be consistent with the hypothesis that non-linear EEG-
dynamics reflected an essential component of creative thinking characterised by a 
de-structuring of strong mental associative “habits”. Divergent thinking would 
probably require a reconfiguration of neuronal cell complexes within a given network 
of mental representations, thereby causing an expansion of the activation to rarely 
activated cell complexes. Mölle et al. (1996) concluded:  
“Assuming that the associative (habit) strength in these newly activated ranges of the 
neural network is low but comparable for all representations, a spread of excitation is 
expected to result in strong competition among the cell assemblies representing 
these mental representations, and in turn, to result in enhanced complexity of the 
scalp-recorded EEG” (p. 63). 
An additional analysis of the spectral performance testified reduced power-values in 
the delta band (1.0-3.5 Hz) during mental relaxation in comparison to divergent and 
convergent thinking. The power-values within the theta band (3.5—7.0 Hz) over the 
frontal cortex areas were higher during convergent than divergent thinking or mental 
relaxation. The alpha power-values (8.0-12.1 Hz) over the central and parietal 
regions, in turn, were less pronounced during the convergent brain challenge than 
during both other conditions. The power-values of the beta band (14.1-30.1 Hz) were 
highest during the divergent brain challenge, at an average value during the 
convergent task and lowest during mental relaxation. Mölle et al. (1996) failed to give 
possible explanations for these results. They considered the EEG-complexity as a 
more suitable method to differentiate between both brain challenges. 
A PET-study (Bechtereva et al., 2004) demonstrated correlates of verbal creativity in 
the left parietal-temporal areas (Brodmann areas 39 and 40). Two different cognitive 
strategies of creativity were tested. The ‘successive strategy’ was produced by 
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instructing the probands to create a story from a matrix consisting of 16 words from 
different semantic groups.  The presentation time was 90 seconds. A control task 
consisted in presenting words from a single semantic group. It was assumed that a 
higher rate of creativity was required for writing a short story using words from 
different semantic groups. In contrast to the control task, a significantly higher 
activation, occured in the left middle temporal lobe (BA 39). Based on other studies, 
the authors concluded that the Brodmann Area 39 was probably involved in flexible, 
creative thinking and necessary for imagination and fantasy, which are also 
prerequisites for performing creative tasks. 
For the second task (‘insight strategy’), the probands were presented with a matrix of 
12 nouns for 90 seconds. They were supposed to create word chains and to speak 
their logical associations out loud. A word chain could be, for example,”glass, river, 
magnet, time, parquet, book, snow, wax, ceiling, package, woodpecker, armchair. “ It 
could, for instance, be transformed as follows: “glass-reflection-water-river, river-
sand-element- electron-magnet, magnet-attraction-movement-time“, and so on. Pre-
tests were carried out for securing the cognitive strategies. In contrast to the control 
group, significantly higher activations in the left gyrus supramarginalis within the 
parietal lobe occurred (BA 40). The authors assumed that the left gyrus 
supramarginalis is involved in flexible thinking and imagination. In both test series, 
activations in the left medial frontal gyrus (BA 8) were registered. The authors 
interpreted this as an indication that the memory is strongly involved in both tasks.  
By the comparison of both tests, brain areas could be identified that affected the 
execution of creative tasks independently from the applied cognitive strategy. 
A poly-methodological study with a similar test design (‘successive strategy’) had 
already earlier been conducted by the authors (Bechtereva, Dan'ko, Starchenko, 
Pakhomov & Medvedev, 2001). In this study, the regional perfusion of 16 subjects 
had been measured, and an EEG-measurement taken from further 26 subjects in two 
procedures, each with different word groups. The results plead for an interaction of 
both hemispheres. Activations were recorded in both frontal lobes (BA 8-11 and BA 
44-47).  The importance of the coherence between the occipital and frontopolar brain 
areas, as pronounced by Petsche (1996), could not be confirmed by this study to the 
same extent. The interpretation of the EEG-results regarding the topography of the 
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activations is only insufficiently feasible due to the small number of testings, 
respectively probands, and the concurrent inhomogeneity of the group. 
The ‘insight strategy’ had previously also been tested by the authors with the use of a 
similar test design (Starchenko et al., 2002). Sequential words of a chain had to be 
connected with associative nouns and to be spoken out loud. Nine probands were 
tested by means of PET. In association with the creative process, activations in the 
left gyrus supramarginalis (BA 40) and the left cingulate gyrus (BA 32) had been 
registered. The observed activation of the Brodmann Area 40 could be verified by the 
above study (Bechtereva et al., 2004). 
 
4.5.5 Creativity and the effect of emotions 
 
Shemyakina and Dan’ko (2004) investigated the effect of induced positive or 
negative emotional states58 on the EEG-correlates of verbally creative processes. 
The authors postulated that the quality of the emotional background would change 
the functional state of the brain and that these changes would be reflected in the 
EEG within the activation pattern. Within a specified time frame, the probands (N = 
15) had to create as many original definitions as possible of presented emotionally 
coloured or neutral terms. Two-word pairs were presented within three testings that 
differed regarding complexity, emotional value, and one control condition. The test 
persons performed the tasks merely mentally, with their eyes open. 
The test task O consisted of a complex, creative, emotionally neutral task. The word 
pairs ‘essence — sand’ and ‘pedestal — foil’ were presented. The probands were 
supposed to create logically coherent definitions of the first word, as many and as 
creative as possible, with additional use of the second word. The definitions had to 
differ semantically59. The test task P (complex, creative, emotionally positively 
                                                          
58 The induction of the emotions was carried out by two methods: on one hand externally by the task of defining emotionally 
expressive terms, and, on the other hand, internally by asking the probands to maintain their individual emotional attitude to  the 
presented term. 
 
59 An example of the complex, creative, emotionally neutral test task O regarding the word pair ”essence - sand“: 
a) The essence is those few grains of sand that remain in the palm (possibly, adhere to it) when one takes a handful of sand on 
a beach and the greater part of it pours trough the fingers when the fist is unclenched. 
b) The essence is a thought. In intelligent creatures from other planets, it may exist in the form of grains of sand in the head. To 
activate their mental activity, these creatures must walk on their hands, and then a thought in the form of sand grains, as if 
passing through a sieve, pours into the real world and "materializes" (Shemyakina & Dan`ko, 2004, p. 146). 
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coloured) involved the word pairs ‘love – groats’ and ‘kiss – hat’. The test task N 
(complex, creative, emotionally negatively coloured), in turn, included the word pairs 
‘death – paste’ and ‘exile – ore’. The task requirements of the conditions P and N 
were similar to those of the condition O. However, the probands were supposed to 
consider their individual emotional feelings regarding the first word of each word pair 
in P and N. This emotional state should be maintained during the entire task 
processing. The control condition C consisted in a simple, creative, emotionally 
neutral task with word pairs originating from the same or similar semantic group 
(‘splinter – firewood’; ‘chest [of drawers] – linen’). The control task was supposed to 
evoke a slightly creative process because the association of two words from the 
same or a similar semantic family mostly does not raise any particular problems. 
Regarding the tasks P and N, the probands were asked, among other, for the value 
and the duration of the subjective emotional experience, the depth of the emotions 
and their effect on the performance (inhibiting or stimulating). 
By means of 19 scalp electrodes, the average power-values per electrode position 
were computed as an index of the local synchronisation. The correlations of all 
possible electrode pairs were calculated as an index of the spatial synchronization 
(coherence). A Within-Subjects-Design was carried out so that the probands were 
exposed to all conditions. The significance of the average values was tested by 
means of variance analyses. The contrasts were calculated for the combinations PN, 
PO, NO and OC. 
Significant differences regarding the local power-values manifested mainly in the 
temporal electrode positions at the comparison of contrary emotions (in tasks P and 
N), or respectively at the comparison of positive versus neutral emotions (in tasks P 
and O). Significantly higher average power-values could be mainly observed in the 
complex, creative, emotionally positive tasks P in the electrode positions T3, T4 and 
T6 (contrast PN) as well as in F7, T3 and T6 (contrast PO). The comparison of the 
emotionally neutral, complex and creative and the emotionally likewise neutral but 
simple creative task (contrast OC) resulted in significant differences in the electrode 
positions C3, T3 and T6. 
The coherence analyses (see Figure 26) evidenced the most pronounced differences 
in the comparison of the complex and simple creative tasks (contrast OC). During the 
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complex creative, but emotionally neutral task a generalised increase in both intra- 
and inter-hemispheric functional communication became manifest.  The increases in 
the medial temporal and parietal electrode positions (T4 and P4) of the right 
hemisphere and within the posterior temporal electrode position (T5) of the left 
hemisphere were particularly distinct. 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Significant coherence differences during the performance of creative tasks with or without emotional induction 
regarding the contrasts PN, NO, PO and OC. A solid line shows a coherence increase; a pointed line shows a coherence 
decrease during the first task in comparison to the second one within the contrast. The strongest line is p < .0001; the thinnest 
line is .01 < p < .05. O: complex, creative, emotionally neutral; P: complex, creative, emotional positive; N: complex, creative, 
emotionally negative; C: simple, creative, and emotionally neutral (from: Shemyakina & Dan'ko, p. 148). 
 
The emotionally positive creative task in comparison to the emotionally neutral one 
(contrast PO), showed a more pronounced coherence between the frontal areas of 
both hemispheres and the left posterior temporal areas (at Fp1-T5; Fp2-T5; F3-T5 
und F4-T5) as well as between the posterior temporal and occipital cortex areas of 
the left and right hemisphere T5-02 and T6-01). In addition, coherence decreases 
manifested within this contrast, mainly in the medial temporal positions T3 and T4. 
An emotionally negative background in turn (contrast NO) caused in the intra- and 
interhemispheric frontooccipital (Fp1-O1, Fp1-02, F4-01 and F4-02) and 
frontotemporal areas (F7-T6 und F8-T5) increased functional coherences between 
far remote electrode positions. Furthermore, interhemispheric interactions became 
visible which involved the medial temporal area of the left hemisphere (T3- F4, T3-01 
und T3-02). Besides, the coherence within the left hemisphere between frontal and 
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temporal areas (F3-T3, F7-T5, F3-T5 and T3-T5) increased. In contrast to task P 
(contrast PO), task N (contrast NO) could be associated with a significant coherence 
increase in all temporal electrode positions of both hemispheres. Coherence 
decreases were less represented and less pronounced. 
Independent of the quality of the emotions, an increase in coherences appeared 
during the induction of emotions at creative tasks. The increases involved mainly the 
temporal and frontal cortex areas of both hemispheres. The performances during 
both positive and negative emotional tasks (contrast PO and NO) led additionally to a 
significant increase of intrahemispheric functional connections between F3 – T5 and 
F4 – 02. Such a manifestation could not be observed during the creative task 
(contrast OC) nor at the comparison of both emotional tasks (contrast PN). 
Consequently, the induced emotions were apparently able to modify and affect the 
EEG correlates of the creative activity. For instance, the coherence increases 
between Fp1-T5 and Fp2- T5, which could be observed during the complex creative 
task (contrast OC), were additionally strengthened by the induction of positive 
emotions (PO). The coherence increases between T3 – F3 and T5 – F8 within the 
contrast OC were in turn heightened by the induction of negative emotions (contrast 
NO). 
Finally, the contrast PN was characterized by the generation of new functional 
connections, which had not been significant in the other contrasts. For example, 
intra-hemispherically enhanced interactions were observed between the positions 
Fp2-T6, Fp2-P4, F4-Pz, F4-P4, and F8-Pz as well as between Fp1-P4 and F7-P4. At 
the same time, coherent decreases occurred between T3-C3 and Fp1-T6. The EEG 
of the creative, emotionally positive task P showed in comparison to the creative, 
emotionally negative task N a rather higher number of intra- and interhemispheric 
coherence increases of far remote positions. Characteristical for both tasks, however, 
was an increase within the frontal, temporal and posterior cortical areas of the two 
hemispheres (Fp2-T6; Fp2-T5 and Fp2-P4 in task P and Fp1-T3, Fp1-O1 and Fp2-T3 
in task N). 
In an interview, most probands rated the complex creative, but emotionally neutral 
test task O as the most difficult. The pronounced coherence increase during this task, 
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in comparison to the simple, creative control condition C, may be associated with 
their rating, if one proceeds from the assumption that a correlation exists between the 
degree of coherence and difficulty of a task (see Section 4.5). 
The reason given for the perceived difficulty was that emotional terms (in contrast to 
neutral ones) facilitated the generation of creative definitions by evoking lively, 
associative visual imaginations. The latter might have been a reason for the 
increased couplings between various cortical areas and the occipital and posterior 
temporal areas of both hemispheres in the contrasts PO and NO. According to 
Shemyakina and Dan’ko (2004), this observation correlated with the modulation of 
imagination and memory by emotions and with the activation of visual cortical cortex 
areas during the mental reproduction of visual objects. According to the statements of 
the probands, the construction of original definitions in connection with emotionally 
neutral terms required substantial mental effort. The strategy, they applied in this 
case, was creating a mental associative logical chain by defining one term by 
another. Thereby, a visual picture appeared only later, as the result of a search 
activity and not spontaneously and sudden as in the case of the emotional induction. 
According to the authors, this finding suggested 
 “[…] that the significant differences in EEG SS [spatial synchronization] involving the 
posterior cortical areas of both hemispheres reflect a specific influence of the induced 
emotions on the task performance by subjects“ (p. 148).  
Furthermore, the probands found it difficult to determine precisely, which kind of 
emotion (positive or negative) appeared faster and was maintained longer. 
The topography of the increasing functional connections during the complex, 
creative, emotional neutral task O in comparison with the simple, creative task C 
would, in turn, indicate the involvement of both hemispheres during a complex 
creative process. This finding would be “inconsistent with the common idea of the 
high dominance of the right hemisphere in creative processes" (Shemyakina & 
Dan'ko, 2004, p. 148). In a comparison of both tasks O and C, which differ regarding 
complexity, the most outstanding differences during the complex task were observed 
in the prefrontal, left posterior temporal, right temporal and right medial temporal 
lobes. Since cortical functional connections converged during imaginative thinking in 
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the parieto-temporal and during abstract thinking in frontal points, the authors 
concluded that the observed involvement of both the parietio-temporal and frontal 
areas during the complex, creative task, ”probably confirms again the significance of 
the intensification of different types of thinking during solving a Creative task" (p. 
149). 
In summary, Shemyakina and Dan’ko (2004) could prove that the additional induction 
of emotions during creative activity generated significant increases or decreases in 
the functional couplings or, respectively, measurable new couplings. The induced 
emotions changed the significant interactions observed within the contrast OC by 
approximately a third. The negative emotions increased the couplings between 
particular brain areas, while the positive emotions generated new couplings, which 
caused both an increase and a decrease of spatial interactions. 
Only the connections F3 – T5 and F4 – O2 were equally influenced by positive and 
negative emotions.  Left temporal areas, mainly the position T3, seemed to play a 
significant role during creative performances under the condition of emotional 
induction. This area functioned as a convergence centre of heightened spatial 
interactions within the contrasts NO and PN, which represent the effect of a negative 
emotional background. An increase of local synchronisation appeared particularly 
pronounced in this area, namely within the contrasts PN and PO, which means in 
connection with induced positive emotions. Altogether both hemispheres seemed to 
be involved, since a large number of interhemispheric functional connections could 
be observed as well.  
The reports of the probands demonstrated, as already mentioned, that emotions as 
reactions to emotional terms appeared quickly and initially increased the occurrence 
of associations regarding the terms during the tasks P and N. At the same time, the 
emotions seemed to inhibit the transfer of one emotionally justified idea to another. 
Therefore, the optimizing effect of an emotional background (positive or negative) 
consisted in an increased speed of the association occurrence and the total sum of 
definitions (fluency). However, the inhibitory effect led to a reduced originality of 
definitions. (In general, various variants were produced on the basis of one idea.) 
“Generation of vivid emotional images and spontaneous emotional associations 
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impeded the transition to a search for a new idea“, concluded Shemyakina and 
Dan'ko (2004, p. 150). 
A problem in the study by Shemyakina and Dan’ko (2004) is the small number of 
probands (N = 15, 8 female) of both genders and additionally, the small number of 
testings (see Section 1.9.1). For the method of the coherence analysis applies as 
already discussed above, that due to a missing conduct of source localization the 
source of the cortical activation is only inaccurately determined. Although the 
research approach to observing the effect of induced emotions on the cortical activity 
during the performance of creative tasks seems interesting, it would be desirable to 
apply different methods, possibly imaging procedures. Furthermore, it would be worth 
thinking about expanding this research approach to other forms of creativity. About 
the actual creative output of the probands is only known so far that the induction of 
emotions, independent of their quality, positively affects the fluency of the 
productions, but rather inhibits the originality of the output. A creative verbal brain 
challenge was presented, but this does not necessarily secure an efficient, creative 
output. Possibly, the testing of two proband groups could be revealing. They would 
have to be divided into highly creative and low creative individuals by means of pre-
testing through implementing tasks similar to the actual test tasks. It can be assumed 
that the level of difficulty will determine a part of the results in this case. An extremely 
creative group familiar with such tasks would presumably yield different results under 
the induction of emotions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
In the context of the research objectives described in Chapter 1, the question of a 
validation of the two models presented in Chapter 2, namely the model of aesthetic 
experience by Leder et al. (2004) and the model of visual aesthetics by Chatterjee 
(2003), shall be further analysed here.  
In this analysis, the core studies presented in Section 3.4 and, if needed, further 
related studies will be taken into account.  
Vartanian and Nadal (2007) pose the fundamental question of the usefulness of the 
model of experience by Leder et al. (2004) for biological approaches. So far, the 
model had been considered to be formulated on a psychological level (Nadal et al., 
2007). According to Nadal et al., (2007) the model seemed inappropriate to form 
specific hypotheses about brain activities that can be brought into connection with the 
stages of the model. 
Vartanian and Nadal (2007) provided however three reasons why the model of 
aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004) could also be considered as valuable in 
the context of neuroimaging studies: 
• The model integrates cognition and emotion in terms of an aesthetic response; at 
the same time current neuroscience has just made remarkable progress in the 
dissociating of the "neural pathways belonging to those nodes of information 
processing" (Vartanian & Nadal, 2007, p. 435) 
• The authors also assume that despite intensive neuroscientific research, only little 
is known about the neural networks correlating with the different stages of this model. 
This provides an opportunity to test various involvements by means of specific 
hypotheses for each of these levels with regard to the ‘aesthetic response’ . 
• Finally, according to Vartanian and Nadal (2007), this model contains time limits for 
its individual stages, which means that one level has to be completed before a new 
processing can take place. 
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According to Vartanian and Nadal (2007), especially this latter aspect has particular 
importance in the context of neuroimaging studies. About the ‘temporal constraints’ 
the authors point out the following: 
"This can be a valuable tool in neuroimaging because one can conduct time-course 
and functional analysis to see whether the time course of activation corresponding to 
various structures occur in structures with the predictions of the model" (p. 435). 
The neuroimaging studies presented in Section 3.4, and other similar ones are 
primarily designed for designating the cortical correlates of aesthetic experience. 
Vartanian and Nadal (2007) have nevertheless tried to evidence the correctness of 
the model of aesthetic experience by the aforementioned study results and similar 
ones. In addition to the studies listed in Section 3.4, they also resorted to 
neuroimaging studies by Jacobsen et al., (2006), and Skov, Christensen, Rowe and 
Paulsen (2005). 
The studies by Cela-Conde et al. (2004), Kawabata and Zeki (2004), and Vartanian 
and Goel (2004) illuminated differences in brain activation during the evaluation of 
stimuli as ‘beautiful’ and ‘not beautiful’. Jacobsen et al. (2006) compared the whole 
aesthetic decision-making process with a different decision, namely the symmetry. 
Accordingly, the research results of Cela-Conde et al. (2004), Kawabata and Zeki 
(2004), and Vartanian and Goel (2004) relate to the neural correlates that were 
evoked by stimuli assessed as ‘beautiful’ compared with the neural correlates that 
were elicited by stimuli determined as 'ugly' (Vartanian & Nadal, 2007). In addition, it 
should be noted at this point that the results by Jacobson (2006) therefore relate to 
the neural correlates of the assessment process as such. 
Jacobsen et al. (2006) instructed the subjects in their study to judge geometric fabrics 
in the first task according to their symmetry and in the second task the same fabric 
for its aesthetic effect. If one refers this approach to the model of aesthetic 
experience by Leder et al. (2004), one may ascertain that an assessment according 
to symmetry is made in the first stage, in the course of perceptual analysis. The 
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aesthetic judgement, however, takes place on the fifth level of the procedural 
assessment. 
Jacobsen et al. (2006, as cited in Vartanian & Nadal, 2007) argue 'that the contrast 
between aesthetic and symmetry tests would reveal the brain areas that are involved 
in aesthetic judgment, in relation to symmetry judgment' (p. 436). 
Vartanian and Nadal (2007) refer to the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. 
(2004) according to which "the activation pattern that reflects aesthetic judgment 
must differ from the pattern that reflects symmetry judgment” (p.436). By the research 
results of Jacobsen et al. (2006), the authors consider the aforementioned 
hypothesis as proven. However, Vartanian and Nadal (2007) emphasize that further 
research would be required for eventually comparing the individual stages of 
“successive information processing” to possibly correlating cortical structures in order 
to allocate these to the model by Leder et al. (2004). 
Moreover, Vartanian and Nadal (2007) explore the question of what the study results 
by Vartanian and Goel (2004) reveal about the model of aesthetic experience by 
Leder et al. (2004).  
In this context, they remind us that the “information processing stream“ runs parallel 
to an “affective evaluation stream“ and that the former continuously receives 
information from the latter.  
In relation to the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004), this means for 
a recipient that he can evaluate the artwork at any time according to the information-
processing sequence, that means without having reached a certain level of the 
information processing.  Vartanian and Nadal (2007) remarked to the above 
question, that according to a first possibility the research results by Vartanian and 
Goel (2004) would confirm the cortical and subcortical structures that cause a 
continuous affective assessment.  
Furthermore, those areas would thereby be designated, which were also expected to 
react at any time when issuing a positive favour judgement. According to the authors, 
another possibility is that the judgements of the recipients in the study by Vartanian 
and Goel (2004) would express the aesthetic emotion, which, according to the model 
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of aesthetic experience, could only occur after an evaluative stage. An additional 
study, which required the assessment at a particular time, could shed light on this 
dissent. 
The next point, which needs a further discussion is, to what extent the research 
results by Skov et al. (2005) and Kawabata and Zeki (2004) may contribute to a 
validation of the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004). Because the 
study by Skov et al. (2005) was not presented in Section 3.4, but could make a 
significant contribution to the clarification of the abovementioned question, it should 
be outlined here shortly. 
Skov et al. (2005) presented to their subjects stimuli from the international affective 
picture system. In this system, stimuli are categorized in emotionally positive, 
negative, and neutral stimuli. As in the study by Kawabata and Zeki (2004), the 
subjects should judge the stimuli as ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’ or ‘neutral’ . The fMRI generated 
results showed that  by stimuli assessed as beautiful, in contrast by those assessed 
as ‘ugly’, far-scattered circuits such as occipital, parietal and frontal lobes were 
activated (Vartanian & Nadal, 2007; Nadal, 2013). At stimuli, which were categorized 
by the international affective picture system as emotionally negative, but were 
assessed as ‘beautiful’, a slightly different network became apparent consisting of 
occipital, temporal and the frontal lobes, and especially of the bilateral frontal cortex 
(Vartanian & Nadal, 2007; Vartanian, 2013). 
Despite methodical differences,  Kawabati and Zeki (2004), and Skov et al. (2005) 
tried to detect such brain regions that become more activated than others by stimuli 
assessed as ‘beautiful’. Vartanian and Nadal (2007) postulate: 
"According to the model of aesthetic experience, evaluation of beauty tap aesthetic 
judgment. Thus its computation can only occur following processing all five stages of 
the model, culminated by evaluation"(p. 438). 
This statement can be interpreted in such a way that the "Continuous Affective 
Evaluation" observed in the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004) 
cannot be seen in connection with the activation of the frontal orbital cortex. One may 
rather assume that certain affective units of beauty are generated in the same.  In 
line with research results by Kringelbach (2005) and Kringelbach and Rolls (2004), 
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Vartanian and Nadal (2007) mentioned in connection with the previously described 
also the involvement of the orbital frontal cortex in "complex reward interactions 
hedonic and emotion interactions" (p. 438). 
Finally, also the study by Cela-Conde et al. (2004) should be investigated as to what 
extent it may contribute to validating the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. 
(2004).  According to this study, especially the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
activated in the assessment of stimuli considered as ‘beautiful’ (see Section 3.4). 
Likewise, its involvement in the decision-making process has already been 
highlighted (see Section 3.4). In their attempt to validate the model of aesthetic 
experience by Leder et al. (2004) by the research results of Cela-Conde et al. (2004), 
Vartanian and Nadal (2007) refer to the fact that no correlation was recorded during 
the activation of early latencies and stimuli judged as ‘beautiful’. This assumption as 
well as the results of previous similar studies cause Vartanian & Nadal (2007) to 
postulate that  
“ ’Cela-Conde and colleagues' (2004) reflect the neural correlates of the cognitive 
stages posited in the model of aesthetic experience. It is during these stages that the 
success of the cognitive mastering in producing satisfactory understanding is 
monitored” (p. 439).  
Furthermore, Vartanian and Nadal (2007) emphasize the role of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex at the monitoring and initiation of top-down processes. 
In the context of the study by Cela-Conde et al. (2004), the authors also point to the 
occurrence of response latencies in less than two seconds in most subjects. 
In accordance with this, they regard one of the fundamental assumptions of the 
research by Leder et al. (2004; described earlier in Section 2.3) as confirmed, namely 
that the anticipation "judgments may have relied heavily on affect-based heuristics" is 
reasonable (Leder et al., 2004, as cited in Vartanian & Nadal, 2007, p.439). 
Eventually, Vartanian and Nadal (2007) conclude that the left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in the model of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004) plays a role both in 
the "evaluation phase, the initiation of feedback loops" and the "interaction of 
between cognitive and affective states" (p. 439). 
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The next point further to be clarified refers to the validation of the model of visual 
aesthetic by Cahatterjee (2003). As already stated in Section 3.4, an attempt will be 
made to explain to what extent the designated model can be verified despite or 
exactly on behalf of the differing research results presented in Section 3.4. First, one 
has to investigate the reasons for these differences despite similar research 
questions. 
The most noticeable difference of the studies listed in Section 3.4 lies in the diversity 
of the applied neuroimaging techniques. While Kawabata and Zeki (2004) and 
Vartanian and Goel  (2004) conducted their studies using event-related functional 
magnetic resonance (fMRI), Cela-Conde et al. (2004) used 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) as neuroimaging technique. While the workings of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have already been introduced in 
Section 1.9.2, it should be added here concerning magnetoencephalography (MEG), 
that by this neuroimaging technique magnetic fields are measured, which are 
generated by excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials in the dendrites of 
pyramidal neurons (Lounasmaa, Hämäläinen, Hari & Salmelin, 1991; Maestú et al., 
2005). 
Most striking and probably more significant in the context of the differing research 
results are the varying temporal and spatial resolutions, which in turn "require 
different exposure times to the stimuli and interstimuli intervals" (Nadal, 2007). 
The experimental designs are also different. While Kawabata and Zeki used a 3-
points scale (beautiful, ugly, neutral) in connection with the assessment of preference 
judgment, Cela-Conde et al. (2004) used a dichotomous scale (beautiful, not 
beautiful) and Vartanian and Goel (2004) even a 5-point scale. 
With regard to the gender composition of the experimental group, one has to mention 
that 5 women and 5 men participated in the study by Kawabati and Zeki (2004), 
whereas 8 women and 2 men participated in the study by Cela-Conde et al. (2004) 
and 10 women and 2 men in the study by Vartanian and Goel (2004). Many studies 
have pointed out the importance of gender differences in the context of studies on 
aesthetic preferences  (Eysenck & Castle, 1971; Furnham & Walker, 2001; Polzella, 
2001). Moreover, gender differences exist in relation to neural correlates of various 
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cognitive  (Bell, Willson, Wilman, Dave & Silverstone, 2006; Boghi et al., 2006) and 
affective tasks (Azim, Mobbs, Jo, Menon & Rice, 2005; Mackiewicz, Sarinopoulos, 
Campbell & Nitschke, 2006; Piefke, Weiss, Markowitsch & Fink, 2005). 
A difference not to be neglected is the composition of the stimulus material. For 
example, portraits as stimuli were only used in the study by Kawabata and Zeki 
(2004). The use of non-artistic stimuli in the study by Cela-Conde et al. (2004) was 
also unique. Vartanian and Goel (2004) used two modified versions of each image in 
addition to the original version of the image. Referring to the research by Bernard 
(1972), Cela-Conde Marty, Munar, Nadal & Burges (2002), Furnham and Walker 
(2001), Hekkert and Wieringen, (1996a, 1996b), Johnson and Knapp (1963), 
Lindauer (1990), Neperud (1986), and Winston and Cupchik (1992), Nadal et al. 
(2007) annotate:  "There is an extensive literature showing differences in the 
aesthetic preference for visual stimuli according to their degree of abstraction, artistic 
qualities and modification" (p. 387).  
Finally, it should be noted that there were also fundamental differences between the 
three studies regarding the curriculum. In contrast to the two other studies, only 
Kawabata and Zeki (2004) were concerned to select stimuli in a pre-selection 
procedure. Cela-Conde et al. (2002), and Nadal, Marty & Munar (2006) refer, in this 
context, to unintended recognition processes which were measured during the brain 
activity of the participants in the context of the confrontation with study related tasks, 
which in turn revealed a relation to mnemonic processes and aesthetic judgement. 
A further fact that may have led to different outcomes of research in the context of 
aesthetic preference for visual stimuli, is the influence of various psychophysical 
variables such as luminance, contrast or predominant wavelength or complexity, 
novelty or prototypicality (Berlyne, 1970; Martindale & Moore, 1988). The effect of 
some of these variables on aesthetic preference for visual stimuli has also been 
shown in the context of studies dealing with neural correlates of visual processes 
(Müller, Lutzenberger, Preißl, Pulvermüller & Birbaumer, 2003; Sasaki, Vanduffel, 
Knutsen, Tyler & Tootel, 2005). As already described in Section 3.4, Cela-Conde et 
al. (2004) have homogenized the stimuli in their study regarding complexity, novelty, 
colour spectrum and luminance, and resolution and size. Neither Vartanian and Goel 
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(2004) nor Kawabata and Zeki (2004) has reported on such a procedure. Therefore, 
one may ask the question whether these variables were controlled. 
Based on the follow-up study by Nadal et al. (2007), one can investigate the issue of 
whether the model of visual aesthetic is verifiable by the three aforementioned 
studies. For a better understanding, the model of visual aesthetics by Chatterjee 
(2003) will be briefly outlined. Chatterjee (2003) developed the concept of visual 
aesthetics based on the cognitive neuroscience of vision. After confronting an 
observer with a visual stimulus, the model proposes an early visual processing stage 
(i.e. processing colour, brightness, shape, movement and location), followed by a 
middle stage of visual processing (i.e. the grouping of these characteristics). These 
stages are combined with attention and figurative representations (e.g. locations and 
faces), followed by an emotional response, and finally by the decision. 
In their follow-up study, Nadal et al. (2007) present empirical results about 
Chatterjee´s (2004) model by comparing it with three different fMRI studies (i.e., Cela 
-Conde et al, 2004; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004). Three 
components of Chatterjee's (2003) model of visual aesthetics are identified in the 
three fMRI studies: first, the process of the early visual processing stage; secondly, 
the emotional reaction and, thirdly, the decision. 
The early visual processing stage can be allocated to the occipital cortex, the most 
significant brain area for seeing (Vartanian & Goel, 2004). Emotional reactions 
become apparent in the representation of the reward value and awareness of the 
emotional state (Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004). Nadal et al. (2007) 
argued that the cortical part of the reward value of aesthetically rated stimuli 
corresponds to the activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Particularly noteworthy is 
that visual stimuli are evaluated as beautiful, if these were associated with a higher 
reward value in the brain of the participant than the stimuli assessed as ugly 
(Kawabata & Zeki, 2004). In addition, the subcortical part of the reward value was 
identified in the nucleus caudate by Vartanian and Goel (2004). Moreover, Nadal et 
al. (2007) argued that an increased activation of the motor cortex might reflect a 
meaning for the reward at ugly stimuli or the motoric readiness highlighted by them 
(Kawabata & Zeki, 2004). 
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Vartanian & Goel (2004) identified the subjective emotional experience associated 
with the aesthetically preferred stimuli in the anterior cingulate cortex; the decision 
component of Chatterjee´s (2003) model of visual aesthetics was verified in the work 
of Cela-Conde (2004). Nadal et al. (2007), however, conceded that it was not 
possible to determine whether the identified brain activity in the left dorsolateral 
cortex reflected decisions based on perceptual information or information of reward 
value.  
In summary, one may conclude that the empirical underpinning of the model of visual 
aesthetics of Chatterjee (2003) by Nadal et al. (2007) conveys a comprehensive 
overview of the potential mechanisms that play a role in the confrontation with 
aesthetic stimuli. 
Although these insights into the visual processes and processes relevant to decision 
making in the brain are interesting, the results about the emotional reactions seem to 
be the most significant for the current research. These findings suggest that a reward 
(i.e. the desire for an aesthetic product) is essential in triggering aesthetic 
preferences, ratings, and subsequent decisions (Leder et al., 2004; Zeki, 1999). 
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Chapter 6 
 
DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE 
 
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have made significant contributions in 
recent in recent years to clarify the neurobiological basis of the art experience. The 
experience of art can be considered as a complex of perceptual, cognitive and 
emotional experiences. From the scientific evidence, one can clearly deny the 
question whether there exists a brain centre responsible for processing the aesthetic 
experience (Cela-Conde et al., 2004). 
Instead, art and aesthetic experience rather arises in the context of the interaction of 
widely ramified cortical and subcortical networks. Already Zeki and Bartels (1999, as 
cited in Cela-Conde et al., 2004) have pointed out about the visual system:  
 "Anatomical evidence shows that there is no single area to which all of the 
specialized visual areas connect, which would enable it to act as an integrator 
capable of bindings signals coming from all of the different visual systems" (p. 6324). 
One may add that none of the cortical and subcortical brain areas is designed to 
respond exclusively to aesthetic experience. 
Besides the neural basis for common creative processes, artistic actions involve 
many specific neural processes. The different visual processing routes and 
association areas of the occipital, parietal, and temporal cortex are necessary for the 
visual imagination. Planning and action control involves the prefrontal areas. Motoric 
performance requires the motoric areas, basal ganglia and cerebellum (Changeux, 
1994). Also, the models of aesthetic experience by Leder et al. (2004) and of visual 
aesthetics by Chatterjee (2003; see chapter 2 and 5) both support the theory of a 
network of different brain areas for visual aesthetic experience with coexisting 
emotional reward systems. 
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Thus, Gardener (1982) is right in assuming there does not exist any single 
specialised brain area for artistic skills. However, his assumption that artistic creation 
always requires a fully functioning brain could not be confirmed in recent years. To 
the contrary, as the lesion studies have shown (see Section 3.7.2.4) artistic abilities 
are preserved despite severe neurodegenerative diseases.  
In the introductory section, the question arose whether and how these lesion studies 
(see Section 3.7) may contribute to clarifying the aesthetic experience.  
Their findings prove that neurological processes underlying aesthetic experience are 
a widely ramified and nonspecific network of various brain areas. This system seems 
also to be responsible for the first occurrence, development or preservation of artistic 
abilities (see Section 3.7.2.4). 
Due to the aforementioned broadness of this network and the correlating possibilities 
to compensate or shift, could artistic skills resist against at least complete failure. 
Likewise, a change in the artistic style or an artistic primary manifestation in the 
context of a neurodegenerative disease may, in fact, be explained by that shift of 
neuronal activity to non-degenerated brain areas.  
As mentioned in Section 3.7, neural injury and neurodegenerative diseases result in 
certain constraints and changes in artistic style. Therefore, works by artists with right-
sided brain damage partly display distinct distortions in their spatial organization 
(Zaidel, 2005; Bäzner & Hennerici, 2007). However, pronounced artistic abilities can 
be retained even up to late stages of severe neurodegenerative diseases, such as 
Alzheimer (Fornazzi, 2005) or Parkinson (Chatterjee et al., 2006). 
Ranking et al. (2007) reported in the context of investigations on patients with 
Alzheimer disease and frontotemporal dementia that in Alzheimer patients a 
simplified composition and a subdued colour palette could be determined, whereas 
patients with frontotemporal dementia preserved the ability to copy by drawing. They 
explained this phenomenon by the fact that posterior structures had been spared in 
latter patients. Viskontas and Miller (2007, as cited in Miller & Miller, 2013, p. 100) 
assume that "patients with frontotemporal dementia develop focal cognitive and 
behavioural deficits, with sparing of function of unaffected brain regions". 
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The neuropathological constraints sometimes lead indeed to a greater expression of 
the non-affected aspects of artistic creativity (Chatterjee, 2004, 2006). In individual 
cases of neurodegenerative diseases (Miller et al., 1998; Miller & Hou, 2004) or of 
brain damages caused by intracerebral haemorrhage (Lythgoe, Kalmus, De Haan & 
Khean Chong, 2005), profound artistic skills may even appear for the first time, 
although the patients had previously dealt little or not at all with art. Stylistically, the 
works created thus are more realistic or surrealistic than symbolic or abstract-
oriented (Miller et al., 1998).  
Particularly damages in the orbitofrontal and left hemispheric brain area seem to 
favour a sudden occurrence of artistic activity. This phenomenon is interpreted as 
disinhibition, particularly of the right half of the brain. If dominant rational and detail 
related processes are damaged, then the remaining structures can unfold even better 
(Méndez, 2004; Pollak, Mulvenna & Lithgoe, 2007). 
In the context of a study in which creative achievements of people with 
frontotemporal dementia were investigated, De Souza et al. (2010) reported a 
decrease in creative accomplishments. At the same time, the authors also reported a 
periodically observed increase of creativity in such patients. More critically to look at 
are, however, studies such as those by Halpern and O´Connor (2013) or Halpern, 
Elkin, Frankston & O ´Connor (2008), which report on an unchanged art experience 
in patients with Alzheimer disease and frontotemporal dementia. A comparison with a 
control group is missing here. Chatterjee remarks to the question of to what extent 
lesion studies contribute to the understanding of the neurobiological processes of the 
art experience: "Studies of people with brain damage can also advance our 
understanding of the perception and experience of art" (p. 394). 
According to the author, this is because: 
"Investigations of patients with brain damage have contributed greatly to our 
understanding of cognitive and affective systems. This approach also has substantial 
promise in advancing neuroaesthetics. By contrast, while damage to brain certainly 
impair the ability to produce art, paradoxically, in some cases art abilities seems to 
improve […] The paradoxical improvements offer unique insight into the creative 
underpinnings of artistic output" (Chatterjee, 2011, p.393-394).  
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Zaidel (2005, as cited in Miller & Miller, 2013) remarks on a possible investigative 
isolation of a brain centre for aesthetic experience in the context of lesion studies: 
"Overall, the study of the impact of neurological disorders on the art experience 
argues against the existence of specialized brain mechanism underlying the 
experience of art" (p.140). 
In summary, one may state that neuroimaging studies prove that art processing 
involves three functional groupings of brain activity. These are also an integral part of 
models by Chatterjee (2003) and Leder et al. (2004). Nadal (2013) explains in this 
context: 
"Appreciating art engages processes related to perception (attentional enhancement 
of the analysis of certain features), cognition (evaluative judgment, attention, and 
retrieval of information from memory), and affect (generation of pleasant feelings, 
emotions, representations and anticipation of reward, and awareness of one´s 
affective state. These processes are performed in parallel, they are highly 
interrelated, and they rely heavily on information feedback, making it impossible to 
describe any meaningful sequence of events" (p. 152).  
In Chapter 5, the different results of the studies presented in Section 3.4 in the 
context of the verification of the model of aesthetic experience by Leder (2004) and 
the model of visual aesthetics by Chatterjee (2003) have already been mentioned.  
Subsequently, a further critical appraisal will follow here. 
As already mentioned, the investigations by Kawabata and Zeki (2004), Cela-Conde 
et al. (2004), and Vartanian and Goel (2004) were, despite similar research 
questions, carried out methodically different, which may be the reason for their 
differing results. Cela-Conde used a different methodological approach and 
measured the activity using magnetoencephalography (MEG) while the two other 
research groups evaluated metabolism activities by means of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Kawabata and Zeki made use of a pre-test, in which the 
subjects classified the images beforehand. The effect may have been that an 
additional recognition process took place before the second classification, whose 
activity was additionally measurable. Further studies also demonstrate that 
psychophysical variables, such as brightness, complexity and contrasts of the 
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presented images, may have an impact on the aesthetic perception. In two of the 
three studies, no information was found whether these confounding variables had 
been controlled. Because of such differences, no adequate control can be 
guaranteed, and one cannot infer from the activity, which cognitive partial processes 
are involved and whether all related aesthetic decision processes were measured. 
Overall, the results must not be seen as contradictory but as completing one another. 
The judgement about aesthetics is overall a very complex, multimodal cognitive 
process. Different cognitive operations take place in various areas of the brain at 
different times and must eventually be integrated with one another. Due to the 
differing experimental designs, the individual working groups may have filtered out 
only parts of the processes and therefore prognosed distinct participating areas. In a 
decision and categorization of images different processes connected with each other 
take place, starting from the pure visual processing in the visual cortex or the 
influence of memories and emotions that a picture produces. 
Some more aspects should therefore extend the previously presented experimental 
designs. For example, in order to determine whether the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is involved in the decision-making and classification, subjects should just 
contemplate, but not classify pictures. In this case, no decision-making process takes 
place, and therefore, it can be assumed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is only 
active in decision processes.  In addition, confounding variables such as brightness 
and contrast of the artworks have to be standardised for the study. Factors such as 
gender, emotional content, accurate description of the task are to be recorded and 
incorporated into the evaluation. 
The results of imaging processes are however always only usable if the components 
of the cognitive performance are known and can be examined in isolation, or if the 
function of an individual brain area is known, in order to determine whether this area 
is involved in a particular task. Within the still young research field of neuroaesthetics, 
the components of the aesthetic experience are not precisely known, and the 
involved areas not yet detected. Therefore, it is not yet possible to derive adequate 
hypotheses and information from the data, and the so-called reverse inference 
problem remains a major problem within the imaging procedures. Within an 
experiment, a certain task causes activity in certain brain areas. From the activity, 
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one can however not infer to a particular cognitive performance. The quality of this 
inverse derivation depends on the selectivity of the brain area. If a certain brain 
region is active at many different performances, only a weak evidence arises. If, 
however, the region is only active for a particular task, it is more likely to assume that 
this performance also takes place in this area. 
Philosophers, art theoreticians and art historians exercise fundamental criticism on 
neuroaesthetics. For them, art is a fundamental cultural construction, the subject of a 
contextual variation, historical changes and criticism.  
Liberal arts acknowledge the way in which art displays adaptive flexibility in the 
context of its various culture-specific roles at different time epochs (Davis, 2012). 
According to liberal artists, the methodology of interpreting artworks 
neuroaesthetically and deducting from this interpretation the neural textures of their 
creator, is just one of the numerous ways to functionalize art, and is, in this respect, 
an aberration. Leonardo da Vinci's terse statement that "every painter paints himself" 
may serve as an example. It is just as much in need of an interpretation as is the 
missing distinction between image - and perception-specific aspects of the image 
effect and the lack of differentiation between a production- and an effect-aesthetics 
(Davis, 2012). Some humanists go as far as to say that art would be in principle not 
accessible to scientific or neurobiological questions (Massey, 2009). 
Fenner (1992) responds to this fundamental criticism by emphasising that some of 
the issues posed by philosophers are not applicable to psychology or neuroscience. 
As an example, he mentions the question, "what is art?" or "how is art to be defined?" 
You cannot address neuroscientists and psychologists with such issues that you 
would rather address to philosophers or theorists of art. In this sense, it is not right to 
judge neuroscientific approaches to art according to the extent they would fit 
philosophical issues of the same context.  
However, the psychological and neuroscientific research must allow to be asked, 
whether it does not neglect the influence of the context of art and its significance for 
the art. Thus, neuroimaging studies need such highly controlled settings that can only 
with great difficulty be experimentally manipulated. In order to take this problem into 
consideration, Kirk, Skov, Christensen & Nygaard (2009) introduced semantic 
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contexts with verbal and visual clues in their investigation of the aesthetic experience. 
These instructions are designed in such a way that ‘gallery’ labels or ‘computer’ 
labels are used to implicate a mental association between stimuli and the 
environment of an art gallery or computer software for test subjects. In this context, it 
should be once again referred to the model of experience by Leder et al. (2004), 
which emphasizes the role of such information and knowledge, and includes their 
role as integrative components of the model of the experience of art. 
Finally, it should be added that neuroaesthetics is a young emerging branch of 
research and a field where there is tension between art and science. This research 
domain is sure to shed light on our understanding of the neurobiology of human 
hedonic experience. It does so by applying aesthetic stimuli and the resulting neural 
mechanisms. As demonstrated in this dissertation, lesion studies may contribute as 
well to the understanding of the nature of art experience. 
It remains the task of a future, and more comprehensive, analysis to explore the role 
of art style and expertise in depth by referring again to the two presented models of 
perception. In this future research, special attention shall be paid to the interaction 
between cognitive and affective processes.  
A controversy which remains a significant, but unresolved question is whether 
neuroscience should remain limited to the research of the biological basis of 
aesthetic experience or if this approach could make a significant contribution to the 
understanding of artistic activities.  
A further fundamental question arises in the context of the interdisciplinary 
embedding of neuroaesthetics in the triads consisting of the evolutionary aesthetics, 
enactivism and cognitive psychology, neurophenomenology and aesthetics. 
Moreover, a detailed list would be required of neurodegenerative diseases reflected 
in the art. Such a list would allow investigating whether certain regularly recurring 
form elements in works of art reflect neurodegenerative diseases. Could it thus also 
become at least partially possible to diagnose neurodegenerative disorders by 
means of such patterns?  
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Chapter 4 dealt with several factors associated with the neuroaesthetic focus of this 
paper, the main approaches in creativity research, where again the neurobiological 
foundations dominated. The fundamental question, whether neuroscience is able to 
explain creativity cannot clearly be answered. In a certain sense, the answer is "yes". 
Since human mental states are fundamentally based on neurobiological processes, 
creative processes are also based on neural processes - and therefore creativity 
within a narrower, psychological meaning can be explained by the neurosciences in 
principle. In a different sense, however, the answer is "no", because the concept of 
creativity is not a purely individual-psychological one. In general, it is not only defined 
by the way an > X < (an idea, a theory, a piece of art or a product) is produced, but 
also and essentially by the fact whether the >X < receives social recognition - a 
process that does not primarily fall within the competence of the neurosciences. 
In the narrower psychological sense, creativity is often understood as a staged 
process, which proceeds, however, not strictly chronologically, but is overlapping, 
that means it runs recursively and comprises, as a rule, the following steps: 
preparation, incubation, (sudden) insight and implementation. From a neurobiological 
perspective, the first and the last level are of less interest than are especially the 
second and third: What neurobiological explanations exist for the fact that the 
process of incubation develops apparently unconsciously and that a focused, 
conscious engagement with a problem often impedes creativity? Can neuroscience 
explain to us, how insight or problem solution are achieved in the creative process? 
Although a general neurobiological theory of creativity does not yet exist, the first 
framework for such a theoretical framework was presented (2004) by Dietrich (see 
Section 4.4.1). Similar to the research results summarized in Section 3.4 "type 
preference and neural mechanisms", the prefrontal cortex is in Dietrich's framework 
theory of central importance. Similar also to the research results on the neural 
correlates of the art experience, the prefrontal cortex plays a significant role but one 
cannot designate it as the seat of creativity. It is embedded in a widespread network 
of different brain areas. 
Chapter 4 included primarily a clarification about fundamental issues of (neuro-
biological) creativity research such as, for example, the generation of original ideas. 
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A further specification with respect to the biological and neural underpinnings of 
creativity in the arts should be addressed in a more detailed work. 
Section 3.7 included the topic of how and whether any neurodegenerative processes 
may lead to a change of artistic creation or even occasionally induce first artistic 
manifestations, such as in the literature described. By the identification of the 
respective degenerated area, for example, conclusions could be drawn on its 
involvement in artistic creation. 
About the neurobiological research on creativity, the question arises after the 
clarification of the relationship between the degeneration of various brain areas and 
the emergence of new creative impulses. This issue could also be analysed in an 
additional research work. 
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